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ABSTRACT

THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THAILAND

Aaron Micah Johnson, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Kheang Un, Director
Since 2000, Thailand’s judiciaries have decided the fate of polls, politicians, political
parties and policies. Such frequent incursions into uncharted political waters signals a tide of
new and largely opaque activities that scholars refer to as “the judicialization of politics.” This
dissertation provides an account of the judicialization of Thai politics through an examination of
the Administrative Court of Thailand. It focuses on the particular actions of both judges and
plaintiffs as necessary to explain the phenomenon. In addition, this study attempts to examine the
effects of the judicialization of Thai politics upon not only the immediate parties involved in
disputes but also expands beyond to cover larger political, social and economic questions.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DE KALB, ILLINOIS

MAY 2016

THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THAILAND

BY
Aaron Micah Johnson
©2016 Aaron Micah Johnson

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Doctoral Director:
Kheang Un

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I dedicate this dissertation to my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. I want to thank my family
and friends for supporting me and encouraging me to finish. There are so many people who have
helped me over the years that it would be an additional dissertation to mention them all. I would
like to thank my Committee Chair, Dr. Kheang Un, for his support, patience in reading drafts,
and sense of humor. I want to thank Dr. Allen Hicken and Dr. Mitch Pickerill for their patience,
useful comments, and encouragement. I want to thank Dr. John Hartmann for assisting my return
to DeKalb and for providing an environment of friendship and much-needed support. Finally, I
want to express my sincerest appreciation to the Department of Political Science and Center for
Southeast Asian Studies for financial assistance and encouragement throughout my tenure as a
student.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. vi
LIST OF FIGURES ...............................................................................................................viii
Chapter
1. ENTER THE COURTS ............................................................................................. 1
The Judicialization of Politics: Approaches and Aversions ...................................... 7
More Politicalization than the Judicialization of Politics: Current Approaches,
Narrow Questions and Predictable Explanations .......................................................13
Significance of the Study ...........................................................................................18
Key Research Questions ............................................................................................21
Dissertation Outline ...................................................................................................22
2. JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................25
Defining the Judicialization of Politics ......................................................................26
The Judicialization of Politics: Key Explanations of Empowerment ........................35
Understanding the Judicialization of Politics through the Administrative
Court of Thailand: Towards a Framework.................................................................50
The Judicialization of Thai Politics: Calls for the Administrative Court ..................55
Conclusion .................................................................................................................57
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...............................................................................58
Conceptual Overview.................................................................................................59
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................69

iv
Chapter .......................................................................................................................Page
Methodology and Data ............................................................................................... 7
Methodology and Data Shortcomings ....................................................................... 76
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THAILAND:
ORIGIN, PROCESS AND SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................. 78
Prelude to the Court: Justice and the Struggle to Establish
the Administrative Court ............................................................................................. 79
The Administrative Court: Key Actors, Jurisdiction, and Powers .............................. 93
Plaintiffs and Judges: Powers and Privileges ..............................................................106
Activating the Administrative Court: Process .............................................................118
Judicial Independence: Institutional Arrangements ....................................................122
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................127
5. FROM INDIVIDUALS TO PLAINTIFFS ................................................................129
Why Did They Sue the State? Contending Explanations ..........................................130
Why They Sue: Perceptions of Elected and Unelected Institutions ..........................132
In Their Own Words: Former Administrative Court Plaintiffs .................................152
Judicialization and the Questions of Its Effects .........................................................161
Conclusion .................................................................................................................162
6. STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS: JUDGES AS KINGS AND SERVANTS ............163
Calculated Decisions: The Court-centric Approach ..................................................164
Section One: Who Are the Administrative Court Judges? ........................................171
Section Two: Factors Impacting Decision-making....................................................176
Section Three: Judges’ Perceptions ...........................................................................184
Section Four: Impact on Politicians ...........................................................................193

v
Chapter

Page

Conclusion .................................................................................................................196
7. CURIOUS COURT CASES AND POLITICAL PERMEATIONS ..........................198
Case Studies: Insight and Importance ........................................................................199
The Beginning of the End: The Electricity-Generating
Authority of Thailand (Case Number 5/2549, 2006) .................................................201
Going Green: The People v. The Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate
(Court order 592/2009) ..............................................................................................221
Bad Bosses and Significant Losses: Thawil Bpleensri v.
Yingluck Shinawatra (Court of First Instance decision: 847/2556)
Supreme Administrative Court decision: 33/2557) ...................................................232
Conclusion .................................................................................................................237
8. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................243
The Judicialization of Thai Politics: Future Research and Recommendations..........254
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................256

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Overall Number of Administrative Court Cases Accepted from 2001-2013 .................... 3
2. 2013 Cases Accepted by the Supreme Administrative Court:
2001-2013 By Category and Year .............................................................................100
3. 2013 Cases Adjudicated by the Supreme Administrative Court:
2001-2013 By Category and Year ............................................................................101
4. Current Regional Administrative Courts of First Instance and Corresponding
Jurisdictions Structure................................................................................................102
5. Central (Bangkok) Administrative Courts of First Instance and
Corresponding Provinces within its Jurisdictions ......................................................103
6. Futuristic Composition of Regional Administrative Courts of First Instance and
Corresponding Provinces within its Jurisdictions .......................................................103
7. Total Number of Consultations by Year and Type ............................................................110
8. Office of Case Enforcement Statistics Based on the Accused Parties 2001-2013 ...........117
9. KPI: Public Perceptions of Trust in Public Institutions .....................................................134
10. 2010-11 Global Corruption Barometer Perceptions of Corruption in
Public Institutions ............................................................................................................137
11. Global Corruption Barometer: Perceptions of government effectiveness
of address corruption.......................................................................................................139
12. Perceptions of Corruption in Public Institutions ..............................................................141
13. Global Corruption Barometer: Public perceptions of the Government’s Efforts
to Fight Corruption .........................................................................................................142
14. Asia Foundation 2009 Perceptions of Integrity of Institutions ........................................143

vii
Table

Page

15. Asia Foundation 2009 Perceptions of Politicization of Institutions ................................ 144
16. Asia Foundation 2010 Perceptions of Institutional Integrity ........................................... 145
17,. Asia Foundation 2010 Perceptions of Politicization of Institutions ............................... 146
18. 2007 World Values Study: Confidence in Government .................................................. 147
19. 2002 Asian Barometer Thais Perception of Trust in Institutions .................................... 149
20. Asian Barometer 2006 Thais Perception of Trust in Institutions .................................... 150
21. Number of Consultations Requested Since the Court’s
Inception up until December 2013 ................................................................................... 154
22. Level of Education for All Administrative Court Judges ................................................ 172
23. Courts of First Instance Judges Interviewed Total Number and Percentage ................... 174
24. Total Distribution of Court of First Instance Cases Based on Region and
the Number of Provinces within its Jurisdiction from 2001-2013 ................................... 175
25. Percentage of Current Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand Interviewed ............ 176
26. The Thailand 2005 National Election Result ................................................................... 204
27. The 2006 National Election Result .................................................................................. 219
28. The 2007 National Election Result .................................................................................. 227

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Hierarchical structure of the Administrative Court ...........................................................104
2. Hierarchical structure of the Administrative Court of First Instance ................................107
3. Chart...................................................................................................................................121
4. Thai perceptions of corruption in public institutions .........................................................138
5. Perceptions of effectiveness addressing corruption ...........................................................140
6. Perceptions of corruption in public institutions .................................................................141
7. 2007 World Values Foundation confidence in government ..............................................144

CHAPTER 1
ENTER THE COURTS
“Could there be the judicialization of politics in the Administrative Court? Yes, it is very likely.
But I don’t see this as necessarily a ‘bad’ thing.”
-Former President of the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand1

Since 2000, Thailand’s judiciary has decided the fate of polls, politicians, political parties
and policies.2 Such frequent incursions into uncharted political waters has signaled a tide of new
and largely opaque activities that scholars refer to as “the judicialization of politics” or “the
reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy
questions, and political controversies.”3 The judiciary is a new actor that has entered into the
already messy fray called Thai politics. This dissertation provides an account of the
judicialization of Thai political activities by focusing on judges and plaintiffs. In addition, this
study attempts to examine the effects of the judicialization of Thai politics on not only to the
immediate parties involved in disputes but also expands beyond to cover larger political, social
and economic questions. This study focuses exclusively on the Administrative Court of Thailand,
which is a cover term for both the nine regional Courts of First Instance and the Supreme

1

Interview on July 3, 2012.
This dissertation choses as its point of departure the 2000 Constitutional Court decision that found former Democratic Party
Executive, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Sanan Kachornprasart guilty and banned for five year for failing to
declare his assets. While Thailand has many courts, this dissertation specifically refers to the Court of Justice, Constitutional
Court and the Administrative Court. Nonetheless, the study is fully cognizant of the literature on lèse-majesté, a phenomenon,
which, also is increasing in frequency and involves the judiciary, namely the Supreme Court of Justice. Much like the
Constitutional Court annulled the results from the 2006 election, the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand ruled an
injunction against a re-run in districts that had failed to achieve the 2007 Constitutionally-required 20 percent voter turnout.
3 Ran Hischl. The Judicialization of Politics in, Caldiera, Gregory A., Kelemen, R. Daniel. and Whittington, Keith E. (2008; 723)
The Oxford Handbook on Law and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hirschl’s definition refers to three processes: “(1)
the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules, and procedures into the political sphere and policy making forums and processes; (2)
judicialization of public policy-making through “ordinary” administrative and judicial review; and (3) the judicialization of “pure
politics”—the transfer to the courts of mater of an outright political nature and significance including core regime legitimacy and
collective identity questions that define (and often divide) whole polities.”
2

2
Administrative Court centered in Bangkok. While existing studies on the Thai judiciary’s
activities overlook this particular court system and choose instead to regard the more visible
Constitutional Court of Thailand, a more nuanced examination reveals the Administrative Court
of Thailand’s merits. Ginsburg (2009, 94-95) underscores this fact when he remarks, “Although
given less attention worldwide, the availability of judicial review of administrative action is in
some sense more important than constitutional review, in that most citizens encounter the state in
simple interactions that do not raise constitutional issues. [E]ven more than the Constitutional
Court, the Administrative Court has played a major role in structuring citizen-state relations
since 1997 and is becoming an important arena.”
Indeed, Ginsburg’s assertion proves prophetic when witnessing recent developments in
Thai politics and justifies the call that serious attention be given to the Administrative Courts
and, by understanding its activities, a deeper understanding of judicialization can also be
achieved. Due to its emphasis on official administrative acts, the Administrative Courts’
jurisdiction includes important political, economic, and social questions. Moreover the calendar
of the Administrative Court’s activity is impressive and at the very least alone warrants further
inquiry. Since its establishment as stipulated in the 1997 Constitution and its official opening in
2001, up until 2013, the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Court have accepted nearly
100,000 cases. Table 1 illustrates the steady rise of cases each year for both the Bangkokcentered Supreme Administrative Court and the regional Courts of First Instance between 2001-

3
2013.1 Finally, since 2005 Thai politics has been characterized by frequent cycles of violence,
breakdowns of democratic rule, and disappointing authoritarian responses.

Table 1
Overall Number of Administrative Court Cases Accepted from 2001-2013
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

Supreme Administrative
Court
384
963
1262
1434
1809
1994
1929
1998
2027
2273
2352
3150
3345
24920

Administrative Courts of First
Instance
5311
4256
4249
3620
4349
5075
4958
4254
5250
4607
5915
8482
9675
70001

Total
5695
5219
5511
5054
6158
7069
6887
6252
7277
6880
8267
11632
13020
94921

Source: 2013 Annual Statistics for Administrative Court Cases. Office of the Administrative Court of Thailand.

After the September 19, 2006 military coup d’etat removed popular but mercurial Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the interim military-appointed government then orchestrated the
drafting of a new 2007 Constitution that was approved in a controversial public referendum. One
striking consequence of the 2007 constitution was the strengthening of the judiciary and granting

1

To be clear, there is one Supreme Administrative Court but multiple Administrative Courts of First Instance. The Supreme
Administrative Court is essentially a court of appeals. This should not be confused with Thailand’s Supreme Court of Justice
which primarily adjudicates criminal cases. Cases involving official administrative acts are under the purview of the
Administrative Courts. Chapter 4 will elaborate on questions of jurisdiction.

4
it a position of greater political prominence. As Harding and Leyland (2011, 166) observe, “The
enormous faith placed in the Thai judiciary to decide crucial issues was identified by some critics
as the ‘dominant theme’ of the 2007 Constitution.”2 A key reason for this newfound faith in the
judiciary was the performances of the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as, the Supreme
Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court of Thailand immediately prior to and after the coup.
In fact, the expanded role of the judiciary represents a trend in Thailand whereby other nonelected institutions possess considerable prerogatives compared to their elected counterparts.
The Administrative Court has been one of the few institutions to be given greater political
responsibilities. The 2007 Constitution established a seven-member Senate Selection Committee
responsible for appointing members of a dual appointed Senate3—one of the members is a
Supreme Administrative Court judge (s 112).4 The President of the Supreme Administrative
Court is now a member of the Constitutional Court Selection Committee responsible for
appointing judges. Although the most recent coup occurred in May 2014, it is likely that the
trend of according greater significance and responsibility to non-elected institutions will likely
continue for the foreseeable future. The divisions within Thai politics and society that were
crystallized during the height of the Thaksin government remain unchanged—making attempts
to re-run democratic elections too costly for his opponents, thus setting the stage for a coup. The
Administrative Courts were once again instrumental in providing the necessary pretexts for the
most recent military coup in May 2014 by ruling that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s

See: ‘Judicial Role in the Constitution: From People’s Charter to Judges Charter,’ The Nation, April 30, 2007.
Half parliament-appointed and half elected by the populace.
4 The previous 1997 Constitution established a fully elected Senate.
2
3

5
cabinet decisions to transfer a career civil servant was procedurally-illegal. The Constitutional
Court then used the former court’s ruling to claim that the transfer was based on corruption.
Until recently, most discussions on Thai politics paid little attention to including the
judiciary as a relevant actor responsible for effecting political outcomes. Pasuk and Baker (2009,
275) aptly capture this by writing, “In the past the judiciary had played a minimal role in Thai
politics. In the great passion for constitutional reform during the 1990s, the judiciary scarcely
figured. Politicians rarely seemed worried by the prospect of judicial reckoning. No prime
minister has ever been found guilty of malpractice while in office, and only one minister had
been jailed for corruption in recent years.” Indeed the judiciary’s inertia was the consequence of
a constellation of factors.
First, as part of King Chulalongkorn’s (Rama V) Chakkri Reformation that included
widespread reforms to modernize the country and keep it free from colonial rule, the creation of
the Ministry of Justice in 1892 began to introduce justice reforms.5 Prior to that, there was no
position of judge, as the administration of justice was an ancillary function of Department Heads
in Bangkok and Provincial governors. Neither positions were independent of the crown.6 This
changed with the passage of the 1908 Law on the Organization of the Courts, which removed
justice administration from the departments to six courts, five of which were now placed in the
Ministry of Justice. The sixth, the Supreme Court, was directly under the authority of the King.
Because of the latter, judges’ privileged status elevated them from criticism and, ultimately,

5

For an excellent review of the development of the modern justice system see Vella (1955), Thai Bar Association, (1967) and
Darling (1970).
6 Neither department heads or governors were particularly interested in entertaining autonomy given the prestige that proximity
to the throne offered.
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accountability. The overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 by a group of civilian and
military officers ushered in experimentations with parliamentary democracy. However, after a
series of coups and countercoups, the military established its political supremacy after 1946.
Despite episodic flirtations with parliamentary rule along the way, the judiciary remained
uninvolved with the larger politics of the day until the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution.
Second, the courts previously lacked institutional powers necessary for judicialization.
For instance, neither its jurisdiction nor the safeguards in appointment and removal afforded the
independence necessary to incentivize the entertainment of political questions. Judicial review
did not exist and, given the long succession of military dictatorships, any attempt thereof would
invite further weakening. With particular respect to the Administrative Court, despite nearly a
century of disappointments in efforts to create it, the institution did not exist until 2001. Only
shortly after the 1997 Constitution’s creation of the Constitutional Court did it and the
Administrative Court (both intended to be independent of political influence) enjoy real space to
contribute to the judicial life of the nation in a meaningful way.
However, the mere establishment of the new institutions, while important, is a necessary
but insufficient explanation for their subsequent performance. What explains the judiciary’s
ascendency towards the political? Specifically, what factors explain the Administrative Court’s
activity? Activity entails the decisions that the court has made in cases brought before it. How do
judges make decisions? In recognition of the old adage—“without plaintiffs, judges have no
cases to decide”—what factors explain individuals’ decision to use the court? Finally, to what
extent does the Administrative Court’s decisions affect politics, economics and society? This

7
dissertation attempts to answer these enjoined questions by uncovering legal and political
complexities of historical importance, as well as to explain associated implications.
In order to answer such pressing questions, this study investigates the context within
which Administrative Court judges and former plaintiffs maneuver. In order to assess the court’s
larger political impact, this study also includes the perspectives of politicians and high-ranking
bureaucrats. It assesses the extent to which the court impacts how bureaucrats perform their
duties (in implementing policy) and likewise how politicians create policies. Seeking to ensure a
geographically-comprehensive perspective of the court’s impact between 2011-2014, this study
interviewed judges from the Courts of First Instance throughout the country’s four main regions:
Central, North, Northeast, and South. The study also includes interviews with Supreme
Administrative Court judges.
The Judicialization of Politics: Approaches and Aversions
Earlier literature examining the judicialization of politics focused almost everywhere in
the world but Asia—save a selected few. This neglect was intentional (albeit confusing) as the
late C. Neal Tate (1994, 464), reflecting on the phenomenon’s potential occurrence in the nondemocratic countries of Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Brunei, concluded, “It
appears that the judicialization of politics is likely to occur mostly, if not only, in regimes that
have adopted the institutions and norms of liberal democracy and that have accepted the
principle of judicial independence.”7 As a result, until recently, nearly all of the cases and the
analytical perspectives were derived from liberal democracies, a bias which resulted in the

7

Interestingly Ginsburg and Moustafa (2005) note an important but (conveniently) overlooked irony that much like authoritarian
leaders even in democracies, the judicialization of politics can be caused by elites overriding elected institutions. As a result they
find that the previous neglect of authoritarian regimes from such analyses is unnecessary.
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exclusion of most countries that failed to achieve membership in such an exclusive group. A
consequence of such a limited scope of countries led to Dressel’s (2012,12) sober analysis that
“current theoretical models of judicialization are transferred only with difficulty to the Asian
context.” This dissertation addresses the lack of a full understanding of the Thai context when it
comes to judicialization of politics.
The majority of pre-existing approaches explaining judicialization focuses primarily on
sources that empower the courts. To simplify, these accounts posit the following factors:
individuals, institutions, ideas and macro-structure. Individual approaches present judicialization
as the result of agency. Such action(s) are largely based on strategic calculus. Both Ginsburg
(2003) and Ramseyer (1994) present political elites’ motivation for empowering courts based on
their anticipation of greater electoral competition advantage. Cognizant of the potential loss of
power motivates threatened leaders to empower the judiciary in order to “lock-in” policy
prerogatives or prevent unfair retaliation by winners. Relatedly, another strategic model that
Hirschl (2006; 2008b) coins “hegemonic preservation” refers to elites, who as they become
exposed to competition, decide to “lock-in” their prerogatives by appointing a loyal judiciary
able to negate any potential threats from an electorate.
Included in individual-based approaches, is the presentation of judges as political actors.
From these accounts, judges too maneuver to increase the court’s power relative to other actors
and institutions. Their decisions, based on various motivations, are strategically-derived. For
example, Ferejohn’s (2002) “separation of powers” model presents judges’ strategic behavior
stimulated from several exogenous factors beginning with a gridlocked executive and legislature
unable to resist and or punish them.

9
Approaches explaining judicialization through a strict emphasis upon institutions locate
such empowerment at either the domestic and/or supranational level. For example, domestic
courts are active in political arenas directly or indirectly through membership in supranational
bodies like the United Nations and World Trade Organization and the European Union. A
precondition of membership usually requires that domestic governments adopt laws and
principles that empower the judiciary to serve as a key guarantor of fundamental rights. In some
countries, this may not have occurred save such requirements. Institutionalist approaches, that
are domestic in origin, present judicialization as a consequence of existing political and legal
structures that provide the necessary institutional “infrastructure.” These are usually
constitutionally enshrined and involve the separation of powers or some form of checks and
balances, in addition to, a legal document clearly articulating the judiciary’s functions. In this
sense, courts engage in the political arena because they possess and utilize the institutional
powers conferred upon them to do so.
Proponents of ideational factors present judicialization as a wave of a larger global rule of
law movement that includes the establishment and appropriateness of the judiciary as arbiter of
political questions. The provision of judicial review and court’s de facto and de jure
independence has remained an indicator of respectability. In fact, some analyses like Woods and
Hilbink (2009) go further by arguing that irrespective of regime type or the degree to which they
possess institutional independence, whether judges actually intervene is rooted in their
willingness to do so—itself a consequence of larger historical and cultural contexts which affect
their identity and, thus, likeliness of action. The rise in judicialization is influenced by norms,
practices the origins of which are located in domestic or international norms. For instance,
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Cappelletti (1989) notes that the rise in constitutionalism in the post-World War II era was a
result of the failures of elected institutions in pre-war Germany, Italy and Japan to stop the
election of fascist dictators who violated with impunity the rights of their opponents. Preventing
the “tyranny of the majority” from reoccurring was one of the central motivations for proponents
of an enhanced role for ensuring the judiciary’s independence and powers.
Finally, macro-structuralist accounts of judicialization are diverse and located at the
domestic and supranational level. For example, neofunctionalist-based analyses depict the
judiciary’s expansionary role(s) as predicated on particular demands from a state expanding in
responsibilities and responses to pressures from within and without. Modernization-inspired
theories posit that as societies become more complex, so do public policy challenges that the
state is asked to solve. As a consequence, in some cases, the latter requires the creation and/or
empowerment of legal institutions to efficiently regulate and control such effects. Scholars have
also portrayed judicialization as a response to the global diffusion of democratic values and the
rise of constitutionalism in particular since the conclusion of World War II (Tate and Vallinder
1995; Epp 1998; Cappelletti 1989). The global expansion of liberal democracy and
constitutionalism have in many respects translated into the near universal acceptance of norms
and standards which confer greater legitimacy on the judiciary as an appropriate arbiter of
disputes. For instance, it is not uncommon for the judiciary to possess the final voice in questions
of fundamental human, economic and social rights.
While in offering accounts of judicialization, scholars usually utilize the aforementioned
approaches when addressing what Hirschl defines as “mega-politics.” His second category
denotes judicialization of public policy-making through “ordinary” administrative and judicial

11
review. Hirschl’s distinctions between the second and third “type” is that the former is intended
to include cases that are more “narrow” in terms of the overall impact of the parties affected by
the decision, although he admits that such differences are more a matter of choice than degree. In
their analysis of the judicialization of politics or what they define as the judicialization of
administrative governance, Ginsburg and Chen (2009) posit three factors that explain the
emergence of the judiciary: economic, political and international.8 Economic factors refer to the
need for an expanded judiciary in the regulation of economic activity caused by globalization.
An increasingly globalized economy has led to enormous increases in trade and inflows of
capital which then necessitates that domestic governments, previously accustomed to informal
institutional arrangements with state and non-state domestic firms, adopt new (formal) measures
to successfully accommodate new firms. Thus judicialization serves to define or clarify existing
laws and regulations. Also, economic activity, in particular the increasing privatization of public
services, requires the courts to monitor and regulate these new arrangements, hence the
expansion of their powers.

While economic incentives speak to structural obstacles that governments face, political
factors include actors’ decision-making (agency). Given the diversity of regimes in Asia,
Ginsburg (2009) claims that both democratic and authoritarian regimes have proven willing to
empower their respective judiciaries to assist in governance. In democracies the expansion of the
judiciary in the areas of administration reflect a need to monitor bureaucracies’ behavior given
challenges such as the limited period of government’s elected terms. Even for authoritarian

8

Chen and Ginsburg (2009) consider “international” to be synonymous with what Hirschl and I define as macro-structural.
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regimes, judicialization has addressed the need for governments to provide credible
commitments to economic investors, both foreign and domestic.
In addition, the judiciary serves as an oversight mechanism for large bureaucracies and
helps address principal-agent challenges, as well as improves domestic and foreign investor
confidence. Ginsburg and Chen (2009, 8) summarizes this with the following, “Whereas in
democracies, courts are needed because of extensive principal-agent problems associated with
the competition for political power, in dictatorships they are needed precisely because political
power is so concentrated.” Nevertheless, the motivation for control suggests that judicialization
can occur in authoritarian regimes, although it may be so on a more limited scale and limited to
particular areas. Finally, international factors are twofold: institutional and ideational.
Institutional factors refer to supranational regulatory regimes, which dictate domestic regimes’
policies and behavior. Ginsburg and Chen (ibid, 9) note that, “trade and investment regimes
typically involve supranational adjudication and review of local government practices.”
Ideational factors attend to the prevalence of global legal norms that present the increase of
judicial activities in the areas of administrative governance as not only appropriate but
increasingly necessary.
In sum, despite distinctions between the approaches with respect to whether the question
is one of governance or “mega-politics”, as the previous section has illustrated, the sources of
empowerment are located in agency, macro-structure, ideas or institutions. Further, the locus of
the sources of empowerment may also vary depending on the particular context. With respect to
the judicialization of politics in Thailand, the distinction that Hirschl makes between governance
and mega-politics is spurious because the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction affords the

13
inclusion of both questions. For example, the court has made decisions which have cancelled the
re-running of national elections, ruled elected mayors ineligible, prevented major industries from
operating due to policy slights, reappointed senior bureaucrats to the chagrin of the Prime
Minister, as well as reversed major policy decisions to privatize state industries.
More Politicalization than the Judicialization of Politics: Current Approaches,
Narrow Questions and Predictable Explanations
As previously discussed, prior to the 1997 Constitution’s establishment of the
Constitutional and Administrative Court, the judiciary lacked agency and the institutional and
larger structural conditions that were conducive to judicialization. These conditions began to
change beginning with the 1997 Constitution’s establishment of two independent courts:
Constitutional and Administrative. Since the creation of these courts, their subsequent activity
has affected both politics and government administration. Most of the arguments previously
offered conclude that the judicialization of Thai politics is an elite-driven phenomena—most
notably that of the monarchy. In particular, several authors, (Dressel 2010a, 2010b, 2012;
McCargo 2014, 2015; and Hewison (2010) have written that the key factors explaining
judicializaiton are elites’ infighting—and the particular role of the monarchy. Most argue that the
King’s addresses to the courts clearly signaled the monarchy’s opposition to Thaksin and his
supporters and thus compromised judges’ ability to be independent. This, however is not
judicialization of politics but, instead, politicalization of the judiciary.9 For these authors, the
judiciary is beholden to the King’s interest. While many of the cases offered are accurate in this

9

There is a thin line here. As will be shown, sometimes the court can make decisions based on what they believe the King wants
though he may have not actually told them to do so. Arguments were also made about the Constitutional Court’s ruling to
suspend 111 party executives from Phua Thai party, even upsetting the top brass over such a draconian judgment.
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conclusion, this fails to account for the diversity of cases that exists in which the monarchy is not
involved and, hence, judicialization occurs. By offering cases that clearly demonstrate
judicialization, this study contributes to the Thai literature on judicial politics and addresses an
important lacuna.
In one of the earliest attempts to explain the judiciary’s role in Thai politics, Dressel
(2010) arrives at the conclusion that intra-elite conflict resulted in conservative royalist groups
using the judiciary to achieve their (political) bidding. This is an instance of politicalization.
Dressel and many authors claim that King Bhumipol Abdulyadej has directly intervened on
multiple occasions to ultimately politicize the judiciary and ensure that it rule against former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and, subsequently, affiliated politicians, political parties and
individuals. Examining the Thai judiciary’s decisions between 2006-2008, Dressel notes that the
Constitutional Court of Thailand, Supreme Administrative Court and the Supreme Court of
Justice have handed down rulings that are clear indications of “double-standards” and a
politically compromised institution.
For example, he notes how in concerted fashion the Administrative and Supreme Court
ruled to annul the 2006 national election results that would have likely reaffirmed Thaksin and
his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party’s political dominance. While Thaksin and the TRT had won reelection in early 2005, due to his increasingly authoritarian governing style, as evidenced by the
removal of checks and balances and eventually culminating into a tax-free sale of his
telecommunications company to a Singapore firm, opposition from various segments of Thai
society arose. None of his detractors was more crucial than that of the royal family. Calls for his
resignation began to grow louder and as large protests gained further momentum, the embattled
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but still popular prime minister decided to conduct a snap election in February 2006, believing
that another electoral victory would both re-confirm his popularity, bolster his legitimacy and
most importantly, silence his critics.
Aware of the likelihood of a repeat of the previous 2005 election victory that saw TRT
win an outright majority and in doing so become the first re-elected political party in the
country’s history, opposition parties, including the chief rival, the Democrat Party, decided to
boycott the election, expecting that in many of their districts, the constitutionally required 20
percent voter turnout would not occur and thus the government would be unable to form until a
re-run was conducted with the desired turnout.
During this time, charges were filed with the Constitutional Court, accusing the TRT of
fraud and even paying for political parties to run as opposition in boycotted districts in an
attempt to reach the required 20 percent minimum turnout. In addition, the Supreme
Administrative Court accepted cases related to several procedural errors that occurred during the
election. During this controversy, many authors claim that King Bhumipol Adulyadej’s April
2006 royal address calling for the three main courts (Constitutional, Supreme and
Administrative) to “resolve” the impasse was crucial. According to Dressel (2010), King
Bhumipol’s comments that an impending one-party TRT government was “undemocratic” was a
death knell to Thaksin. He (2010, 680) states, “that the royal message got through was shown
just days later when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court called a meeting of the heads of the
Administrative, Supreme, and Constitutional Courts. The meeting was not only followed by the
Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the April 2 elections but also by the heads of the three
courts calling for the Election Commissioners to resign.” The result of the courts’ decision led to
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the continuation of protests that paralyzed the country up until September 2006 when the Thai
military came into power while Thaksin was in New York.
With Thaksin removed, Dressel (2010) and others credit King Bhumipol’s address to the
Administrative Court on the eve of the Constitutional Tribunal’s 2007 decision on the fate of
Thai Rak Thai party as the factor that led to its eventual decision to dissolve the Thai Rak Thai
party and impose a five-year ban on 111 party executives. At the same time it acquitted its more
conservative and royalist-aligned Democrat Party despite overwhelming evidence that its
members committed many of the same offences as the TRT. Ultimately, Dressel claims that
Thailand has experienced politicalization of the judiciary and not judicialization.
McCargo (2014) attempts to provide a framework for what he understands to be the
judicialization of Thai politics. Acknowledging that the diversity of courts, cases, and outcomes
preclude any likelihood of arriving at generalizable conclusions as they pertain to what
judicialization is, as well as its effects, he suggests using a micro-level (case by case) approach
that is highly contextualized. McCargo acknowledges that even the Thai word for judicialization,
‘tulakanpiwat’ remains contested and usually connotes two contrasting interpretations related to
the court’s functions: progressive and conservative. Progressive judicializations serves to
advance the agendas of society’s most marginalized and has the potential to translate into the
creation, expansion and protection of rights. Judicialization that is conservative in orientation
seek to “clean up electoral politics” and prevent the tyranny of the majority.
Ultimately, the two perspectives that McCargo presents are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. However, based on the court cases that he refers to— the annulment of the 2006
election, the dissolution of TRT and subsequent acquittal of the Democrat Party, the removal of
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Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej from office, the Supreme Court’s two-year jail sentence for
Thaksin for helping his wife secure a lucrative land deal, the seizure of $1.32 billion of his assets
from and the removal of his younger sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra— the direction
is one-sided.10 No wonder he (ibid, 437) concludes, “For many in Thailand, the new institutions
first created under the 1997 Constitution—notably the Constitutional Court—had become part of
the problem, rather than part of the solution. Institutions that were supposed to ensure stronger
checks and balances have become elements of a troubling “juristocracy”: highly politicized and
serving primarily to reign in supposedly untrustworthy politicians on behalf of bureaucrats and
royalists.”11
There is an element of truth in McCargo’s conclusion. His specific examples do exhibit
the judiciary’s activity as well as the rather predictable nature of decisions. However, despite his
earlier caution that one could not draw overall conclusions with respect to judicialization,
McCargo fails to adhere to his own forewarning. Further, he does not offer a particularly
balanced account illustrating the progressive outcomes. Ultimately, by stating that the court is
politicized, what he is alluding to is the politicialization of the judiciary and not judicialization
per se.
As this dissertation will demonstrate, politicalization of the judiciary by elites has
occurred and some of the outcomes have served to enhance conservative elites’ position.
However, as this study will also illustrate, judicialization has also occurred and, the judiciary, in
particular the Administrative Court of Thailand has made decisions that led to the realization of

10

McCargo does not suggest that the two perspectives are exclusive.
Hirschl’s (2004, 1) “juristocracy” refers to the phenomena of, “constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount
of power from representative institutions to judiciaries.”
11
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progressive outcomes. In particular, the Supreme Administrative Court’s rulings both against and
for the bureaucracy, has included the cessation of activities by powerful industries that caused
environmental degradation including awarding of large financial compensation. In fact, in efforts
to adjudicate cases related to environmental and health challenges with speed and efficiency, the
court even created a special, “Green Courts” which is strictly dedicated to adjudication such
cases. Likewise, the court has created a special division to adjudicate personnel cases within the
bureaucracy. These outcomes have protected and expanded the individuals’ rights against abuse.
Significance of the Study
This study is significant because, for the past decade and a half, Thailand’s judiciary has
increasingly become an important actor affecting the country’s political, economic and social
affairs. Whether acting to annul elections, ban politicians and parties, as well as affirm/reject
important government policies, the Supreme Courts of Justice, Constitutional Court, and
Administrative Courts have been active, whether within their own respective jurisdictions or, on
occasion, in concert. To date, while several students of Thai politics have acknowledged the
judiciary’s increasing prominence , none have managed to approach the phenomenon from the
perspective of both mega-politics and governance in an in-depth and systematic fashion. Apart
from examining a few select cases, there have been no serious attempts to place the phenomenon
within the larger context of published findings. Many explain away the court’s activity as a result
of elite machinations without backing up their claims or counter-claims by referring to the
scholarship of serious researchers.
Regrettably, the existing literature on the Administrative Court of Thailand is largely
confined to public law scholars like Leyland (2006; 2009 and 2010) who, while actually
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demonstrating judicialization, fails to take seriously the institution as a political actor.12 This
dissertation expands the scope of the judicialization of Thai politics literature by including the
Administrative Court—a court that has produced both, to use McCargo’s useful distinction,
progressive and conservative outcomes. Given the nearly fifteen years of political turbulence in
Thailand, the court is still an institution that exists within a highly politicized environment. As
subsequent chapters will further elaborate, internal divisions within the court began to reflect the
larger societal divisions, aligning the country between pro- and anti- Thaksin supporters.
The focus on the Administrative Court promises several contributions. First, the military
overthrow of the caretaker government on May 22, 2014 was yet another indication of the
fragility of Thai democracy. To date, the current military dictatorship’s disingenuous attempts to
defuse an environment engulfed by tensions by crafting a bargain between political elites whose
interests are threatened by democratic politics and those who are empowered by it. However, it is
likely that the new constitution will further weaken elected institutions in favor of the unelected.
This will translate into a more prominent role for “independent” bodies like the Supreme Court
of Justice, Constitutional Court and Administrative courts, as well as the civilian and military
bureaucracy. Even during the current military rule, judicialization continues. The Administrative
Court remains active in striking down the present military government’s policies, although the
types of cases are more narrow given the restricted policy space. My interviews with a few

On reason the public law field has maintained a monopoly on the Administrative Court and perhaps the political scientist’s
aversion to study the court is the former’s assertion that the court possess institutional safeguards that prevent it from political
use. As the chapter on judges will demonstrate, Administrative court judges at both the Supreme and First Instance levels confirm
that while de jure independence exists (defined as the formal institutional provision that provide judges the necessary autonomy
and resources to make decisions free of external and internal interference), politics so as well. I suspect an additional reason for
the neglect is the divide between political science and public administration. The latter is, wrongly perceived as devoid of politics
and sadly reduced to a mere technical questions. Given the importance of the historical importance of the bureaucracy in
Thailand as well as growing importance of policies in electoral politics, ignoring an institution tasked with monitoring the
bureaucracy as well as determining political outcomes is surprising.
12
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Administrative Court judges at both the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Administrative
Court reveal that judges have not directly faced any interference from the military government
but did express a continued awareness of the political context and the associated sensitivities
therein when making decisions.
Second, the turn towards non-elected institutions at the expense of elected ones shines a
spotlight on the more significant power of the (non-elected) bureaucracy which effects the lives
of ordinary citizens. As a consequence, one of the key institutions responsible for ensuring
government accountability, transparency and efficiency is precisely the Administrative Court.
Finally, research on the judicialization of Thai politics answers larger questions about the status
of democratization. Understanding why the Administrative Court’s role is more prominent,
indeed more important, and who is using the court and why, can offer insights as to the condition
of Thailand’s politics. In particular, in cases where the Administrative Court decides against the
government, does this mean that the relatively new but largely untested court serves as an
instrument of accountability, or is it yet another blip in a long historical line of ineffectual
institutions? This study offers insight into these larger questions. Today, any analysis of politics
and governance in Thailand that fails to provide an account of the judiciary is incomplete.
This study contributes to the judicialization of politics literature in a number of ways.
First, by testing theories related to courts and judges as well as former plaintiffs, this study seeks
to determine whether the aforementioned theories are applicable to Thailand. In cases where they
fail to elucidate beyond the obvious, it then seeks to provide alternative explanations and thus
further advance the literature on judicialization and the courts. Second, this study aims to be one
of the few to incorporate the perspectives of judges, both acting and retired. This is a rarity given
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the challenge of access to people in power, time and the needed sensitivity associated with the
topic. Third, this will be the first extensive, in-depth study of the judicialization of politics in
Thailand. While some scholars have examined a few controversial decisions and have, as a
result, arrived at rather one-sided conclusions about the role of judiciary in Thai politics and
society, this study invests a considerable amount of resources in pursuit of a more
comprehensive account. Finally, by focusing on two categories that Hirschl distinguishes under
the umbrella of judicialization—mega-politics and policy/governance—this present study
enlarges our understanding of the phenomenon because it demonstrates how one court can
examine both dimensions. It is hoped that the results from this dissertation can advance the
literature as a whole, as well as make scholars of Thailand more cognizant of the impact of the
judiciary on politics at both the national and the more personal, intimate level. In short, courts
increasingly matter in Thailand. The degree to which they do and do not and why is what this
study aims to demonstrate.
Key Research Questions
This study’s key research questions are:
1. What key factors account for the judicialization of politics in Thailand? In particular:
2. What key factor(s) account for former plaintiff’s decision to use the court?
3. What factors account for the Administrative Court’s activity?
4. What key factors do judges take into account when making a decision?
5. What are the major implications stemming from the establishment of the Administrative
Court from the perspectives of both judges and plaintiffs? To what extent has the
Administrative Court affected the relationship between Thai citizens and the
bureaucracy? To what extent has the Administrative Court affected the bureaucracy?
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Dissertation Outline

Chapter 2 proffers an overview of the judicialization of politics literature while paying
particular attention to key approaches that explain the phenomenon’s occurrence and absence.
By exploring the necessary conditions needed for judicalization, most notably: formal
institutional protections that afford judges independence in decisionmaking and judges willing to
make such decisions and individuals willing to submit plaints, this chapter establishes a
framework for the study. Further, the chapter explores key debates within the literature while
also addressing where the Thai case fits.
Chapter 3 outlines the dissertation’s methodology. This dissertation used a withincountry comparative approach and utilized both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In
particular, the study includes several public opinion surveys and official case statistics from the
Office of the Administrative Court. The study used in-depth interviews in order to determine the
key factors that judges take into account when making a decision. In addition to the quantitative
analyses and interviews, this study also uses previous court cases as case studies.
Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of the Administrative Court. Understanding the
Court’s history, mission, jurisdiction and formal enforcement powers, are key to appreciating its
role as well as uncovering the power of judges and the position of plaintiffs. The chapter also
provides statistics that illustrate the activity of the Administrative Courts in terms of its caseload,
as well as other functions that the institution performs. The chapter concludes by demonstrating
that the institutional dynamics of the court offer a necessary but alone insufficient explanation
for both judges and plaintiffs’ actions.
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Chapter 5 explores the perspective of former Administrative court plaintiffs through
interviews. The chapter also tests arguments related to judicialization through an exploration of
Thais’ perceptions towards the courts and other institutions. Ultimately, the chapter finds that
public opinion surveys suggest that Thais are more likely to adjudicate their grievances involving
the bureaucracy through the judiciary. This affirms one of Tate’s pre-conditions for
judicialization. In addition, based on interviews with former plaintiffs, most plaintiffs perceive
the court as one of “last resort” meaning that it is used after all other means of conflict resolution
are exhausted. The origins of this is institutional however, many plaintiffs are motivated to
receive justice. This chapter concludes that judicialization within the perspective of the
Administrative Court is likely to continue.
Chapter 6 examines the perspectives of Administrative Court judges both current and
former, at the Court of First Instance and Supreme Administrative Court. This chapter also
explores the key factors judges take into account when making decisions. It also provides judges’
perspective on Thai politics, government, political institutions, plaintiffs and how judge
themselves perceive the role of the court. It argues that Administrative Court judges are strategic
actors who are primarily concerned with the public’s perception of the court’s reputation and will
seek to appease whenever possible. Supreme Administrative Court judges reflected a greater
awareness of the public perception and were sensitive to their reactions.
Chapter 7 includes former court cases as case studies. The cases illustrate not only the
court’s ability to affect important government policies including foreign policy, national
elections, and powerful economic actors. The cases also illustrate an instance where the interests
of King Bhumipol Adulyadej are directly-vested. This case illustrates that the court can function
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as it went from an independent institution (judicialization) to being under the direct control of
another actor (politicalization). Thus while previous accounts of the judiciary’s role in Thai
politics present judicialization and politicalization as mutually-exclusive, this chapter
demonstrates more nuanced is demanded on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the study’s key findings, contributions as
well as limitations. One notable shortcoming has been that the study does not incorporate the
perspective of the bureaucracy. Future research is necessary in order to better determine how
bureaucrats perceive the Administrative Court. This will help better inform questions regarding
the court’s impact.

CHAPTER 2
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS LITERATURE REVIEW
Nowadays I have to “lawyer up.” I’ve been subject to several lawsuits in the Administrative
Court and had to increase my legal staff. It affects my ability to govern.”
--Current governor of a large metropolitan city1

Over the last decade and a half, the Thai judiciary’s role in determining political,
economic and social outcomes has been unprecedented in history. However when situated in the
larger global context, the judicialization of Thai politics is in fact part of a more established and
ongoing “movement.” This chapter takes stock of the judicialization of politics literature with a
particular emphasis upon the key approaches that account for its occurrence. It presents a
framework to explain the phenomenon’s inter-related nature and accounts for the diversity of
actors involved. In addition, the framework also explains one concept’s fluidity.
Surveying the different terms that judicialization of politics scholars offer, section one
establishes a definition with clear conceptual guidelines for this study. In doing so, the important
distinctions are teased out for analytical clarity. Section two explores the plethora of approaches
that explain judicialization’s occurrence—an explanation ultimately located in sources that
empower the judiciary. Arguing that none of the approaches are adequate in their explanation of
judicialization alone, section three presents a framework for this study that affords better

1

Interview on August 6, 2012.
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analytical clarity. Finally, section four focuses on the relevant scholarship on the judicialization
of Thai politics to the Administrative Court and how the framework addresses shortcomings.
Defining the Judicialization of Politics
Throughout its relatively short history in political science, scholars have offered
numerous definitions of the judicialization of politics. In one of the earliest multi-country studies
on judicialization, C. Neal Tate in Tate and Vallinder (1995, 28) conceptualizes the phenomenon
as a “dual process”:
1) “A process by which courts and judges come to make or increasingly to dominate the making
of public policies that had previously been made (or, it is widely believed, ought to be made) by
other government agencies, especially legislatures and executives”; and, 2) “A process by which
nonjudicial negotiating and decision-making forums come to be dominated by quasi-judicial
(legalistic) rules and procedures.”

Several assumptions that pertain to key actors, processes, outcomes in this definition require
further explication. First, the establishment of courts and judges as the key actors presumes that
they have the independence from external actors to make decisions. This is important because in
the absence of independence, there is no judicialization but, instead, politicalization of the
judiciary.1 While this dissertation finds courts and judges are key actors necessary for explaining
judicialization, it is not the only one. Second, this definition subscribes to a specific process and
direction: the shift in responsibilities from other actors, notably elected institutions and
individuals, to the judiciary. Judicialization means that the courts and judges are more prominent
in determining political outcomes relative to other actors. Finally, the definition assumes that
judicialization leads to a specific outcome—the creation of public policies. Indeed, more notable

1

Politicalization does not mean that the judiciary was previously an apolitical institution, to the contrary it refers to the lack of
independence from external actors to make “their own” decisions.
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decisions from judiciaries like the U.S. Supreme Court and others have led to the creation of new
public policies, most notably in the form of laws addressing a variety of issue areas ranging from
abortion, slavery, hate speech and even to the seemingly miniscule regulation of weekly work
hours.
However, the judiciary’s ability to effect political outcomes can occur in much more
complex and less obvious ways. For example, U.S. Supreme Court scholar, Michael McCann
(1994, 72) demonstrates such impact on political actors’ behavior that is not directly observable.
The actions of both legislators and executives may reflect strategic considerations of the court’s
anticipated reactions to impending legislation or behavior. In this sense, when Congress and the
president negotiate legislation, whether or not one side believes the court is in their “corner” or
not, can determine the strength of one’s bargaining power and thus dictate subsequent
negotiations. McCann (ibid) also finds that “legislators both anticipate judicial statutory
interpretation when writing new laws and “rewrite” laws in response to judicial rulings
“inviting” clarification of previous policy action.” If other political actors take into account the
anticipated reactions of the judiciary when performing their respective duties, then perhaps
judicialization may have always been an understudied reality. Ultimately, this perspective
reminds scholars to exercise greater awareness in their conceptualization of the judiciary’s role
and how it alters the behavior of other actors beyond the formalities of judicial review.2

Landfried’s (1994) neo-institiutionalist examination of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions over a 40-year
period, found that its impact on the Bundesstaat through the more obvious judicial review represents but one aspect. Indeed, the
court was able to influence the policymaking process by signaling to lawmakers what content should (and should not) be
included within proposed legislation. Because the court is the authority with respect to the interpretation of the constitution, this
dictates that lawmakers consider the anticipated reactions when crafting legislation. In addition to a sensitive parliament,
Landfried finds that the parliament acquiesces to the judiciary by not seeking to challenge its authority. Hence, Landfried asserts
that judicialization occurs before the court formally acts and a more comprehensive understanding of how the judiciary functions
is necessary.
2
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The second part of the Tate’s definition refers to the increase of legal norms, formal rules
and procedures over previously non-legalistic ones. Both Habermas (1988) and Teubner (1987,
359) refer to this as “juridification” or “the tendency toward an increase in formal (or positive,
written) law that can be observed in modern society.” In their essay on juridification, Blichner
and Molander (2008, 38-39) provide a five-concept typology: constitutive, law expansion and
differentiation, conflict-solving by reference to law, increased judicial power, and legal-framing.
Each concept reflects a specific process and outcome.
“First, constitutive juridification is a process where norms constitutive for a political order are
established or changed to the effect of adding to the competencies of the legal system. Second,
juridification is a process through which law comes to regulate an increasing number of
different activities. Third, juridification is a process whereby conflicts increasingly are being
solved by or with reference to law. Fourth, juridification is a process by which the legal system
and the legal profession get more power as contrasted with formal authority. Finally,
juridification as legal framing is the process by which people increasingly tend to think of
themselves and others as legal subjects.”

Like all constitutive approaches there are difficulties determining the specific timing when these
rules gain widespread acceptance and adherence as well as the extent of its impact. For example,
establishing formal laws may not necessarily lead to its application and impact on society or
politics if, as is common in many countries, especially, Third Wave democracies, formal legal
institutions and corresponding laws are, for many reasons, cosmetic.3
As Tate and Vallinder (1995) concede, it is possible that these two processes can occur
independent of each other. For example, the expansion of formal rules, norms and legal
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Discussing the judicialization of Latin American politics, Sieder et. al., (2005) argue that in some newly democratizing
countries where judiciaries were instruments of repression in authoritarian regimes such legacies of abuse have meant that the
creation of formal laws empowering the “new” courts have proven ineffectual.
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discourse (de jure independence) may not result in an increase in the judiciary’s direct policymaking activity but may, in fact, prove merely cosmetic. Furthermore, as this chapter will
illustrate, the judiciary’s “domination” of the policy-making process can even either undermine
support of existing laws or supersede laws, rules and procedures.4

In her examination of the Mexican judiciary, Pilar Domingo (2004, 110) defines the
judicialization of politics based on four key processes:
“First it is a process by which there is an increase in the impact of judicial decisions upon
political and social processes. Second it refers to the process by which political conflict is
increasingly resolved at the level of the court. Third, at a discursive level, judicialization of
politics reflects the degree to which regime legitimacy is increasingly constructed upon public
perception of the state’s capacity and credibility in terms of delivering on the rule of law, rights
protection. Finally, it refers also to the growing trend by different political actors and groups
within society to use law and legal mechanisms to mobilize around specific policies, social and
economic interests and demands.”
Domingo’s judicialization is more expansive with respect to the actors, processes, and outcomes
than Tate and Vallinder suggest. She draws attention to the significance of courts and judges and
their various functions—all of which may either be a driver (direct) or driven (indirect) in the
process of judicialization. Whether impacting political and social questions, the scope and effect
of judicialization can be contingent on context. As this chapter will expound further, the
judicialization of politics can occur irrespective of whether judges alone are the key source of
empowerment or not.

Moreover, the establishment of formal independence (de jure) may not translate into judges’ ability to make decisions without
external influence (de facto).
4
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The four processes also illustrate the diversity of activism and degree of independence
that the judiciary may have. In the first component of the definition, Domingo positions judges’
decision-making and its associated impact as the main driver of judicialization. The second
definition positions individual(s) who use courts and judges to achieve their respective interest(s)
as the key drivers. In the latter case, judicialization originates with the actors who use the court
to achieve an objective(s) through legal channels. The third definition depicts judicialization as a
process that enhances and/or maintains regime leadership legitimacy.5 Finally, the fourth
definition describes judicialization that originates from non-state actors who mobilize the courts
to achieve their respective goals. In sum, although the judiciary ultimately determines outcomes,
the emphasis on other actors as necessary to explaining the process by which this occurs
provides a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon.
Domingo’s definitions while comprehensive, fail to offer meaningful distinctions
between process and outcomes. For instance, the judiciary’s increasing involvement in
determining politics is an outcome but offers no explanation with respect to motives. This is a
challenge that persists within the literature, as scholars have the tendency to presume that
judicialization makes “positive” contributions for the state and society, whereas “bad” decisions
represent a more biased court and thus is indicative of “politicalization” of the judiciary. Several
challenges arise from such assumption. First, political science and judicialization literature in
particular, depicts judges as political actors who make (biased) decisions strategically. The
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As this chapter will later discuss, this reflects the increasingly global acceptance of the rule of law irrespective of regime type
although such universalism democratizes its meanings.
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biased nature of their decision-making does not mean that they are not independent.6 To the
contrary, judges’ strategic nature in fact reflects an autonomy that is afforded to them. That
judges are strategic also can complicate assumptions that particular decisions are indicative of
the court’s independence. Greater context understanding is needed. Further, understanding that
judges are political actors affords scholars of judicialization to better account for the court’s
behavior and hence the degree to which the phenomenon can strengthen or undermine regimes.
Comparative law scholar Ran Hirschl (2006, 723; 2008, 121-124) defines the
judicialization of politics as a “tripartite” process that is usually interrelated with other aspects,
though need not necessarily be limited to just one of the following: “(1) the spread of legal
discourse, jargon, rules, and procedures into the political sphere and policy making forums and
processes; (2) judicialization of public policy-making through “ordinary” administrative and
judicial review; and (3) the judicialization of “pure politics”—the transfer to the courts of matter
of an outright political nature and significance including core regime legitimacy and collective
identity questions that define (and often divide) whole polities.”7
Like the previous two authors, the first part of Hirschl’s definition refers to what is called
“juridification.” Hirschl’s latter two definitions delineate what he refers to as “normal” and
“mega-politics.” “Normal” politics are instances where the court creates administrative policies
and exercises judicial review. “Mega politics” raises political questions of greater significance in
scope. For example, in some countries policy issues such as abortion, affirmative action, capital
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Independence does not mean that judges are not influenced by several factors, it simply means that they are not directly
influenced from an external (outside of the court) actor(s) who is able to directly eliminate their ability to make a decision.
Whether making decisions based on personal ideology or more the anticipated reactions of others, judges are presumed biased.
7 Hirschl uses “pure” and “mega” interchangeably.
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punishment, state-run healthcare or same-sex marriage are important policy questions that can
have enormous political implications. Both a politician’s and a political party’s position on issues
can impact their political future and their relevance to stakeholders, most notably voters. Further,
as Ginsburg (2009, 1) reminds us, the overemphasis of constitutional questions within
judicialization studies neglects the reality that “most citizens are far more likely to encounter the
state in the routine matters that are the stuff of administrative law rather than in the rarified
sphere of constitutional law.” This underscores the importance of possessing a broader
conceptualization of the judiciary and its involvement in governance and administration.8
Ultimately, determining whether judicialization has or has not occurred, regardless of origin, is
what is important.9
Alec Stone-Sweet’s (2000; 2002, 71) conceptualization of judicialization offers a
historical-institutionalist account of the process in which the judiciary is legitimated as the
arbiter of conflict between two parties.10 He defines judicialization as, “the process by which
triadic law-making progressively shapes the strategic behavior of political actors engaged in
interactions with one another.”11 This “triad” refers an interactive relationship involving three
actors—two disputant parties (“dyad”) and a third party (usually the judiciary) which he then
calls, “triad”). Judicialization officially commences when conflicts that two disputants were

In fact, Hirschl himself acknowledges that his category of policy and public administration questions as “narrower” in scope
and impact and somehow less “pure” may simply be an exercise in semantics.
9 Essentially, what constitutes “political” is contextual. Hirschl (2006,728) even concedes that the distinction between the second
and third categories lies, “between mainly procedural justice issues on the one hand, and substantive moral dilemmas or
watershed political quandaries that the entire nation faces on the other.” Even this distinction is contingent on other factors. For
example, the significance of national elections depends upon other corresponding factors, most importantly the quality of the
state administration in terms its ability to translate voters’ policy preferences into tangible results.
10 This also includes the two disputant parties accepting the decision as final.
11 In an earlier work explaining the French Constitutional Council’s evolution from an apolitical outside to an active lawmaker,
Stone-Sweet (1992, 7) defines this as “juridicization of policymaking” or “how the increasingly intense interaction between a
constitutional court and governments and parliamentarians has structured political choices and shaped policy outcomes.”
8

33
previously able to mediate outside of formal/legal intervention become intractable, thus requiring
both to entrust the matter to a third party and adhere to the latter’s decision.
Stone-Sweet’s definition possesses the fluidity to capture the process(es) and timing of
the dyad’s establishment, breakdown and evolution into a triad. This conceptualization of
judicialization is less fixated upon the establishment of a formal (state) institution and is
applicable in contexts outside of state-centric accounts. Stone-Sweet’s judicialization focuses
more on the process by which the two disputant parties adhere to the third party’s decision and
how this relationship develops formally—less than the particular issue area that is judicialized.
This expands our understanding of what can be judicialized. Critics of his definition argue that it
is uni-directional. For example, Ferejohn (2002) argues that Stone-Sweet fails to offer an account
of “de-judicialization” which implies a breakdown of the triad and re-establishment of the dyad.
Further, the extent to which Stone-Sweet’s judicialization can accurately determine the timing
when the dyad becomes a triad (judicialization) in cases involving great complexity is
questionable. Judicialization is a concept that is more fluid because it is dependent on the
breakdown of mediation between specific parties. This perspective may give too much emphasis
to individual actors because it does not account for the effect of the state. For instance, the
establishment of new laws and courts may affect the speed by which the dyad breakdowns or
even how it is maintained.
Other definitions of judicialization are narrower in scope, as they emphasize a particular
process or outcome. For example, examining the judiciary’s role in the expansion of rights in the
U.S., India and Britain, Charles Epp’s (1998) advances the term “rights-enhancing
judicialization.” This is what Siederet al. (2005, 5) define as “judicialization from below” or
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“when certain sectors of society gain greater consciousness of their legal rights and entitlements,
and when citizens adopt strategies of legal mobilization to press claims through the courts for
their existing rights to be upheld, or use legal discourses to create rights not yet protected or
codified in law.” From this perspective, society uses courts to either fully establish new rights or
affirm and enhance existing ones.

Literature on the judicialization of rights made an important contribution to the field
because it demonstrated that the process could originate from the below thus giving a new voice
to studies that had until then overemphasized the role of courts and elites. This is precisely Epp’s
reason for his study notes explanations that overemphasize the role of the high courts in rights
revolutions in the U.S., Britain and India are important, this does not diminish the importance of
the court entirely nor that of the state. In fact, Epp’s (1998) admiration of the legal structures
rivals that of the role of “the masses.”12
In its simplest form judicialization is, the process(es) by which courts and/or judges
determine political outcomes. This dissertation uses Hirschl’s definitions of the judicialization of
politics because it captures the various processes involved.13 However, it intentionally avoids
equating the phenomenon with a particular outcome(s). As was mentioned previously, the
assumption that judicialization serves only a positive purpose for state and society fails to
appreciate the phenomenon’s many permutations. For example, judicialization may or may not

Central to Epp’s (198, 2-3) thesis is that actors utilize what he defines as “institutional support structures” such legal advocacy
organization and legal networks to provide the needed legal pressures to obtain legal victories.
13 Judicialization contrasts from politicalization in that the latter refers to judicial activity that lacks autonomy and is directed
from without. Thus courts and judges make decisions at the behest of another actor(s). Patapan (2012, 219) describes
politicalization as “political usurpation of the legal authority of the court in ways that undermine its expertise, independence, and
judgment.”
12

35
lead to the “desirables” of improved governance, accountability or transparency—it may in fact
undermine regimes—democratic or authoritarian by empowering elites who, no longer being
able to influence political power through the ballot box, to have a “voice.” Victories obtained
through the judiciary may further exacerbate social, economic and political inequalities as much
as it may reduce them.

Further, Hirschl’s definition is better positioned to accommodate the Administrative Court of
Thailand’s institutional peculiarities. First it privileges Administrative Court judges as
responsible for not only providing rulings, but also its jurisdiction which includes “normal” and
“mega-politics.” The court’s institutional rules empower judges to investigate and ultimately
enforce its rulings. While Hirchl’s definition provides the most accurate account of the court’s
activity, its description is partial as it fails to reflect the inter-related nature of judicialization.
Any attempt to understand judicialization through the perspective of the Administrative Court of
Thailand must take into account plaintiffs because, in their absence, judges have no cases to rule
on. Thus, the framework below addresses this important gap.
The Judicialization of Politics: Key Explanations of Empowerment
Judicialization of politics occurs when the court and judges determine or affect political
outcomes. This definition assumes that judges make decisions independent from direct external
influence. This section provides key factors that explain the phenomenon’s occurrence. Despite
burgeoning research, the judicialization literature still lacks comprehensiveness, as scholars in
the subfields of international relations, comparative politics (including comparative judicial
politics), public administration, and public law have unfortunately worked in isolation. This led
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to Stone-Sweet’s (2002, 2) sober conclusion that “no coherent body of theorizing on judicial
institutions exist[s].”
A key reason for the many “islands of findings” is that most studies originate from
different sub-fields that in turn adopt different points of departure with respect to fundamental
questions such as the role and behavior of courts and judges. For example, the public law field
largely present courts and judges, barring a few “deviants”, as an apolitical actor(s) genuine in
their commitment to upholding the principles of jurisprudence. As previously discussed, political
scientists by contrast presume that courts and judges are yet another political actor albeit in a
more interesting garb. With respect to these fundamental points of departure, this section
discusses the major approaches that explain judicialization and demonstrates that both the public
law and political science make important contributions to the overall understanding of the
phenomenon.
This section surveys some of the major approaches that explain the key factors why the
judicialization of politics occurs. Hirschl (2008) presents five approaches: functionalist, rightscentric, institutionalist, court-centric and realist. Other scholars like Dressel (2012) offers three:
institutionalist, ideational and structural approaches to explain the judicialization. Finally,
Ginsburg and Chen (2009) also submits three: economic, political and institutional. Despite the
differing terminologies, all three authors’ approaches converge. For the purpose of
simplification, this study categorizes them under the following umbrella-terms: individual,
institutional, ideational, and macro-structuralist. While all the approaches possess their own
individual merit, none alone sufficiently explain the phenomenon examined within this study.
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Thus, the section includes a framework that addresses this shortcoming and better captures
judicialization.
Individual-Based Approaches
Approaches that emphasize individuals as central to the analysis of why judicialization
occurs, focus on the importance of choice(s). Led by various motives, elites, ranging from
powerful politicians to judges, empower the judiciary to have a greater ability to determine
political outcomes. Discussing the importance of judges, Tate (1995, 33) asserts that
“judicialization develops only because judges decide that they should (1) participate in policymaking that could be left to the wise or foolish discretion of other institutions, and at least on
occasion, (2) substitute policy solutions they derive for those derived by other institutions.”
While this presents a more “noble” justification of judges’ motives, it underscores the
importance of understanding judges’ ontology.
The absence of judicialization studies was largely attributed to political science’s
reluctance to come to terms with its conception of courts and judges that was outdated,
normative and, ultimately, inaccurate. Specifically, because most of the research in the
discipline’s early years focused on formal institutional rules and procedures, both court and
judges were reduced as apolitical and thus deemed a subject unworthy of inquiry during the turn
to more behavioral-oriented research.14 The focus on judges’ values and conservative or liberal
leaning were usually deduced from their decisions. One glaring omission from such analysis was

For an excellent review of the development of the judicial politics literature, see Nancy Maveety, ‘The Pioneers of Judicial
Behavior ‘The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2003, especially chapter 1: The Study of Judicial Behavior and the
Discipline of Political Science. Interestingly, Dwodle’s (2009) questions why most political scientists have previously neglected
the courts. This may be because institutions were abandoned during the disciplines behavioral revolution, although the study of
judges’ decision-making remained a subject of study.
14
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the omission of the institutional rules from which judges operated. The emergence of “new
institutionalist” analyses began to focus on how institutional rules affect judges behavior and
how the latter may not be indicative of actors’ true desires. This points to the strategic nature of
decision-making that eventually became a dominant school within the discipline called “rational
choice.”
Derived from neoclassical economics’ rational choice theory that portrays human
behavior to be the result of strategic calculus, judges and, by extension, the courts, in turn,
possess exogenously-derived preferences that they order and choose based on the anticipated
actions of other actors. These actors vary from the dispute parties, elected and non-elected
institutions, the media, etc. Most of this strategic interaction transpires within the institutional
context of the court’s formal rules. Given such constraints, individual(s) make the most optimal
decision possible (Lichbach 2003). The judicialization of politics literature in particular assumes
that judges use the powers and privileges bestowed to them in order to strategically intervene in
politics. This approach borrows from the judicial politics literature that is commonly referred to
as the “strategic model.”15
Ample literature exists explaining motives for judicialization. For example, judges make
decisions in response to the anticipated reaction of other actors, such as elected institutions and
individuals, other judges on the same bench, the media, the reputation of the court, and their
careers. Knowledge of judges’ preferences is important because it can allow observers to better
predict their decisions. Ultimately, the strategic-based approach states that judges’ decisions do

15

For more on the strategic model, see Elster 1986, Spiller & Gely 1992, Boucher & Segal 1995, Epstein & Knight 1998; 2000,
Maltzman et al. 2000, Lax & Cameron 2007, and Staton & Vanberg 2008.
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not reflect their sincere (true) preferences. While judicialization solely focuses on the strategic
approach of judicial decision-making, it is important to note the other two key perspectives
explain how judges make decisions: attitudinal and historical-institutional.16

Individual-based analyses that explain judicialization are not limited to judges. Political elites,
rather individually or as a collective, strategically empower the court for several reasons. First,
long-standing elites may empower the judiciary to determine political questions for the purposes
of accessing in the court in future. Such access would allow elites political influence especially
when others sources of power no longer exist. Referred to as the “separation-of-powers”
literature judicial empowerment is attributed to the strategic calculations of other actors, most
notably legislators.
Ginsburg (2003, 97) states, empowerment is the result of “concrete political power
struggles, the interests of elites and other influential stakeholders, and clashes of fundamental
ideals” that are irreconcilable. The courts thus serve as a check on elected institutions at the
behest of elites who face uncertain futures and henceforth are crafted to serve as a method to

16According

to the attitudinal model, judges make decisions based upon their ideological positions and/or personal values. For
example, ‘Judge Aaron votes conservative because ideologically he is a “conservative.” Ultimately, this approach argues that
each decision is a revelation of judges’ true preferences and that they are self-interested political actors. As Segal and Spaeth
(2002, 111) state that, “Attitudinalists argue that because legal rules governing decision-making in the cases that come to the
Court do not limit discretion; because justices need not respond to public opinion, Congress, or the President; and because the
Supreme Court is the court of last resort, the justices, unlike their lower court colleagues, may freely implement personal policy
preferences.” Finally, the traditional legal model reduces judicial decision-making as a question of the extent to which decisions
reflected a commitment to upholding the principal of legal jurisprudence. Judges only take into consideration their interpretation
of the law in spite of other potential factors such as pressure from the media, politicians, other branches of government and civil
society, etc. (Engel and Engel 2010). While the general lack of precision of most laws usually necessitate judicial rulings which
lack consensus, this does not necessarily mean that the law is the most important factor under judges’ consideration when making
a decision. This is referred to as “mechanical jurisprudence” which assumes that there is only one correct response to legal
question that all judges must adhere to (for more see, Segal and Spaeth 2002, p. 48). Finally, historical institutionalist
perspectives of decision-making argues that judges preferences constitute and are constituted by the rules inherent in the courts.
The judiciary’s institutional rules construct how judges make decisions and provide judges with their identity.
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“lock in” unpopular interests. It is important to understand that while elites can empower the
judiciary this does not mean that judges’ decisions are not their own; in fact, it may even mean
greater independence than before.17 Hirschl (2008) finds the expansion of judicial power to be
the result of the traditional elite’s careful machinations. Empowering the judiciary through the
devices employed by the longstanding elites, is intentioned to protect and maintain their interests
in the face of threats from rival parties (Ramseyer 1994) or even allow politicians to evade blame
for unpopular policy positions which are projected to result in defeat (Sunkin 1995; Voigt and
Salzberger 2002).
Likewise, explaining why national courts have become so powerful evidenced by
increased activity in determining political questions that beforehand were within the strict
domain of elected institutions, Hirschl (2004) too concludes that political and economic elites
under threat of political power strategically empower the courts. The increase in
constitutionalism and judicial activity in Israel, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa which he
labels “juristocracy” and such instances to be a direct consequence of elites and interest groups
machinations desiring to ensure that their position is not threatened in the likelihood that they
would lose political power.18 Coining this term as the “hegemonic preservation thesis” Hirschl
(ibid, 11-12) argues that elites decide to transfer power away from the legislature to the courts,
which, through continued access, is able to ensure the continued protection of their interests.
Hirschl (ibid, 12) focuses on three elite groups that empower the courts: 1) political elites who
seek to maintain or further enhance their dominance, 2) economic elites that perceive the courts

17

When judges lack autonomy, the result is politicalization.
Hirschl’s (2004, 1) “juristocracy” refers to the phenomena of, “constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount
of power from representative institutions to judiciaries.”
18
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as being a strong advocate of neo-liberal economic policies and 3) judicial elites (judges) who
are inclined to desire the enhancement of their status and powers.
In addition to the focus on threats towards of electoral prospects, political elites can also
empower the judiciary as a response to pressures stemming from government’s poor
performance and economic crises. Ginsburg (2009) credits the 1997/98 East Asian Financial
Crisis for spurring decisions for political reforms, in particular the establishment of judicial
review in new areas related to macro-economic policy and administrative governance reforms.
For Thailand, the crisis spurred politicians and other elites’ decision(s) to approve the most
liberal constitution in the country’s turbulent political history—a decision that provided an
expanded role of the judiciary and hence the opportunity for judicialization.
Early judicialization of politics literature focused solely on democratic regimes, both
established and newly-transitioned. Such exclusivity was the consequence of several
assumptions, many of which are interrelated. First, scholars expected that only within liberal
democracies could there exist an environment of genuine political, social and institutional
support hospitable for judicialization. Second, scholars assumed that only democrats would be
serious in affording the judiciary with such powers necessary for judicialization—most notably,
independence from outside interference. Finally, scholars assumed that only within democratic
government could one find a serious commitment to the principles of the rule of law and, in
particular, equality before the law. As a result, all of the earlier case studies were representative
of Western democracies, as well as newly democratizing regions in post-Soviet Eastern Europe,
Latin America, and Africa. As a result there was a failure to consider authoritarian regimes as
potential site for judicialization.
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However, the inability to consider the possibility of judicialization within authoritarian
regimes reflects several misconceptions. First, a lack of understanding about the judiciary’s role
and function within authoritarian regimes needs better appreciation. Further, scholars had a poor
understanding of the concept of judicial independence and its relation with regime type. As a
result, most of the assumptions made explaining why judicialization does or does not occur were
narrow and even contradictory. Several unanswered questions resulted in confusion and
contradictions. One of the key reasons that prevented earlier scholars from considering
authoritarian regimes was not only a lack of understanding of the regimes but also a normative
bias attached to the phenomenon. Many considered judicialization to produce a “good” for
democracy, even though democracy theorists have long debated the role and appropriateness of
the judiciary and in particular its ability to affect the elected institutions’ public mandate.
Labeling instances where the U.S. Supreme has through judicial review inhibited elected
institutions as the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”, Alexander Bickel (1962, 33) concludes such
behavior to be “a deviant institution in a democratic society.”19 Indeed, in discussing the rise of
powerful judges, famed judge Robert Bork (2002, 2-22) is more colorful in his assessment of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty which he defines as the “American disease” that would eventually
lead to, he warns, “the rule of law to the rule of judges.” Bork argues that contemporary judges
use their position to advance their own agendas (usually leftist) in a larger culture war between
conservative and liberal values, while frustrating majoritarian institutions and the popular will.20

The “counter-majoritarian difficulty” refers non-elected institutions’ ability to override elected institutions.
Not everyone is convinced that the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” is really that difficult at all. Dahl (1975, 291) attempts to
downplay concerns by arguing that with particular respect to the Supreme Court, such fears are exaggerated because elected
officials are responsible for the appointment of justices. As a result, he concludes “it would appear, on political grounds,
somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion of the Supreme Court justices would
long hold to norms of rights or justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.” If this statement is true, then the
19
20
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The underlying point is that even in democracies, the judiciary’s position is not without criticism.
Decisions can exacerbate inequalities or protect the rights of minorities.
Several authors are dismissive of any prospect that judicial review could exist within
authoritarian regimes, let alone judicialization. Cappelletti (1989,188-189) declared, “Indeed, if
one wisdom clearly emerges from comparative analysis...it is that no effective system of judicial
control is compatible with, and tolerated by, anti-libertarian, autocratic regimes, whether they
place themselves at the left or the right of the political spectrum. This fact, that judicial review is
anathema to the tyrant, is confirmed by developments in many countries in several continents,
and most frequently in Latin America and Africa.” Further addressing the judicialization of
politics specifically, Tate (1995, 464) famously proclaimed, it “is likely to occur mostly, if not
only, in regimes that have adopted the institutions and norms of liberal democracy and accepted
the principle of judicial independence.” Others like Schedler (2009, 10-11) dismiss the notion
that the judiciary is anything other than a “course” from leadership’s “menu of manipulation.”
Such cynicism assumes that courts were ultimately created to work at the strict behest of regime
leadership and that this precluded any pretense of anything “positive.” While these assumptions
offer some validity—they fail to reflect a more comprehensive account of the role of the
judiciary even within authoritarian regimes. In the discussion of the published literature on

emotional arguments about Supreme Court judges not being directly elected are overstated. For instance, through the process
whereby an elected President nominates individuals that the elected members of Senate confirm, the final appointments to the
bench will reflect political aspirations of the voting public to a reasonable degree. At most, any deviation will not be as extreme
as Bickel and Bork suggest. Holding elections for appointments to the Supreme Court would add new and possibly dangerous
complications, especially with the increasing role of money in elections. Finally, after examining the number of instances in
which the Supreme Court has ruled on congressional legislation related to freedom of speech, religion, press and assembly
unconstitutional, Dahl (1975, 292) concludes that with such decisions, “the lawmakers and the Court were not very far apart;
moreover, it is doubtful that the fundamental conditions of liberty in this country have been altered by more than a hair’s breadth
as a result of these decisions.”
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judicialization that continues below, judicialization in the abstract will be shown to be
independent of regime type.
The important question with respect to authoritarian regimes is to determine whether
there would be any incentive by which leadership would afford their courts with independence or
autonomy in making decisions. Discussing the prospects of judicial independence in other
regimes, Becker (1970, 121) is optimistic in his assessment that, “it would seem that a politically
independent judiciary can exist in a political system not usually labeled “democracy” by
Americans.” Unfortunately, scholars have not taken this statement seriously until most recently.
The remaining section affirms Becker’s observation and illustrates that the judicialization of
politics can and does occur within authoritarian regimes.
Asking why regime leaders would empower the judiciary with independence to make
decisions, Moustafa (2007) and Moustafa and Ginsburg (2008, 4) advance five goals:
1. Establish social control and sideline political opponents;
2. Bolster a regime’s claim to “legal” legitimacy;
3. Strengthen administrative compliance within the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and
solve coordination problems among competing factions within the regime;
4. Facilitate trade and investment; and,
5. Implement controversial policies so as to allow political distance from core elements of
the regime.
Authoritarian regimes also seek to use of the judiciary under the greater umbrella of “rule of
law” to assuage foreign investors and legitimate their rule. For example, in his study on the
Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), Moustafa (2007) finds that both former strongmen
Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak needed to convince potential foreign investors who were wary
of the nationalizing policies of the former Nasser government’s serious commitment to
upholding the rule of law in terms of guaranteeing property rights for businesses that were
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concerned about arbitrary seizures. In addition to the SCC, Egypt’s Administrative Court was
empowered to exert control over the bureaucracy given that the military dictatorship lacked the
capacity to monitor the bureaucracy. Finally, the empowerment of courts assisted the regime in
using the rule of law as a tool of legitimacy for critics. The irony, as Moustafa brings to light, is
the fact that the court provided an opening for meaningful contestation—which was not the
original intentions of the Mubarak regime. Through the SCC, government opponents were able
to challenge and win in areas, such as reversing legislation that had barred political opposition
and outlawed opposition parties. In 1987 and 1990, the SCC ruled that the national election laws
were unconstitutional, then leading to the dissolution of the People’s Assembly.
Scholars have attempted to combine judges and political elites to explain judicialization.
Discussing the phenomenon in the United Kingdom, Sunkin (1994, 126) concludes that two
sources are responsible: ambitious judges and strategic politicians. In the first instance,
motivated to expand their powers and circumvent parliament, judges have successfully
challenged central and local government policies in various areas such as “education, television
licensing, airline regulation, local government finance and social welfare.” The court is strategic
in the sense that they understand that may face retaliation if other actors, most notably parliament
perceive them as too evasive.
Discussing politicians, Sunkin argues that they are responsible for judicialization because
they purposely delegate contentious policy questions to the judiciary. Several reasons are
responsible for such strategic delegation.21 First, by allowing the judiciary to determine the
outcomes of political questions, it also removes politicians’ direct responsibility and
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For more on politicians’ strategic delegation, see Voigt and Salzberger (2002).
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accountability to the electorates for potentially unpopular policy positions. Second, delegation
can also negate prospective victories from political rivals who adopt a more popularly favorable
position towards an issue. In sum, individuals make judicialization possible either directly or
indirectly through strategically empowering the court’s institutional powers and, from the
perspective of judges, strategic decisions that advance the court’s position relative to other
institutions.
Institutionalist Approaches
Institutionalist perspectives explain judicialization to be the results of pre-existing rules
and powers that empower the court to make decisions independent of interference and provide
the jurisdiction related to political questions. For example Hirschl (2008), Tate and Vallinder
(1994; 1995) argue that institutions designed to maintain the rule of law, most notably an
independent judiciary with review power is a necessary pre-condition for judicialization. Also
included within the institutionalist approach is pre-existing institutions that are closely
characterized with democratic government. In particular, enshrined principles such as the
separation of powers, a judiciary that is adequately staffed with judges, an adequate budget and
measures to prevent external interference. In addition, there should usually be the establishment
of human and legal rights.
As mentioned, in institutionalist approaches, the global expansion of democracy is seen
as responsible for being a key driver of the judicialization of politics. Tate (1994, 188) suggest
that with the exception of the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, “it appears that the
judicialization of politics is likely to occur mostly, if not only, in regimes that have adopted the
institutions and accepted norms associated of liberal democracy and that have accepted the
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principle of judicial independence, there is little likelihood for the judicialization of politics in
these countries.” After noting the “not free” rating that Freedom House assigned to Cambodia,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma and Brunei, democracy usually entails a separation of powers among
major branches of government, as well as some form of decentralization. For most liberal
democracies, the rule of law is well-institutionalized evinced by political elites' and citizens’
general adherence.22 Harding and Nicholson (2009, 2) examine the prevalence of what they
define as “new courts” in Asia or “the introduction of a court not previously in existence (or a
new chamber within the existing court structure) having a specially defined jurisdiction or to a
judicial innovation which does not relate to jurisdiction as such.” New courts facilitate
judicialization given the introduction of new rules and jurisdiction for managing conflict between
opposing parties.
Finally, discussing the expansion of judicial review and the rise of constitutionalism in
the immediate aftermath of World War II, Mauro Cappelletti (1989) argues that the failures of
elected institutions to stop the rise of fascist dictators in Italy and Germany led to an enhanced
role for the judiciary as new institutional powers included an ability to determine political
questions—in particular protecting the rights of minorities. Institutionalist approaches argue that
judicialization is the result of established rules and provisions, most critically, independnce that
empower to court and judges to make decisions that determine political outcomes.
Ideational-based Approaches

The emphasis on liberal is intentional because, as Zakaria (1997) makes clear, a majority of today’s democracies are far from
liberal.
22
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Ideational-based approaches argue that the expansion or creation of norms and values
which are favorable to judicialization include the participation of the courts in political questions.
For example, rights-centered approaches portray the judicialization of politics as a consequence
of a more politically conscious public who perceive as appropriate, the judiciary engaging in
political questions on their behalf. Further, this approach finds that non-state actors, ranging from
non-government organizations, interest groups, and political activists, accord greater trust and
confidence in the judiciary as opposed to elected institutions. This approach maintains further
that legal mobilization structures assists the process of allowing the under-represented and
disenfranchised to achieve and protect their rights.23
Explaining the judicialization of rights in Canada, Britain, the United States and India,
Epp (1998) credits the phenomenon in the U.S. and to a limited extent Britain (but not India) to
not only to individuals’ ability to access the courts, but also the presence of “institutional support
structures” related to government-sponsored finance as well as rights advocacy groups and
lawyers willing to engage in litigation. This sustained pressure led to what Epp (ibid, 7) labels a
“rights revolution” which was composed of judicial attention to and support for new rights as
well as implementation of those rights. In the absence of plaintiffs and lawyers, courts are
inactive, as judges have no cases to rule on and rights cannot be established and/or expanded on
in a vacuum.
Scholars also credit values and norms attributed to liberal democracy and in particular
constitutionalism, the protection of human rights, as well as equality before the law that can lead

Labeling this approach, the “rights hypothesis”, Ferejohn (2002, 56) argues that people use courts to both create and protect a
nursery of rights against political abuse.
23
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to judicialization.24 For example, in her study examining the increase in judicial activity in postauthoritarian Mexico, Domingo (2005) finds that rights discourse has facilitated greater public
involvement in the rule of law and checks against the arbitrary use of state power against society.
Smulovitz (2005) argues that rights discourse was also a significant factor of judicialization of
several issues areas not previously covered in Argentina. Areas such as family violence and
workplace sexual harassment are no longer ignored or limited to non-state forms of justice, but
victims are increasingly using the judiciary as a method to punish offenders. Judicialization in
these areas became possible once society accepted the court as a legitimate arbiter.
Macro-Structuralist Approaches
Macro-structuralist approaches present political phenomena to be a consequence of large
structural-historical forces, in this case judicialization (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997;Lichbach
2003). Several perspectives explaining judicialization exist. Hirschl (2008) writes of
functionalist-oriented approaches that explain judicialization is a response to specific needs. This
is usually in the form of the government’s attempt to address complex challenges. For example,
modernization theories depict the judiciary’s empowerment to be the result of socio-economic
development. Evinced by indices of high levels of urbanization, literacy and technological
sophistication, such growth also invites complex challenges, such as environmental pollution
(created in part by advanced industrialization), international terrorism and transnational
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The importance of norms and values are also important in explanations of the lack of judicialization despite institutional
powers that better position judges to determine political questions. Hilbink (2007), incorporates a historical-institutionalist
perspective to analyze of the Chilean judiciary’s behavior during and after the Pinochet dictatorship. Explaining the judiciary’s
averseness towards addressing larger political questions despite its institutional prowess, she finds that the court itself in terms of
both the institutional rules and senior judges, shaped how lower ranking judges perceived themselves and their role. This identity
is what Hilbink labels “apolitical” and ultimately explains the court’s muteness.
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organized crime (made possible due to technological advancements), and governments thus
respond with essentially more government, and hence the creation of legal institutions or the
expansion of existing ones.
Writing about the judicialization in Asia, Ginsburg (2009, 5) credits economic
globalization which has, “rapidly intensified scope and scale of global transactions and the
liberalization of trade and capital flows” has translated to the introduction of new (international)
entrants into domestic markets. He further explains that in order to provide incentives for these
new actors to invest, domestic governments create several policies to advance the interests of
investors. For example, policymakers craft regulatory standards and institutions to replace those
that were previously informal or non-existent. These efforts are aimed at creating a more
transparent and accountable environment. In some instances, efforts to attract investment has
lead to an increase in the privatization of public sector services, which commands the
establishment of legal institutions needed to adjudicate disputes. In this sense, the role of state
has transformed itself from public good provider to conflict-mediator through new judicial
activity.
Kim and Park’s study posits “macro-structural” and “micro” variables to explain
judicialization in South Korea. The Constitutional Court of Korea (KCC) is the primary
institution that has led judicialization. First, South Korea’s democratic transition in the late 1980s
resulted in a constitutional government which has allowed political competition to become
institutionalized. This is important because both the political elite and society became
increasingly pluralistic thus commanding that competition for political power become more

51
formal. The expansion of judicial rules to establish or clarify new rights helped better facilitate
judicialization.
Kim and Park refer to “micro” factors as the court’s institutional and ideational
composition. Institutionally the Constitutional Court has the provisions necessary for
independent decision-making. Korean society, has demonstrated trust in the judiciary and is
overly supportive of judicialization. Finally, KCC justices practice strategic “temperance”
decision-making which includes their ability to consider the anticipated implication of their
decisions. This has allowed for judicialization to continue.
Understanding the Judicialization of Politics through the Administrative
Court of Thailand: Towards a Framework
Current explanations of judicialization are unable to explain the Thai Administrative
Court’s activity. Despite each of the approaches different points of departure and their respective
contributions to explaining judicialization therein, none alone are capable of providing a
comprehensive account of the phenomenon in Thailand. Judicialization involves several
interrelated processes. Accounting for this dynamic, this section proposes a framework that
combines aspects from several approaches. The framework is contextual in that it is tailored to
the specific institutional design of the Administrative Court. This framework combines the
rights-based and court-centric approaches with modifications. Judicialization begins once
individuals’ submit plaint(s) to the court because without cases, judges have nothing to decide.
Following this, judges are then responsible for making decisions. Ultimately, it points to the
importance of ensuring that frameworks are appropriate to the institution in question which can
subsequently determine which individuals(s) are relevant for explanation. In the case of
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judicialization for this dissertation, both plaintiffs and judges are relevant for explanation.
Therefore the framework includes the following:
1. First, individuals’ decision to use the court begins judicialization. This reflects a willingness or
desire to use the court. While rights-based approaches to judicialization present the phenomenon
as largely dependent on an increasing rights-consciousness of society, this dissertation
operationalizes willingness based on public perceptions toward elected institutions and nonelected institutions. Discussing individuals’ motivations to use the court, Cortner (1968) argues
that there is an inverse relationship between individuals’ perceptions of alienation towards
elected institutions and the judiciary is indicative of their willingness to pursue litigation against
government. In particular, high perceptions of alienation towards elected institutions and low
perceptions of alienation towards the judiciary are likely to lead individuals to pursue ligation.
Likewise, Tate and Vallinder (1994; 1995) argue that judicialization correlates with an inverse
relationship between (public) perceptions towards the judiciary versus elected institutions. In
particular, perceptions that are favorable towards the judiciary and less favorable towards elected
institutions are likely to lead to judicialization. The opposite would indicate the absence of
judicialization.
This dissertation’s framework includes public perception of the civilian bureaucracy
within its analysis of public opinion surveys data of non-elected institutions given that the
Administrative Court is primarily responsible for adjudicating cases between individual(s) and
the bureaucracy. The inclusion of the civilian bureaucracy affords greater conclusiveness with
respect to understanding future trends in judicialization. This contributes to the judicialization of
politics literature because it underscores the importance of public perceptions because they are
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able to indicate willingness to sue. Finally, understanding public perceptions of
institutions/individuals that are jurisdiction-specific can provide an indication of the
phenomenon’s future.
2. Understanding the judiciary’s formal institutional rules and in particular the measures to
establish independence (de jure) as well as judge’s actual ability to make decisions
independently (de facto) is vital. First, judicialization necessitates independence for judges to
make decisions without interference from outside (f)actors. As chapter four will elaborate, the
Administrative Court’s formal institutional composition affords judges protection from direct
interference in the appointment, removal, disciplinary, and budget process. Rios-Figueroa (2011)
uses five indices to determine the extent of independence: (1) judges’ selection and appointment
process, (2) tenure length of judges versus appointer, (3) the appointment procedure’s
relationship with tenure length, (4) whether judges’ removal process requires 2/3 of legislature
tenure, (5) whether there is a particular quota of judges and the budget process.25
As Peerenboom (2004) notes, nearly every regime, democratic, authoritarian or
otherwise, has a “thin” version of the rule of law. Actual independence, (de facto) depends on the
actors involved (structure). Agreeing with Leyland (2006) and Mutebi (2006), this dissertation
finds the Administrative Court of Thailand’s de facto independence has been impressively
resilient across several governments and regimes. Judicialization has occurred in democratic and
authoritarian regimes albeit at a more limited scale in the latter. The study finds that the only
actor who is capable of eliminating the court’s independence is King Bhumipol Abdulyadej.

25

Although Rios-Figueroa (2011) is particularly referring to constitutional courts, there is no indication that this should not apply
to other courts irrespective of a particular type.
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When King Bhumipol Adulyadej is involved, the politicalization of the Administrative Court
results.
3. De facto independence is conceptualized as the court’s willingness to adjudicate cases.26 This
study uses three indicators from statistics that reflect the Administrative Court’s activity. First,
the number of cases that the court accepts compared to those that they reject. Second, the number
of cases that the court has fully adjudicated in comparison with those that it has not. Without an
actual decision, judicialization remains incomplete. Third, the amount of cases filed within the
Office of Case Enforcement that are adjudicated compared to cases that are remain ongoing
indicates the extent to which the court is going to ensure implementation of cases under dispute.
Fortunately, the Office of the Administrative Court of Thailand collects all of this information.

Understanding the specific context is important because it helps identify any (f)actors which
would eliminate the judiciary’s independence. This study submits that Thailand’s revered King
Bhumipol Abdulyadej is capable of affecting the court’s independence thus leading to
politicalization of the judiciary. McCargo’s (2005) “network monarchy” conceptualizes the
fluidity of the King’s influence and means by which he is able to exert it to and through others.
For example, the King usually employs Privy Council President Prem Tinsulonand as a
messenger de force to “communicate” his interests. As this dissertation will later show, on
occasion, the King will exert his influence. When this occurs, the judiciary, like all Thai

26

That the judicialization of politics literature conceptualizes judges to be strategic actors complicate the notion of assuming
independence is captured based on a particular decision. Judges may avoid cases or delay ruling both of which are part and parcel
of pure stratagem that is attributed to their independence.
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institutions, lack independence. This affirms McCargo (2014) timely reminder that questions of
judicialization should be based on a case/issue basis and is much more fluid than earlier scholars
have previously conceptualized.
In an attempt to develop a framework to explain judicialization of courts in Asia, Dressel
(2012) used de facto independence and the degree of judicial activity. While informative, the
relationship misses one from the important question of instances of politicalization and
judicialization. For instance, the degree of a politicized court’s involvement in mega-politics
questions does not say anything about de facto independence. Ultimately, both Cambodia and the
Thai Constitutional Court from 2006-2010 are, in essence politicized by an external actor. The
question of both Cambodia’s muteness and Thailand’s activity may have more to do with the
regime type, in particular the amount of space given to make decisions than institutional
variables. For instance, the court’s activity should not be based on its degree but type. This
means that judges’ ability to make decisions on its own versus areas/instances where it is unable.
In this sense, de facto independence itself may be predicated on the identification of specific
factors.
Although McCargo (2014) and writers on Thai politics (Dressel, ibid) are accurate in
their observation that politicalization of the Thai judiciary has produced (conservative) outcomes
that have limited elected governments, this is incomplete. This study argues that in addition to
politicalization of the judiciary, genuine judicialization of Thai politics has occurred.
Furthermore, over the years the Administrative Court has made notable progressive decisions in
favor of individuals and local communities and, in turn, against government. The Administrative
Court in particular offers an interesting case of both judicialization and politicalization but this
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depends on the actors involved. Judicialization and politicalization are fluid concepts and thus
the proposed framework is able to capture.
The Judicialization of Thai Politics: Calls for the Administrative Court
Most of the literature on the judiciary’s increasingly political relevance in Thailand
centers more on politicalization than judicialization. Many studies claim, or at least allude to,
courts making decisions under the direction of King Bhumipol Adulyadej. Such an account
paints the judiciary as the lackey of the King who seeks to use the institution to limit the powers
of popular politicians they do not favor. To various degrees, McCargo (2014), Hewison (2010),
Dressel (2008, 2012) and others argue that the judiciary has not enjoyed the necessary autonomy
needed to make independent decisions. Because of the ability of the so-called “elites”—the
“network monarchy”— to influence the court, the result has been, in their eyes, politicalization
of the courts.

But this approach assumes that the monarchy’s interests are always invested. This is
simply not true and, while it is important to note instances to the contrary, they remain a rarity.
On the contrary, scholarship on the Administrative Court’s activity has largely presumed the
institution to be more independent and professional than both the Constitutional Court and
Supreme Court of Justice. In fact, Mutebi (2006, 316) writes, “In contrast to other watchdog
bodies, the Administrative Court’s Justices have been lauded for their probity, their rigour,
constitutional values, and flexibility in implementing secondary laws that might infringe on
public liberty or well-being. These principles have all too often been overlooked, or virtually
derided in some instances, by other constitutionally mandated watchdog agencies including the
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Constitutional Court, the NCCC, and the EC. From the moment the Administrative Court handed
down the historic ruling in June 2002 on a scandal involving the Prime Minister’s use of the
Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) for an illegal investigation into the banking
transactions of journalists critical of his government, the Court has proven to be a key arena for
questioning the abuse of state power.”
Further, public law professor Peter Leyland (2006; 2011) has researched and written
extensively on the Administrative Court and suggests that the court is one of the most
professional and independent in the country. If indeed true, it would make the prospects for
judicialization greater than politicalization. As the chapter on the Administrative Court’s history
and institutional design will convey, the court is afforded independence, a luxury that institutions
like Constitutional Court of Thailand did not have. This dissertation argues that, depending on
the interests involved, both have in fact occurred. Both politicalization and judicialization are
fluid and can occur within the same court irrespective of regime type.
Conclusion
As this chapter has made clear, judicialization involves several interrelated actors on
multiple levels. This is an important reminder because, like all phenomena, there are several
factors that explain its occurrence. With respect to the Administrative Court of Thailand,
approaches that can combine the institutional, court-centered and rights-centered perspectives are
able to offer a more comprehensive account. One of the key contributions of this research is that
it demonstrates judicialization is fluid and can occur irrespective of the regime. It also
demonstrates that understanding public perceptions can help identify current reasons why the
court is active and the phenomenon’s future.

CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study utilized two data collection methods: approximately 40 in-depth semistructured interviews and five case studies. In addition, this study incorporated several secondary
sources: official case statistics, public opinion surveys and official case summaries—all of which
are publicly available. Such methods and data sources correspond with those that previous
judicialization of politics scholarship has employed.1 This study uses what is referred to as
“triangulation” of different methods—quantitative and qualitative. Both compliment each other’s
inherent strengths and weaknesses. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 5-6) submit, “Neither
quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to the other, regardless of the research problem
being addressed.” In fact, the majority of judicialization scholarship uses qualitative methods,
and in particular, the crucial case study method.2 Of such studies, it is rare to gain access to
judges—a privilege that this dissertation includes.
This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section explains the design that this study
used to answer the research questions. This includes the introduction of several concepts, their
operationalization and associated indicators. Following a brief summary of the judicialization of

1

Most studies have examined crucial case(s) that demonstrate judicialization. For more see: McCargo (2014) Dressel (2012)
edited work on Asia, in Sieder et al (2005) some of the chapters by both Espinosa and Smulovitz includes court case statistics to
demonstrate the area of judicialization and the impact in terms of citizens higher propensity to use the court. Tate and Vallinder
(1994) early work.
2
Eckstein (1975, 118) defines the crucial case study methods as, “one that most closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence
in the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit well with any rule contrary to that proposed.”
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politics approaches that this study utilizes, the second section presents this dissertation’s key
hypotheses. In addition, the section explains the selection criterion used for field sites visits as
well as case studies. The third section discusses the instruments that the study utilized to collect
data. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the sources of data, duration of research
and limitations.
Conceptual Overview
Judicialization is the process by which the courts and judges become more active in
determining political questions. Specifically, this study uses Hirschl’s (2008) definition, which
better conceptualizes these processes as: “(1) the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules, and
procedures into the political sphere and policy making forums and processes; (2) judicialization
of public policy-making through “ordinary” administrative and judicial review; and (3) the
judicialization of “pure politics”—the transfer to the courts of matters of an outright political
nature and significance, including core regime legitimacy and collective identity questions that
define (and often divide) whole polities.”
By focusing on the court’s activity in administrative cases and “purer” politics, this study
focuses on the second and third aspects. For example, a discussion of cases involving
administrative decisions related to the transfer of high-ranking bureaucrats as well as the
decisions to annul the re-run of districts in a national election and the annulment of a foreign
policy that prolonged border skirmishes and led to the loss of lives and damage to the local
economy.
Finally, this dissertation examines the impact of judicialization on Thai politics and
government. Whether or not judicialization leads to the improvement of the quality of democracy
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and efficiency of administration is also contingent on how judges make decisions. As the
literature review elaborated, judicialization has strengthened both democratic and authoritarian
regimes in areas such as economic management and administrative oversight. In other examples,
judicialization has yielded results that have, to the chagrin of leadership, created avenues for
opponents to successfully challenge and undermine incumbents. In Egypt, for example, limited
political space for the judiciary led to judicialization that had spillover effects. This was a
consequence that regime leadership had not intended to have happen. Likewise, in democracies,
judicialization can allow groups that lack support from the majority to stifle popular will.
But the court’s activity is not just explained by the court and judges alone. Indeed as
Holland (1991, 9) reminds us, “rarely are courts permitted to be self-starters, searching on their
own initiative for social injustices in need of remedy. They rely upon private litigants or political
institutions to place policy questions on their docket. Where there is relatively easy and cheap
access to the courts, the potential for activism is greater.” Plaintiffs are a necessary component in
explaining judicialization in Thailand. As a result, this study focuses on the activity of plaintiffs,
as well as courts and judges to explain judicialization. In this endeavor, the two approaches
found in the literature that are most relevant are the court-centric and bottom-up types. One
vantage point of analyzing two actors is that it follows Geddes’s (2003, 23) advice “ to divide the
big question into the multiple processes that contribute to it and propose explanations for the
separate processes rather than the compound outcome as a whole.” This is important when
attempting to research complex phenomenon like judicialization. Given the numerous factors
involved in judicialization, this will allow the study to avoid oversimplification at the expense of
accuracy.
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In order to capture the actors and the dynamic in which they operate, the study utilizes
different variables, indicators and methods of collection. As discussed in the literature review
chapter, the court-centric approach positions both courts and judges as the key actors driving the
process. By focusing on the court’s activity and the behavior of judges, and in particular how
they make decisions, this approach demonstrates that judicialization does not occur by
happenstance but, to the contrary, through the purposeful actions of both the courts and the
judges.
Based on the classic study by Epstein and Knight (1998, 10-11), what is popularly
referred to as the “strategic model” of judicial decision-making employs assumptions from
neoclassical economics’ rational choice theory. As such, their argument depict judges as
calculated decision-makers aspiring to achieve their most desired preferences within the context
of institutional constraints and the anticipated reactions of other actors. This borrows from this
judicial politics literature and presents judges as political actors who conceal their preferences
under the guise of jurisprudence and the particular facts of the case. But who exactly are these
judges and what are their preferences? Indeed as the literature review suggested, scholars
characterize Thai judges as conservative in orientation. In both of their respective studies, Sulak
(1971) and McCargo (2015) find Thai judges to have a conservative understanding of their and
the judiciary’s role in society. Judges’ envision their responsibilities as sanctioning elected
institutions and individuals.
One reason for this conservatism lies in judges’ widespread belief that they are
representatives of the monarchy—particularly that of King Adulyadej Bhumipol. As a result,
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judges’ behavior mirrors King Bhumipol’s historically-questionable commitment to liberal
democracy and progressive values and are thus more concerned with the stability and the
maintenance of the status quo.1 This contrasts with more progressive ideals of the judiciary’s role
that seek to advance social rights and ameliorate injustices. According to McCargo (2014), most
judges perceive themselves as extensions of the monarchy and, thus protectors of the nation who
exist to punish politicians as well as sanction governance misperformance(s), including populist
policies. Thus he concludes that, despite the more liberal aspirations that judicialization could
advance more progressive outcomes, such as the protection and advancement of citizens’ rights
against more powerful interests, outcomes have been of a more demos-limiting spirit. The
judicialization of Thai politics will continue to lead to the weakening of elected institutions.
Although McCargo (2014) concedes that his assessment of a more conservative judiciary
may not be applicable to the courts that originated in the 1997 Constitution; however, his
conclusion may nevertheless be salient because, like the Supreme Court of Justice, the majority
of judges who date back to the 1997 Constitution are former bureaucrats and, many, are judges
from pre-existing courts. With respect to the Administrative Court of Thailand, some of the
judges from the Supreme Administrative Court were from the Council of State as well as other
courts.2 McCargo aptly notes the multiple outcomes that judicialization can produce. Earlier
scholarship had failed to distinguish among the outcomes that judicialization produces.3

1

Several authors (Connors, 1999), Hewison (1997) McCargo (2002), and Handley (2008) have illustrated that King Bhumipol is
no democrat and has even, in fact, either directly or indirectly, undermined individuals, institutions and norms necessary for a
truly liberal democratic government (see in particular McCargo 2005).
2
Prior to the creation of the Administrative Court, the Council of State was the institution formally responsible for adjudicating
grievances between bureaucracy and citizen.
3
For instance, just because economic inequality may be higher in some liberal democracies than others it does not mean that
they are not democratic.
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The published literature that explains judicialization from the perspective of plaintiffs
attempts to understand the key factors that explain their decision to pursue litigation. Two key
perspectives are found in the bottom-up literature. The first perspective correlates attitudes
toward elected institutions and the judiciary, with the decision to pursue litigation. For example,
Tate and Vallinder (1994) state that judicialization is likely when the public’s perceptions are
negative towards elected institutions and more positive towards the judiciary. The two authors
follow Cortner’s (1968) argument that perceptions of alienation/marginalization led to either a
greater willingness or averseness to pursing litigation. This study used public opinion surveys to
measure Thais’ perceptions towards not only political institutions but also the bureaucracy and
the judiciary. Further, because the Administrative Court is primarily responsible for adjudicating
cases involving the bureaucracy, this dissertation also includes public opinion survey results
concerning the bureaucracy/bureaucrats.4
Another perspective that explains judicialization from plaintiffs’ point of view essentially
argues that it is seen as a convenience in the sense that it reduces the costs of litigation and
affords continued access. Epp’s (1998, 3) “rights-enhancing judicialization” thesis which argues
that the “masses”, in particular litigants, drive the process through the use of “institutional
support structures.” However, given the context, this argument must be modified because of Thai
civil society’s longstanding weakness—especially in the areas of advancing rights. For example,
Epp’s demonstrates how litigants relied on institutionalized-support that afforded sustained

4

In case of the Administrative court, usually the defendant party is the bureaucracy thus the inclusion of individuals’
perceptions.
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access to the court necessary for judicialization. Although for Epp, this institutional support
originated from non-state sources, one can argue that the Administrative Court itself provides the
necessary resources needed for continued access. Such resources include provision of free legal
consultations, non-required legal representation, the elimination of court fees for litigants, many
of whom are poor, provision for cases that do not involve administrative contracts and a
generous time period for filing grievances—90-day and 1 year for administrative contracts. The
study assumes that the Administrative Court of Thailand’s support structure may provide
plaintiffs with the motive necessary to pursue litigation.

Independent Variable(s) (X):
Within the judicialization of politics literature there is a lack of consensus with respect to
understanding plaintiffs’ motives for pursuing legal action. The larger literature on plaintiffs’
motives is voluminous.5 For example, explaining the expansion of rights as a result of activity
from the masses, Epp’s (1998) “rights-enhancing judicialization” thesis presents this as the result
of plaintiffs’ activity and in particular the use of support mechanisms needed to sustain activity.
Tate’s initial chapter in Tate and Vallinder (1995) argues that the inverse relationship
between perceptions towards elected institutions and the judiciary will determine the extent to
which individuals pursue legal mediation. In particular, when individuals have unfavorable
perceptions towards elected institutions and more favorable ones towards the judiciary, they are
more likely to use the courts; hence judicialization is the result. This argument follows Richard
Cortner’s (1968) in explaining that people’s perceptions of marginalization and disadvantage

5

For an overview of the litigation literature, see the chapter by McCann in Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira (2008).
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from elected institutions determine the extent to which they are likely to pursue litigation.
Instances where there are unfavorable perceptions towards (1) elected institutions and (2) elected
officials and (3) the bureaucracy and civil servants, and; (4) more favorable perceptions towards
the judiciary translate into individuals who are more likely to use the judiciary to mediate their
dispute.
I operationalized those four variables by using the results from existing public opinion
surveys that assess citizens’ perceptions of government and public officials. Although the survey
sample size did not specifically target former Administrative plaintiffs, it serves as a more
reliable proxy. The surveys ask questions related to trust, corruption and, first and foremost, they
are more representative of public opinion than surveys that would just draw from former
plaintiffs input. This more representative sample will provide a better account of the general
population opinions and as a result offer conclusions that produce a more accurate snapshot of
the current and future direction of judicialization.
The public opinion surveys are from the following sources: the Asia Foundation,
Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index and Global Corruption Barometer,
The World Values Survey, King Prajadhipok’s Institute and the Asia Barometer Study.6 Results
from numerous public opinion surveys in order to assess Thai citizens’ sentiments about
numerous institutions both elected and non-elected. I sought to determine whether results are
consistent across the surveys, given that the questions address a similar theme: citizens’
perception of key institutions and actors in their country, both elected and non-elected. All of the

6

The Asia Foundation: http://asiafoundation.org/, Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index and Global
Corruption Barometer: https://www.transparency.org/, The World Values Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp,
King Prajadhipok’s Institute: http://kpi.ac.th/ and the Asia Barometer: http://www.asianbarometer.org/.
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surveys included a relatively large number of respondents, which helped control for random
measurement error. In addition, in order to address concerns about the validity of citizen
perceptions, some surveys asked different questions related to citizen perceptions of elected
institutions and individuals. For example, in 2009 and 2010, the Asia Foundation conducted
surveys that examined Thai opinion about the “institutional integrity” and “institutional
neutrality” of several institutions, including the judiciary. In 2007, 2008 and 2010 Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception’s Index survey asked 500 respondents’ about their
perception of the then current government’s effort in the fight against corruption, as well as
whether they perceived government corruption as becoming better, worse or remaining constant.
In addition, I used the King Prajadhipok Institute (KPI) series of surveys of Thais from
2002-2010 that asked respondents about the extent of their trust in various committees,
institutions, “independent” bodies and agencies. Results from a series of KPI surveys are
particularly valuable because they allow the study to compare not only the judiciary with other
elected institutions but also because it separated the judiciary into three major courts: the
Supreme Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court, and the Administrative Court. As a result,
this survey differentiates the courts. This allows this study to be more precise than those that
employ the generic term ‘judiciary’, which can be misleading. For example, if citizens consider
the term ‘judiciary’ in answering a question about the ‘judiciary’ to mean either the
Constitutional Court or Supreme Court as opposed to the Administrative Court, then results
recoding their perceptions can be misleading.
In order to assess respondents’ perceptions of institutions, this study uses survey results
from Transparency International in order to assess perceptions of corruption, the extent to which
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citizens believe their government is addressing corruption, and which institutions are perceived
the most corrupt. Finally, the study used results from a 2007 Asia Barometer survey to assess the
extent to which respondents are confident in the elected and non-elected institutions such as
parliament, elected officials, and the judiciary.
Tate in Tate and Vallinder (1994; 1995, 28-33) suggests the instruments that comprise
judicialization—separation of powers, democratic governments, a legal document such as a
constitution and/or bill of rights that guarantee liberties for all individuals as well as legal
institutions (courts) are called on to adjudicate disputes. In addition, Tate believes that negative
perceptions towards elected institutions and positive perceptions of the judiciary are important.
Nonetheless, he (ibid. 1995, 33) ultimately concludes that even when these conditions are
present, judicialization is not a foregone conclusion. Recognizing this reality, in addition to the
aforementioned surveys, during in-depth semi-structured interviews with former plaintiffs, I also
asked about the key factors that led them to decide to sue.7
This dissertation adopts the court-centric approach, which ultimately presents both courts
and judges as the key drivers in the expansion of judicialization. This perspective includes two
indicators at two different levels: at the macro-level (institution’s activity) and at the micro-level
(individual judges’ activity). From the macro-perspective, the independent variable that captures
its activity is the number of cases that the court accepts for adjudication. This number
distinguishes cases between the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme Administrative Court.

7

Finally, to assess judicialization’s impact on former plaintiffs, in particular their relationship with the bureaucrats/bureaucracy,
this study asked during interviews.
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At the micro-level, judges’ activities are captured by their decision-making. The courtcentered approach assumes that judges are strategic actors who make decisions based on their
goals/preferences, the anticipated reactions of other actors, and the institutional context. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the judicial decision-making literature also provides multiple
perspectives about the key factors that judges consider. Individual judges’ preferences as well as
their understanding of the anticipated reactions of other actors, mainly the two parties and the
Thai media, are captured through interviews. The institutional context refers to the
Administrative Court’s procedures for decision-making and its effect was also asked during
interviews.
Dependent Variable(s) (Y):
The dependent variables that this study uses to capture the judicialization of politics from
the perspectives of former plaintiffs is found within the court’s case statistics. First, the annual
number of consultations that the court provides is able to more accurately capture judicialization
than the number of cases finally submitted and accepted by the court. The number illustrates that
individuals are at the very least (re)defining their relationship between themselves and the state
in the language of the law. This too demonstrates the presence of judicialization and provides a
more accurate number with respect to actual cases that enter the judiciary. However, in
recognition of the importance of individual(s) decision to use the courts, this study includes the
total number of plaints submitted to both the Courts of First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court.
The dependent variables that captures judicialization from the court-centric perspective of
courts and judges is also captured within the court’s official statistics. First is the annual number
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of cases that the court completes. While in the act of accepting cases, the court legitimates plaints
within its jurisdiction, the actual adjudication of cases is used as an indicator. Second, another
indicator is the number of cases that the Office of Case Enforcement accepts and resolves. A
division within the Office of the Administrative Court, the Office of Case Enforcement is largely
responsible for ensuring the timely adherence to the court’s ruling.
This dissertation also provides insight into the question of decision-making. Although
court statistics and records of cases summaries provide valuable insight into the court’s activity,
including the actual decision, it fails to provide any indication about judges’ individual decision
or anything about the judges themselves. Further, because the court uses the collegial model,
judges’ individual votes are not included. To compensate for this omission, this researcher
interviewed judges. During these interviews, judges at both the Supreme Administrative Court
and Courts of First Instance throughout the country were asked how they make decisions.
Understanding the process that judges use when making decisions permits this study to provide a
more in-depth account of the judicialization process. Ultimately, for judges, their collective
decision alone is the outcome variable.
Hypotheses
This study submits the following hypotheses that will be explored in this dissertation. The
focus on several relationships that this study will uncover will lead to a better understanding of
judicialization in the Administrative Courts of Thailand.
Rights-Centric (Mass-based) Approach
Proposition 1: Former plaintiffs’ perception of representative political institutions (e.g. the
Parliament) impacts whether or not they will address their grievances through litigation.
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Specifically, those who use the courts perceive that they are most alienated from elected
institutions and individuals.8
Hypothesis 1a: Thais have a less favorable perception of elected institutions relative to the
judiciary.
Null Hypothesis H01: Thais have a more favorable perception of elected institutions relative to
the judiciary.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Thais have a less favorable perception of the Prime Minister relative to the
judiciary.
Null Hypothesis H01a: Thais have a more favorable perception of the Prime Minister relative to
the judiciary.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Thais have a less favorable perception of Parliament relative to the
judiciary.
Null Hypothesis H01b: Thais have a more favorable perception of Parliament relative to the
judiciary.
Hypothesis 1c (H1c): Thais have a less favorable perception of political parties relative to the
judiciary.
Null Hypothesis H01c: Thais have a more favorable perception of political parties relative to the
judiciary.
Hypothesis 1d (H1d): Thais have more negative perceptions of politicians relative to the
judiciary.

8

In addition to Cortner, both Schepple and Walker, (1991) and Vose (1959) find that the politically disadvantaged see the court
as their last resort in addressing grievances.
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Null Hypothesis 1d (H01d): Thais have a more favorable perception of politicians relative to the
judiciary.
Hypothesis 1e (H1e): Thais have a less favorable perception of the civilian
bureaucracy/bureaucrats relative to the judiciary.
Null Hypothesis H01e: Thais have a more favorable perception of bureaucrats relative to the
judiciary.
Proposition 2: Former plaintiffs’ decide to use the Administrative Court because of their desire
to oppose rights violations from defendant(s) in question as well as because the Administrative
Court makes litigation easy.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Plaintiffs use the Administrative Court to defend rights’ violation(s).
Null Hypothesis 2(H02): Plaintiffs will declare that they used the Administrative Court for
reasons unrelated to defending themselves against rights violations. Plaintiffs will also respond
that rights violations were not a factor in their decision to submit their plaint.
Proposition 3: The Administrative Court of Thailand accepts more cases than it rejects.
Hypothesis (H3a): The total number of plaints that the Administrative Court accepts increases.
Null Hypothesis (H03a): The total number of plaints that the Administrative Court accepts
decreases.
Hypothesis (H3b): There is a steady increase in the number of cases that the Supreme
Administrative Court accepts as appeals from the Administrative Courts of First Instance.
Null Hypothesis (H03b): There is a steady or dramatic decline in number of cases that the
Supreme Administrative Court accepts as appeals from the Administrative Courts of First
Instance.
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Hypothesis 3c (H3c): There is a steady increase in number of cases that the Supreme
Administrative Court accepts directly.
Null Hypothesis (H03c): There is a steady or dramatic decline in number of cases that the
Supreme Administrative Court accepts directly.
Hypothesis 3e (H3e): There is a steady increase in the number of cases that are filed with the
Administrative Courts of Thailand.
Null Hypothesis (H03e): There is a steady or dramatic decline in number of cases that
individual(s) filed with the Administrative Courts of Thailand.
Proposition 4: Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and the Supreme
Administrative Court, make decisions based on a strategic calculus.
Hypothesis (H4a): Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court consider their goals/preferences when making decisions.
Null Hypothesis (H04a): Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court do not consider their goals/preferences when making decisions.
Hypothesis (H4b): Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court, consider the anticipated actions of other plaintiffs and defendants when
making decisions.
Null Hypothesis (H04b) Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court, do not consider the anticipated actions of other plaintiffs and defendants
when making decisions.
Hypothesis (H4c): Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court, consider institutional constraints when making decisions.
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Null Hypothesis (H04b): Administrative Court judges, both of the First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Court, do not consider institutional constraints when making decisions.
Methodology and Data
In order to be as methodologically comprehensive as possible, this dissertation
incorporates triangulation: case study, qualitative, and quantitative approaches. For example,
obtaining the perspectives of judges in terms of how they make decisions, I conducted semistructured interviews with current and former administrative court judges serving in five courts.
The Office of the Administrative Court did not respond to my initial formal interview request
letter for judges and staff. Given the sensitive title of my dissertation, the sensitive nature of the
topic, and my status as a political science student, I completely understood.
However, I was fortunate to gain initial access to an Administrative Court judge through
a personal contact who is a senior-ranking politician within the Democrat Party who offered to
contact a senior Administrative Court of First Instance judge who was serving in a regional
court.9 After interviewing this judge, they then agreed to help facilitate other interviews with
other judges within the court. In addition to this contact, a personal friend of mine who was a
former journalist had many contacts with many former pro-Thai Rak Thai/People’s Power
Party/Phua Thai politicians, as well as judges in the Administrative Courts, both First Instance
Courts and the Supreme Administrative Court. After these interviews, I then used those judges
that I interviewed to gain access to other judges in a snowballing sampling manner.10

9

At the time, I was unaware of the irony of the situation. The fact that a well-known politician helped a doctoral student
conducting research on judicialization contact a judge who was a close friend should have reassured me that the topic and court
in question was relevant.
10
While not able use a sampling method that was random, given the sensitivity of the topic and my identity, the snowballing
sampling method was appropriate.
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In order to maintain integrity, before and after each interview I assured interviewees that
their identities would be held in strict confidence; all interview notes would be stored in a safe
and reliable location; and they would not have to sign anything11. Each interview with judges
lasted approximately two hours, as well as for those who granted me the opportunity for
additional follow-up. Prior to each interview, each judge was provided with a copy of the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) form, in Thai, which informed them of the study’s purpose,
their rights and privileges. Each judge was then verbally informed that they do not have to
answer any question they were not comfortable with; their identity would not be disclosed at any
time; and due to their voluntary participation, they could terminate the interview at any time.
The judicialization of politics within the context of the Administrative Court is about
(re)defining the relationship between citizen and state with respect to particular state agencies
and officials, this should be captured by in-depth interviews and, the statistical data that the
Office of the Administrative Court gathered. For example, the Administrative Court’s Justice
Development Institute is a division under the Office of the Administrative Court that is
responsible for training both provincial and central Thai bureaucrats about the court,
administrative law and their rights and privileges relative to the court and citizens. While they
conducted surveys assessing the effectiveness of the courts’ influence on the bureaucracy in
terms of improving service delivery and transparency, the professionalism and reliability of these
studies are questionable.

11

The court was hesitant primarily because of the word, “politics” in the phrase judicialization of politics.” Most judges
expressed discomfort with this term as they thought my project was about exposing corrupt judges.
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First Instance
This study incorporated a within-country comparison method. Within-country
comparisons allow for control of extraneous variables. For instance, focusing on a single
institution like the Administrative Court assists in controlling for variables such as culture, time,
and institutional rules. There are nine regional Administrative Courts distributed throughout
Thailand, called the Administrative Courts of First Instance, four of which I examined were in
regions in the North, Northeast, Central and South. In addition, to visiting a Court of First
Instance located in central Thailand, this study also includes interviews with judges from the
Supreme Administrative Courts. I selected a court in each of these regions because they
represent each of the regions in the country. While every court has institutional rules, I did not
assume that all judges make decisions according to the same motivations; nor do I assume that
plaintiffs’ motivations for using the court are uniform.
Because this dissertation examines 4 of the 9 lower level (First Instance) courts that have
the largest number of cases, there may be accusations of selection bias. One reason why this
study did not include some courts was because they had yet to be opened. Because all of the
courts have the same procedures in terms of standards for accepting, rejecting or transferring
cases, I argue that the decision to choose these particular courts was not detrimental to the
reliability of the findings. One reason why I chose the most active courts (those with the most
cases accepted) was to ensure that judges had a sufficient amount of experience to provide
answers that were productive. The study avoids accusations of regional bias and ensures that
much of the country was sufficiently represented geographically.
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Case Study Selection Criterion

In addition to the analysis of public opinion survey data and in-depth interviews, this
dissertation incorporates the case study method to assist in the explanation of the impact of
judicialization in politics.12 As George and Bennett (2005) state, the benefits of case studies are
manifold. They provide a richer context of the phenomena than is offered from studies relying
solely on quantitative data. While the approach can be criticized as “suffering” from “thick
description”, many argue that they can be parsimonious and focused on key variables and events
that help to clearly explain the phenomenon in question.

Shortcomings
Like all studies there are methodological shortcomings. First, the study was limited to
plaintiffs’ perspective(s) with respect to their relationships with the (bureaucracy) defendants.
This study could have focused more comprehensively on the Administrative Court’s impact in
the areas of policy development and implementation. Future studies could be well-positioned to
contribute to this knowledge. Further, the definition and concepts that this study uses are the
result of the author’s choice. While conventional definitions are geared towards judicialization
from the strict (limited) perspective of democratic governance, this dissertation challenges
readers to think beyond such a normative bias and acknowledge the manner in which the process
transcends regime type. Third, this dissertation did not survey plaintiffs and judges. The main
reason for this was the limitation in resources and the specific context within which the study

12

George and Bennett (2005, 5) defines this as, “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”
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was conducted. For example, the research topic was so sensitive that, when judges were
informed that the topic was judicialization, their reaction was not welcoming. They were more
cautious when discussing their decision-making and did not want to fill out a survey that I had
administered. Nonetheless, a larger, more representative sample from pre-existing surveys more
than compensate for this shortcoming. Fieldwork in Thailand began in August 2011 and
concluded in October 2014.

CHAPTER 4
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF THAILAND:
ORIGIN, PROCESS AND SIGNIFICANCE
This dissertation underscores the importance of two approaches, court-centric and rightscentric as integral to the explanation of the judicialization of Thai politics. While the former
emphasizes the court’s activity and judges’ decisions, the latter focuses on plaintiffs’ activity.
Neither judges nor plaintiffs operate in a vacuum. Both maneuver within the larger institutional
context of the Administrative Court of Thailand—in particular its formal rules and procedures. It
is important to understand these rules and procedures because they affect actors’ behavior. Both
judges’ strategic calculus and individuals’ decision to use the court includes consideration of the
institutional rules and procedures.
This chapter introduces the Administrative Court from a consideration of its historical
and institutional positions. The first section offers a brief overview of the Thai judiciary and
highlights the journey that lead to the 1997 Constitution’s establishment of the Administrative
Court of Thailand. Second, this chapter transitions to an examination of the court’s institutional
composition, including the structure, jurisdiction and the case-adjudication process. Third, and
closely related, this chapter turns to explaining the various ways in which the court’s rules
empowers both judges and plaintiffs. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of
independence from the perspective of the judiciary’s formal institutional design by using RiosFigeroa’s (2011) indices for assessing the extent to which the courts have established
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mechanisms to serve as safeguards from outside interference. While the court’s formal powers
are important, the chapter also makes clear that those powers alone are a necessary but
insufficient explanation for the judicialization of Thai politics through the Administrative Court.
The importance of agency, in particular, individuals’ decisions to use the court and judges’
decisionmaking are two necessary factors that are responsible for the phenomenon’s emergence.
Isolated cases are important to the extent that the result of judges lead to the creation and/or
elimination of important policies.

Prelude to the Court: Justice and the Struggle
to Establish the Administrative Court
Within the larger modernizing reforms during the Chakkri Reformation, in 1874 King
Chulalongkorn created an advisory body called the Council of State. Chulalongkorn was inspired
by the French Conseil d’Etat and created the new body to be comprised of legal and
administrative advisors to assist him in the management of the bureaucracy. Summarizing the
role of the new body, Bhalakula (2002, 5) notes, “The Council of State served, on the one hand,
as an organ providing advice to the King on issues related to the management of state affairs as
well as law-drafting on the one hand. On the other hand, it functioned as an organ to consider
petitions presented by the King’s subjects who were aggrieved or injured as a consequence of an
act by a State agency or State official or the adjudication of administrative disputes.”
With Chulalongkorn serving as president, the council’s approximately twenty
individuals, ranged from members of the royal family, noblemen and experts in administrative
affairs. Bhalakula further observes that despite the institution’s aspirations, due to several
redundancies in functions and the inability of the advisors to properly understand the function of
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the council, King Rama V dissolved the council twenty years later—reverting back to the
previous system of individuals petitioning the courts, the bureaucracy and/or the King directly.
In actuality however, the Council possessed no real autonomy, as the final decision always lay at
the king’s discretion.
Facing pressure to maintain independence and escape the colonialist ambitions of Britain
and France, Siam, under King Mongkut (Rama IV 1851-68) began to create a modern state.1
Pressured by British ambassador John Bowring to sign an agreement that would require Siam to
make embarrassingly generous economic and legal concessions, King Mongkut signed the 1855
Bowring Treaty that would essentially force Siam to open its protected markets to trade. In
addition, this treaty stipulated legal extra-territoriality for British citizens and those under its
protectorates. Understanding that other countries would want similar concessions, Mongkut
encouraged the participation of other Western powers to maintain its independence by avoiding
domination by any one power. King Mongkut realized that in order to maintain independence, as
serious transformation of his rudimentary government into a modern bureaucracy would be
needed.
Although Mongkut proceeded with these reforms cautiously, it was his successor son,
King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1868-1910), who carried out reforms in earnest. Admiring
European culture, history and development, King Chulalongkorn traveled extensively throughout
Europe in order to learn more about the modern advances in government and technology. He
even sent his children to Europe for education and a means of equipping to help lead Siam’s
development. Frustrated with underperforming fellow royals and other elites who were in

1

In 1939, the name ‘Kingdom of Siam’ was changed to the ‘Kingdom of Thailand’.
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command of departments, and desiring to accelerate reforms, Chulalongkorn used the strategy of
employing Western advisers. Writing about their importance, Vella (1955, 342) says, “It is
almost inconceivable that the modernization, centralization, and the increase in the efficiency of
the government begun in the 1890’s could have been achieved to any extent without the efforts
and instruction of the foreign advisers.” One notable adviser was a former lawyer, politician and
diplomat from Belgium named Dr. Gustave Rolin-Jacquemyns, who not only advised King
Chulalongkorn and was largely responsible for drafting all of the laws for the latter’s final
approval, but also advised Prince Ratburi or popularly referred to as Rabi who, would later serve
as the Minister of Justice. Of Dr. Rolin-Jacquemyns, Vella (ibid, 342) writes, “During his seven
years of service to the Thai government, he laid the foundation for reliance on legal arguments in
Thai foreign policy.”2
In 1932 a group of civilian and military officers overthrew the absolute monarchy and
promulgated a constitution in 1933 that included the establishment of an independent judiciary.
However, several events would prevent such provisions from coming to fruition. First, larger
political realities undermined the likelihood that the judiciary would possess any meaningful
independence and decision-making autonomy. Shortly after the establishment of the
constitutional monarchy, factionalism between civilian and military coalition parties in the
government emerged. The military’s decision to exile one of the principal architects of the 1932

Discussing the extent of Dr. Rolin-Jaequemyns’ influence, Tips (1992) concludes that he was largely responsible for drafting
most of the legal and administrative reforms for the modern criminal code. Quoting another foreign adviser, Tips (1992, 207)
notes, Rolin-Jaequemyns, “drafted or prepared all the laws and regulations, the diplomatic and administrative correspondence,
and was consulted on everything.” This points to the importance of foreign advisers’ important role in crafting the modern Thai
legal code as well as other areas of reform.2.As McCargo (2014b) notes, this illustrates the important but underappreciated
position that foreign advisors had in the early development the modern Thai state. For the origin and role of foreign advisers
during the Chakkri Reformation, see Vella (1955, 342-343).
2
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revolution, intellectual Pridi Phanomyong, from Thailand due to accusations that he was a
communist, signaled that the military would be the dominant faction. From that moment, the
Thai experiments with constitutional democracy would prove an exception to longstanding
periods of military rule. A series of coups and counter coups followed, although during that time
the military’s position was never seriously threatened by external forces.
Given that the Thai judicial system was a part of the civilian bureaucracy, the new
government absolved them from political influence. Not only was the military in control, they, of
course, used their own courts. Girling (1981,168) notes that under military rule, the country was
subject to martial law and as a consequence, “various cases may be subject to trial by military
courts without right to appeal.” Successive military-dominated governments circumscribed
politics and essentially circumvented opportunities for the judiciary to posses any political
relevance nor perform as an institution to administer justice.
While military rule obviated the judiciary’s relevance, evidence suggests that the courts
would not have been more assertive in politics even under a constitutional monarchy still in its
infancy. For one, the judiciary lacked the institutional powers necessary to make any significant
political gains. For example, Riggs (1966, 156) notes that the court lacked judicial review
powers with respect to the constitutionality of laws. This prerogative would not appear for
another six decades. Further, even before the creation of the Administrative Court of Thailand,
there still existed no independent institution to adjudicate grievances between citizens and the
bureaucracy. Finally, Thai legal historians assert that judges have continued to perceive
themselves as working primarily on behalf of the monarchy.
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Beginning in 1958, General Sarit Thanarat came to power and began to use the monarchy
to legitimate his dictatorship amongst Thais. The judiciary, like other bureaucratic entities, were
more interested in maintaining than challenging the status quo. Girling (1981, 167-168)
acknowledges that although “the judiciary prides itself on its integrity and maintenance of the
rule of law” he nonetheless concludes that it is “the product of Thai society, like the bureaucracy
itself” and thus would have been unlikely to challenge the larger politics of the day. Considering
the prospects of the judiciary initiating political change during longstanding cycles of military
rule, Thai intellectual Sulak Sivarak (1973, 50-51) is more blunt in saying, ”Although Thai
courts are free and worthy of respect, Thai judges, in general, have antiquated ideas and have not
been creative enough to bring about the reformation of Thai judicial procedures and to make
them more relevant to the present needs of the society.”
Administrative law in Thailand is a relatively recent development. In fact, the
establishment of the Administrative Court was the culmination of a decades-long process that
was not without opposition. Administrative Court historian and former Supreme Administrative
Court Vice-President, Dr. Bhokin Bhalakula (2001), writes that prior to the institution’s
establishment, four avenues for adjudicating grievances existed. First, people could use criminal
courts to mediate disputes between themselves and the particular bureaucrat(s) involved. This
more direct method targeted individual officials for their behavior, although, legally, the
consequences were never as serious as the court suggests. Administrative cases were not criminal
offences and absent a criminal act that could occur in certain circumstance, the administrative
cases were technically outside the jurisdiction of a criminal court. Second, individuals could also
appeal to criminal courts to appeal official administrative acts and orders. Administrative actions
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as such were less about an individual’s case per se but broader, as they dealt with larger
questions of policy. Much like the former individual cases, the Thai criminal code was not
appropriate for adjudicating administrative cases.
There were also informal mechanisms to adjudicate grievances. Third, individuals had
the ability to directly petition the administrative officials’ immediate supervisors with hopes that
the latter would rule in their interests and take remedial action. This, of course, depended entirely
on the discretion of the official(s) in question and thus on a more informal relationship between
actors. Finally, Thais had the opportunity to directly submit their grievance(s) to His Majesty the
King for personal mediation.3 However, it was extremely unlikely that a personal relationship
existed between king and subject. The latter two measures were considered outside of the formal
legal process. While in principle all of the aforementioned measures were available for the
aggrieved, in practice they all shared the distinction of lacking application. Citizens challenging
the bureaucracy’s authority were a rarity. Such lack of activity was a partial consequence of the
latter’s dominance over the citizenry.
These four means of adjudicating cases between private citizens and the bureaucracy
lasted until the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. In 1933 Prime Minister Pridi
Phanomyong resurrected the Council of State and placed it within the Office of the Prime
Minister. Similar in terms of hierarchy to its predecessor under the monarchy, this Council of
State comprised the Prime Minister as Chairman, a Secretary-General as head of administration,
and Councilors of State who served as advisors on administrative and legal issues. The
Councilors of State were further divided into two categories: law and petition councilors.

3

Bhalakula (2001,9)
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Appointed by the King to four-year terms, the former were mainly responsible for drafting laws
addressed to the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers, while also providing
legal counsel and opinions to state agencies, including those involving administrative orders.
Interestingly, despite a controversial place in Thai history, the Administrative Court attributes the
creation of modern administrative law and the origins of the court to the intellectual writings of
Pridi. In one of his lectures in 1932, he writes:

The special principles of government, such as the administrative rules concerning the relations
between government power and private individuals, exist in all countries, even in Siam in the
same way as other countries. We shall see in future study that there are many enactments which
lay down the rules of government power, for example, with respect to the power to establish
various ministries and offices. Also there are laws which regulate the practices of the
administration with respect to policing for maintaining peace and order, with respect to
activities for the welfare of the people, or with respect to strengthening the economy. In addition,
there are also enactments about administrative cases, for instance about appeals against various
orders by officials of the legal administrative department. All these matter are not civil,
commercial, or other private law. So they must be organized as another branch of law.4
Further partitioned into two categories, ordinary and special petition councilors were entrusted
with adjudicating administrative disputes. Despite these reforms, the Council of State was largely
ineffective because decisions were not legally binding, thus depriving the body of meaningful
authority to adjudicate cases. In fact, because there were no formal procedures for adjudicating
administrative cases, both in terms of petitioning the court as well as the legal proceedings
dispute parties, the Council as a whole was inoperative.
According to Bhalakula, one recurring challenge was that if a plaintiff were to submit
their grievance(s) about a particular action or act or decree, the Prime Minister, who concurrently
was responsible for the final ruling, could reject petitions out of hand or provide another excuse

4

Translated in Pasuk and Baker (2000).
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absolving the bureaucracy of any responsibility. Numerous efforts were made to address these
gaps. For example, in 1935 the government presented bills called, “The Powers and Duties of the
Council of State concerning Administrative Cases B.E. 2478” and the “Bill of Administrative
Proceedings” to the General Assembly, though both eventually died in the House of
Representatives.
In 1946 legislators attempted to pass the, “Bill on Administrative Cases Trial Partners.”
According to Bhalakula most of the opposition against these efforts came from institutions like
the Courts of Justice, which saw neither a need to create alternative procedures or another (rival)
court. The Courts of Justice viewed the Administrative Court as redundant and thus unnecessary
“idea” that would serve to usurp their powers. Although throughout the years from 1949-1973
legislators made numerous efforts to transform the Council of State into a de facto administrative
court, there was no attempt to create a formal court to adjudicate cases involving official
administrative acts and orders.
For example, in 1949 parliament passed the Petition Act, which mandated the
establishment of a Petition Commission purposed to adjudicate citizens’ petitions against
bureaucrats and/or their respective agencies. The commission performed important duties such as
considering petitions and making judgments that it would then submit to the Prime Minister for
consideration. As the final authority, the prime minister had complete discretion to approve,
reject or, in fact, provide his own judgment. While this system served as a de facto court, like the
second Council of State, the Commission was not a legal body, neither, as Bhalakula (2002,6)
notes, was the body “accomplished” because it was powerless. The Prime Minister had ultimate
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control. While technically, the Petition Commission co-existed and was independent from the
Council of State several overlapping jurisdictions created confusion.
Furthermore, for several reasons the commission was ineffective. First, the commission’s
adoption of civil court procedures produced numerous challenges, such as delays given that cases
were about administrative acts. Civil court procedures incorporated the adversarial approach,
which places the burden of proof on the two parties in dispute—in this case a private individual
versus a state agency or official. An obvious disadvantage was that the bureaucracy had
resources to defend itself and, given that, requests for evidence would require the cooperation of
the defendant. This was an obvious conflict of interest. Bhalakula (2007,46) aptly captures this in
writing, “The State agency, undeniably the more conversant of the two sides in the relevant laws
and facts, was left at large to dictate the direction of proceedings at the expense of injustices
suffered by the people.”
In addition to the adversarial approach of proceeding, the court lacked an impartial
arbiter. As was mentioned, this was absent given that, as final arbiter, the Prime Minister could
either agree with plaintiffs or reject the Petition Commission’s recommendations. This
represented a clear conflict of interest, because agreeing with private individuals ultimately
undermined the premier’s own power and policies. Discussing the politics inherent in the
commission’s role, Bhalakula (2007, 46) again notes, “If a case was not high on the Prime
Minister’s agenda, it may be delayed or wholly ignored.” In an interview, Dr. Bhalakula
discussed the prime minister’s actions in avoiding accountability. He stated, “that prime minister
would either purposely delay the proceedings, or the decision, and or ultimately disagree with the
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commission’s recommendation so as to ensure that the government always won the important
cases.”5
After widespread student-led protests resulted in the military dictatorship stepping down
and the ushering in of the first experiences of parliamentary democracy by civilian rule, on
October 6, 1974, Thailand’s first democratic constitution was promulgated and included
language in Section 212 creating an Administrative Court that was to be completely distinct from
the Court of Justice in terms of its jurisdiction. However, the constitution was vague because it
did not specify whether the court would be placed within the Court of Justice or exist entirely
divorced as a stand-alone court.
Ideas of resurrecting the Administrative Court were found in several pieces of legislation.
Section 70 of the Town Planning Act. (2518/ 1975). The Act on Land Reform for Agriculture
(2518/ 1975) also included language for using the court, provided that it was in existence.
Despite these promising developments, Thailand’s brief flirtation with parliamentary democracy
would prove to be short-lived, as the military overthrew the government in October 1976, only to
then overthrow the succeeding government the following year in October 1977. Preparing for a
general election, the military dictatorship passed the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand
B.E. 2521 (1978). However, this constitution did not include language calling for the
establishment of an administrative court.
In 1979, the Thai parliament once again approved the establishment of a Council of State
Act, which reformed the previous Petition Council by repealing and combing the functions from
the previous petition commission of The Act of on the Council of State, B.E. 2476 (1933) and the

5

Interview with Dr. Bhalakula on September 18, 2014.
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Petition Council Act, B.E. 2492 (1949) and unified the Law Drafting and Petition Councils,
respectively. Nevertheless, despite the attempt to resurrect the Council of State, it suffered from
the same deficiencies as its predecessor: lack of final decision-making authority for the council
as well as appropriate procedures for administrative cases. Following the government of the
unelected Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), there was no progress
towards the court’s development largely because of a dispute over whether the court should have
been under the purview of the Court of Justice or be an independent body with its own appellate
court—or under the purview of the Supreme Court.
According to Bhalakula, in terms of the eventual establishment of the Administrative
Court, the period between 1989-1996 proved to be the most critical. Following the Prem
government, the election of a completely civilian-led government was led by Prime Minister
(and former general) Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991). Parliament decided that upon its
establishment, an Administrative Court of Thailand would be independent and distinguished
from the Court of Justice. After the military removed the Choonhavan government in 1991,
Anand Panyarachun was appointed as interim prime minister until the 1992 elections. However
once the 1992 elections failed to produce an elected prime minister, the military, led by General
Suchinda Kraprayoon agreed to step in. Previously, General Suchinda had vowed to not to run.
Despite attempting to create the illusion that he was running as a civilian, mass protests erupted
only to have the military respond with a bloody crackdown in May 1992. With King Bhumipol’s
decision to intervene between protestors and military, Suchinda decided to step down. After this,
Anand was reappointed until elections.
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In September1992, the Democrat Party’s Chuan Leekpai was elected and formed a
government. Under the Leekpai government, heated discussions about establishing the court
were re-ignited. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai stated on October 21, 1992 that the government
wanted to formally establish the court by 1996. Despite the momentum that had been building, a
1995 land development project scandal involving several cabinet ministers resulted in their
subsequent resignation, effectively halting progress towards the establishment of an
administrative court because the Leekpai government collapsed.
Following a 1995 amendment to the then 1991 Constitution was language specifying that
the Administrative Court would be separate from the Courts of Justice. A new government under
Prime Minister Barnhan Silpa-archa would fail to advance the court. Due to the extent of
widespread corruption which would earn his government the nickname “Buffet Cabinet,” given
that cabinet members enriched themselves, the government was short-lived. The Administrative
Court’s slow development was partially a consequence of larger political crises; and it would
again take a back seat.
Following the Silpa-archa government’s dissolution, retired General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh and his New Aspiration Party coalition formed the next government. The tenure
of this government too would prove brief, as its inability to effectively manage and maneuver the
country’s faltering economy through the1997/8 East Asian financial crisis spelled its doom.
Assigning blame for the stunning collapse of the Thai economy to fiscal mismanagement
stemming from incompetent and corrupt politicians, an overwhelming majority of Thais became
weary of their control of government and lack of accountability in general. To some, the

91
weaknesses in the political system could be located in the institutional design, amendable only
through constitutional reform.
The previous constitution (1991) encouraged parliament to be comprised of large
coalition of political parties. This situation proved unstable and susceptible to corruption.
Governments were formed based on bargaining amongst parties for cabinet positions that were
then brought in to plunder the state. As a result, citizens viewed politicians and political parties,
which were deemed to be no more than a personal vehicle for corruption, as a cancer on
democracy and a well-functioning economy.
While the Banharn government created the constitutional drafting commission it was
under the succeeding the Choonhavan government that the body oversaw the establishment of
the 1997 Constitution. Popularly referred to as the “People’s Constitution” due to the
unprecedented amount of participation from civil society groups as well as intellectuals during
the drafting stage facilitated by the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). Under the theme of
“accountability” and “democratic deepening,” the 1997 Constitution established several
independent courts, including the Administrative Court. The court was tasked to adjudicate
disputes between aggrieved parties and the bureaucracy. The court was one of a nursery of
independent bodies that framers designed to provide citizens with enhanced powers to hold
public officials and bureaucrats accountable for their actions.6 Advocates of political reform
were strengthened by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that saw the baht collapse and Thailand

6

The other independent bodies were: National Anti-Corruption Commission, National Anti-Money Laundering Commission, and
the Constitutional Court.

92
accept economic reform packages from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that called for
greater liberalization.
The Chuan government approved the Act on the Establishment of the Administrative
Court and Administrative Court Procedures, B.E. 2542 (1999), which established the court’s
overall composition, its jurisdiction, the powers and duties of plaintiffs, defendants and judges,
respectively. There are currently eight regional Courts of First Instance and the Supreme
Administrative Court. The Supreme and Central (Bangkok) court officially opened in March
2001, with Chiang Mai in July 2001 and Songkhla in August 2001. Nakhon Ratchasima opened
in October 2001, Khon Kaen 2002, Pitsanoluk October 2002, Rayong 2003, Nakhon Sri
Thammarat August 2003, Udon Thani September 2010 and Ubon Ratchathani April,
respectively.
In sum, the Administrative Court’s development was a long process that encompassed
several periods of successes and setbacks. While the court’s development spanned multiple
regimes and constitutions, the 1997 Asian financial crisis had deleterious affects on the Thai
economy and politics. However, as Connor (2002) notes, the crisis provided the necessary
momentum for the passage of the most liberal constitution in Thai history. Absent the urgency
that lawmakers felt to “do something”, it is highly unlikely that it would have otherwise passed.7

7

Connors mentions that the Ministry of Interior was actively campaigning against the 1997 Constitution. In an interview about
the opposition during the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, Bhalakula made clear that the Court of Justice tried to prevent the
establishment of the Administrative Court. “The Courts of Justice did not believe that there needed to be an Administrative
Court. The thought that the court was unnecessary and that if there were to be a court, they should be under the Court of Justice a
nd not a completely separate court.” Interview on September 18, 2014.
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The Administrative Court: Key Actors, Jurisdiction and Powers
Discussing the Administrative Court’s fundamental powers, jurisdiction and procedures,
this section provides an overview of how the court operates, as well as an enumeration of the key
actors in the court. In order to understand how the court functions, it is necessary to explore its
inner workings, all of which are found in its foundational documents: Act on the Establishment of
the Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999).8 Article 3
classifies the key actors involved in the court’s procedures. For example, parties to disputes are
defined as, “a plaintiffs and a defendant, and includes a person, administrative agency or State
official becoming a party to the case by way of interpleading, whether voluntarily or being
summoned by an Administrative Court to appear in the case by reason of being an interested
person or a person likely to be affected by the outcome of the case, and, for the purpose of the
proceedings, shall also include the person authorized to represent the aforesaid person.”9
An “administrative agency” refers to a Ministry, Sub-Ministry, Department, Government
agency called by other name and ascribed the status as a Department, provincial administration,
local administration, State enterprise established by an Act or Royal Degree or other State
agency and shall include an agency entrusted to exercise the administrative power or carry out
administrative acts. For example, administrative agencies can include the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Department of Corrections, Department of Land, local government organizations such as
the Provincial Administrative Organizations (PAO) or Tambon Administrative Organizations
(TAO), etc.

8

Act on the Establishment of the Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999), hereafter referred
to as, “1999 Administrative Court Act.”
9 ibid,3-4.
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State officials refer to (1) Government official, official, employee, group of persons or
person performing duties in an administrative agency; (2) quasi-judicial council or committee or
person empowered by law to issue any by-law, order or resolution affecting persons; and (3)
person who is under the supervision or superintendence of administrative agencies or State
officials under (1) or (2)10. This primarily refers to individual bureaucrats of any rank, but also
includes quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Ultimately, anyone
empowered by Royal Decree with administrative authority is potentially subject to legal action.
For example, individuals’ positions can be named, such as the Prime Minister or nayok or head
of a local government entity.
An “administrative contract” refers to a contract in which at least “one of the parties is an
administrative agency or a person on behalf of the State and which exhibits the characteristic of a
concession contract, contract providing public service or contract for the construction of public
works or for the exploitation of natural resources.”11 Examples of an administrative contract is
one that exhibits the characteristics of (a) a concession contract, (b) a public concession contract
or (c) a contract for the provision of public utilities or (d) a contract for the exploitation of
natural resources. This means that the Administrative Court considers private companies under
an administrative contract with a government entity to be, by extension, a government entity
liable as well. Article 3 of the 1999 Administrative Court Act stated that upon winning a
concession from the State, private company “A” in having an administrative contract with the
particular state agency, are themselves by extension now legally a state agency and thus subject

10
11

ibid,2-3.
ibid, 4.

95
to legal action as they are under the supervision of a State agency or official. Public-private
companies however are not under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, but under the
supervision of the civil court.
Types of Administrative Court Cases
Like all courts, the Administrative Court has a specific jurisdiction which defines the type
of cases that it is qualified to adjudicate. This section illustrates those cases and discusses them at
length in order to clarify their place. Article 9 of the 1999 Administrative Court Act, specifies six
types for the court’s consideration proper:

(1) case(s) involving unlawful act(s) by an administrative agency or State official, whether in
connection with the issuance of a rule or order or in connection with other acts, by reason of
acting without or beyond the scope of powers and duties or in a manner inconsistent with the law
or the form, process or procedure which is the material requirement for such act or in bad faith
or in a manner indicating unfair discrimination or causing unnecessary process or excessive
burden to the public or amounting to undue exercise of discretion;
(2) disputes pertaining to an administrative agency or state official neglecting his or her official
duties which are required by law or performing such duties with unreasonable delay;
(3) disputes related to a wrongful act or other liabilities of an administrative agency or State
official arising from the exercise of power under the law or from a law, administrative order or
other orders, or from the neglect of official duties required by the law to be performed or the
performance of such duties with unreasonable delay;
(4) disputes related to an administrative contract;
(5) cases legally-prescribed to the Court by an administrative agency or State official for
mandating a person to do or refrain from committing a particular act;
(6) cases legally-prescribed be under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court.12
These six categories command a number of important observations. First, the court only
adjudicates cases involving violations during official administrative acts. For example, when an
individual acting within their official capacity is either (under)performing in a way that is not
consistent with a specific order or decree, legal action is permissible. This is distinguished from

12

The Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2542 (1999).
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criminal acts, which would be under the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. For example, a state
official embezzling funds for their own benefit is considered a criminal offence and hence
adjudicated in criminal court. However, in some instances, violations of administrative acts also
involve criminal activity. Evidence from an Administrative Court hearing is admissible in other
courts.
Administrative Court rulings, if in favor of the plaintiff, generally command remedial
action on the part of the state (e.g., issuing a driver’s license or striking down an order removing
a civil servant from their position and restoring their previous salary). In cases involving the
destruction of property or interest occurred from administrative contracts require the agency in
question to provide financial compensation with, if necessary, interest. Most cases do not require
financial compensation. As this chapter will later show, the majority of cases that the
Administrative Court adjudicates pertain to unreasonable delay of action. When the court rules in
favor of a party, within the ruling are guidelines that they direct them to adhere to the order
within a specified period of time.
Second, that the court adjudicates grievances that involve individual bureaucrats
challenging orders and actions from their superiors demonstrates that the bureaucracy can be
either the aggrieved or provocateurs. In most cases, bureaucrats challenge what they deem to be
unfair human resource decisions that affect their careers. For example, orders related to
promotion, demotion or transfer that bureaucrats’ deem without merit are now subject to legal
action through the Administrative Court. Title II of the 2008 Civil Service Act requires that in
order to use the Administrative Court for arbitration, bureaucrats have to first submit their human
resource-related grievances to the Merit System Protection Commission (MSPC) for
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adjudication.13 Section 116 of the Act states that if there is a disagreement with the MSPC’s final
ruling, the plaint has 90 days to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. Section 71
stipulates that the CSC must accept the Administrative Court’s ruling as final.
Procedurally, bureaucrats can only elevate the Administrative Court after they have
undergone the MSPC arbitration. This is not exclusive to the former but to all interested parties.
Chapter four of the 1999 Administrative Court Act, article 42 states, “In the case where the law
provides for the process or procedure for the redress of the grievance or injury in any particular
matter, the filing of an administrative case with respect to such matter may be made only after
action has been taken in accordance with such process and procedure has also been given
thereunder or no order has been given within a reasonable period of time or within such time as
prescribed by law.”14 Thus the Administrative Court is one of last resort. The fact that the court
can only be accessed after such efforts have been made speaks to the extent to which plaintiffs
are willing to resolve their grievances.
Third, determining what exactly constitutes “unreasonable delay” lends itself to debate
because, ultimately, it is a matter of discretion. Waiting six to nine months to obtain a land deed
or driver’s license when the process is expected to take one week or less is an obvious case in
which the court would take into consideration. What is less clear, however, are instances in
which administrative acts are undefined in terms of time. For example, instances in which the

Sivaraks (2011) writes, “The MSPC is composed of seven commissioners selected by the Selection Committee comprising the
president of the Supreme Administrative Court as chairman, a vice-president of the Supreme Court designated by the president of
the Supreme Court, a qualified CSC commissioner elected by the CSC, and the secretary-general of the CSC shall be a member
and secretary. The MSPC has its main responsibility in (1) protecting the merit system by advising and preventing government
agencies from issuing or regulating unmerited rules and regulations, (2) considering appeals, and (3) considering complaints.”
14 Italics emphasized. Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999), p.
41.
13
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government allows industries to extract natural resources, the former is required to conduct a
prior Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) or a Health Impact Assessment (HIA). Failure to
do so can take months to correct. Further, the court is required to assess the assessment, a task
that requires technical capacity that is beyond judges’ expertise. Ironically, even the court itself
has been subjected to administrative lawsuits for unreasonable delay in ruling.
Within the Administrative Court is the Office of the Case Enforcement, which is
responsible for ensuring that losing parties comply with rulings. This applies to specific acts but
also policies: orders and decrees. Whether poor performance or policy, the Administrative Court
has the authority to address both questions when petitioned. In recognition of this crucial
jurisdiction, the court does have its boundaries. The 1999 Administrative Court Act states that
there are three main categories of cases that are outside the courts’ jurisdiction:

(1) actions concerning military disciplines;
(2) actions of the Judicial Commission under the law on judicial service;
(3) cases within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Family Court, Labor Court, Tax Court,
Intellectual Property and International Trade Court, Bankruptcy Court or other specialized
courts.
The Administrative Court: Hierarchy
Hierarchically, the Administrative Court of Thailand is composed of a Supreme
Administrative Court located in Bangkok and the Administrative Courts of First Instance, the
latter of which the 1999 Administrative Court Act requires that they are dispersed regionally
throughout the country.
According to 1999 Administrative Court Act, the Supreme Administrative Court is the
final arbiter in four types of cases:
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1. those involving dispute(s) pertaining to a decision of a quasi-judicial commission as
prescribed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court;
2. those involving dispute(s) pertaining to the legality of a Royal Decree or by-law that the
Council of Ministers issued or approved;
3. cases which the law specifies as being within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Administrative Court; and
4. appeals made against a judgment or order of an Administrative Court of First Instance.
As Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate, nearly 97 percent of the cases that the Supreme Administrative
Court accepted are appeals from the Court of First Instance. Likewise, approximately 96 percent
of the cases that the Supreme Administrative Court has adjudicated were appeals.
The Administrative Court of First Instance is further divided into a Central Administrative Court
and Regional Administrative Courts. Provinces within the jurisdiction of the Central
Administrative Court are Bangkok and surrounding provinces. There are seven Regional
Administrative Courts: Chiang Mai, Songhkla, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Phitsanulok,
Rayong, Nakhon Si Thammarat, all of which have several corresponding provinces that are
within their jurisdiction respectively.15 See Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.
The Administrative Court consists of two levels (see Figure 1). The highest level, the
Supreme Administrative Court, predominantly performs as an appellate body, while the Courts
of First Instance function as the initial court that adjudicates grievances. Within both the
Supreme Administrative Court and the Administrative Courts of First Instance a hierarchy of
positions exists. For the former, there is a President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Vice

15

While as of this writing there are seven Regional Administrative Courts of First Instance, in Chapter V, Article 94 of the Act
on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure, B.E. 2542 (1999) mandates that there be the a
total of 16. The other 9 Regional Administrative Courts to be established are: Chumphon, Buri Ram, Phrae, Yala, Lop Buri,
Sakon Nakhon, Suphan Buri, Udon Thani, and Ubon Ratchathani, respectively.

100

Table 2
2013 Cases Accepted by the Supreme Administrative Court: 2001-2013 by Category and Year
Year

Direct Plaints

Court of First
Instance Appeals
under consideration

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

25
29
17
32
19
63
41
61
94
93
186
97
105
862

17
107
291
609
906
924
994
1067
1157
1156
1351
1909
2180
12668

Court of
First Instance
Appeal
Requests
342
827
954
793
884
1007
894
870
776
1024
815
1144
1060
11390

Source: Administrative Case Statistics 2013. Office of Administrative Court.

Total

Total
% of
Appeals

384
963
1282
1434
1809
1994
1929
1998
2027
2273
2352
3150
3345
24920

93.48
96.98
97.11
97.76
98.94
96.84
97.87
96.94
95.36
95.90
92.09
96.92
96.86
96.54
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Table 3
2013 Cases Adjudicated by the Supreme Administrative Court: 2001-2013 by Category and Year
Year

Direct
Plaints

Court of First
Instance Appeals
under consideration

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

6
19
2616
21
21
53
41
52
62
67
47
108
128
651

14
64
178
234
387
460
559
428
491
733
967
989
5504

Court of
First
Instance
Appeal
Requests
134
656
713
964
979
920
919
927
740
763
775
875
1051
10416

Total

Total
% of
Appeals

140
689
803
1163
1234
1360
1420
1538
1230
1321
1555
1950
2168
16571

95.71
97.24
96.76
98.19
98.29
96.10
97.11
96.61
94.95
94.92
96.97
94.46
94.09
96.07

Source: Administrative Case Statistics 2013. Office of Administrative Court.

16

The number reflects the cases adjudicated in the same category but not necessarily from that year. So even though the 2003
number is higher than the total accepted in the same from the previous table, it reflects residual from previous years’ cases.
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Table 4
Current Regional Administrative Courts of First Instance and Corresponding Jurisdictions Structure17

1

Court of First Instance
Chiang Mai

2

Khon Kaen

3

Nakhon Ratchasima

4

Nakhon Si Thammarat

5

Phitsanulok

6

Rayong

7

Songhkla

8

Ubon Ratchathani

9

Udon Thani

Provinces in Jurisdiction
Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai,
Mae Hong Son, Lampang,
Lamphun, Nan, Phayao,
Phrae and Uttaradit.
Kalasin, Khon Kaen and
Maha Sarakham, Nakhon
Phanom, Mukdahan, Loei,
Sakon Nakhon, Nong Khai,
Nong Bua Lam Phu and
Udon Thani.
Chaiyaphum, Nakhon
Ratchasima, Buri Ram,
Yasothon, Roi Et, Si Sa Ket,
Surin, Ubon Ratchathani and
Amnat Charoen.
Krabi, Nakhon Si
Thammarat, Phang-Nga,
Phuket, Surat
Thani,Chumphon and
Ranong.
Kamphaeng Phet, Tak,
Nakhon Sawan, Phichit,
Phitsanulok, Phetchabun and
Sukhothai
Chanthaburi, Chachoengsao,
Chon Buri,
Trat, Prachin Buri, Rayong
and Sa Kaeo
Trang, Patthalung, Songkhla,
Satun, Narathiwat, Pattani
and Yala.
Yasothon, Roi Et, Si Sa Ket,
Ubon Ratchathani and Amnat
Charoen.
Loei, Nong Khai, Nong Bua
Lam Phu and Udon Thani

Source: The Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2542 (1999
17

As of September 27, 2011.
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Table 5
Central (Bangkok) Administrative Courts of First Instance and Corresponding Provinces within its
Jurisdictions

1 Regional Court
Central Administrative Court

Provinces in Jurisdiction
Bangkok Metropolitan,
Nakhon Pathom,
Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani,
Ratchaburi, Samut Prakan,
Samut Sakhon, and Samut
Songkhram

Source: The Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2542 (1999)

Table 6
Futuristic Composition of Regional Administrative Courts of First Instance
and Corresponding Provinces within its Jurisdictions

1
2

Court of First Instance
Buri Ram
Chiang Mai

3

Chumphon

4

Khon Kaen

5

Lop Buri

6

Nakhon Ratchasima

7

Nakhon Si Thammarat

8

Phitsanulok

Jurisdiction
Buri Ram and Surin
Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Mae
Hong Son, Lampang,
Lamphun, Nan, Phayao,
Phrae and Uttaradit.
Chumphon, Prachuap Khiri
khan, Phetchaburi and
Ranong
Kalasin, Khon Kaen and
Maha
Sarakham
Nakhon Nayok, Phra Nakhon
Si Ayutthaya,
Lop Buri, Saraburi, Sing Buri,
and Ang Thong
Chaiyaphum and
Nakhon Ratchasima;
Krabi, Nakhon
Si Thammarat, Phangnga,
Phuket and Surat Thani
Kamphaeng Phet, Tak,
Nakhon Sawan, Phichit,
Phitsanulok, Phetchabun and
Sukhothai
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9

Phrae

10

Rayong

11

Sakon Nakhon

12

Songhkla

13

Suphan Buri

14

Ubon Ratchathani

15

Udon Thani

16

Yala

Nan, Phayao, Phrae and
Uttaradit;
Chanthaburi, Chachoengsao,
Chon Buri,
Trat, Prachin Buri, Rayong
and Sa kaeo;
Nakhon Phanom, Mukdahan
and Sakon Nakhon
Trang, Phatthalung, Songkhla
and Satun
Kanchanaburi, Chai Nat,
Suphan Buri and Uthai Thani
Yasothon, Roi Et, Si Sa Ket,
Ubon Ratchathani and Amnat
Charoen.
Loei, Nong Khai, Nong Bua
Lam Phu and Udon Thani
Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala

Source: The Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Courts Procedure BE 2542 (1999)

Supreme
Administrative
Court President

Vice President

Vice President

President of
Chambers

President of
Chambers

Supreme
Admin Judges

Supreme
Admin Judges

Vice President

President of
Chambers

Supreme
Admin Judges

Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of the Administrative Court.
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President and numerous Presidents of chambers. Within each chamber are other Supreme
Administrative Court judges.
Functionally, each position is slightly different. The President of the Supreme
Administrative Court of First Instance is responsible for the overall management and
administration of the court. In addition to this more managerial function that includes conducting
annual inspections to each regional court of first instance, s/he also serves as a judge on cases.
The President is responsible for assigning judges to chambers. Likewise, the President of the
Supreme Administrative Court also serves as the public face of the entire court. The President
also conducts inspections of the court and assigns Supreme Administrative Court judges to each
chamber. The Vice-Presidents of the Administrative Court, both Supreme and First Instance,
support the President’s official duties in addition to perform their duties as judges.
Chambers are the group of judges that the presidents designate to adjudicate a particular
case. Many chambers are specialized based on the specific type of case. For example,
cases involving environment or the Ministry of Justice would be assigned to a chamber where
judges specialize in those corresponding issue areas. Presidents of Chamber are responsible for
the oversight and timely adjudication. The judge-commissioner of justice is an administrative
judge whom the President of the Supreme Administrative Court appoints to prepare the facts,
laws, and a preliminary opinion that is separate and non-binding on the rest of the judges in the
chamber.18 The judge-rapporteur is an Administrative Court judge who the president designates
to collect evidence and facts pertaining to all parties. This information is then given to the

This judge-commissioner of justice provides their opinion before the chamber’s official judgment. According to Article 58 of
the 1999 Administrative Court Act, the President of the Supreme Administrative can appoint a judge commissioner of justice
from either the Supreme Administrative Court or the Court of First Instance.
18
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chamber in advance so that the rest of the judges can determine the ruling. The judge-rapporteur
is coincidentally an administrative judge from that same chamber.
Each trial requires a minimum quorum of judges who must be present. The Supreme
Administrative Court needs a minimum of five judges assigned to each case, while the Court of
First Instance requires at least three judges. The number of judges must always be an odd
number in order to reach a majority. The final ruling does not provide the specific vote of each
judge, only the written decision. Sometimes included in the official decision are judges’
reasoning whether they were in favor of the plaintiffs or defendants.
Adopting the same structure of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Administrative
Court of First Instance also consists of a President, Vice-Presidents, Presidents of Chambers,
Judge-Commissioners of Justice, Judge Rapporteurs and Court of First Instance Judges.
Likewise, all of these individuals operate in a similar capacity as the Supreme Administrative
Court (see Figure 2).
Plaintiffs and Judges: Powers and Privileges
This section demonstrates that the Administrative Court’s formal institutional structure
provides a partial justification for the dissertation’s emphasis on both judges and plaintiffs. Epp
(1998) argues that the institutional support structures allow individuals’ to pursue litigation.
While the institutional support structure refers to lawyers and legal advocacy groups to assist
individuals, this is relevant to the Administrative Court because the court also provides the
necessary provisions to consistently pursue litigation. This section discusses this structure. The
first part examines the institutional powers that the court affords to plaintiffs—specifically those
related to access. The second section elaborates judges’ powers that the 1999 Administrative
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Court Act provides. Beyond the more obvious responsibility of decision-making, I explore their
more ancillary functions that afford their position with significant import. The third part
discusses how both actors interact—specifically through their interdependent relationship that
better illustrates this dynamic. Finally, this section concludes by arguing the while the
institutional configuration is important, it does not provide a complete explanation that
illuminates each actor’s behavior and hence the judicialization of politics.

Administrative
Court of First
Instance President

Vice-President

Vice President

President of
Chambers

President of
Chambers

Court of First
Instance Judges

Court of First
Instance Judges

Vice President

President of
Chambers

Court of First
Instance Judges

Figure 2. Hierarchical structure of the Administrative Court of First Instance.

Who Uses the Administrative Court? Prospects, Privileges and Powers
The Administrative Court offers several incentives for prospective plaintiffs. First and
foremost, the qualifications for filing a grievance are generous. Article 42 of the 1999
Administrative Court Act defines a plaintiff as, “any person who is aggrieved, or injured or who
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may inevitably be aggrieved or injured in consequence of an act or omission by an administrative
agency or State official or who has a dispute in connection with an administrative contract or
other cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court.” This is definition
provides tremendous leverage. In addition, there are no hindrances placed on being a plaintiff
with respect to nationality, age, as even those under the age of 18 must obtain their parents’ or
guardians’ permission.
The Administrative Court also provides prospective plaintiffs with several incentives to
resolve their grievances. Most pertain to generous access standards. In particular, the amount of
time given to submit cases, the provision of free consultations and absence of legal fees in all
cases with the exception of administrative contracts. With respect to time, to be eligible to access
the administrative courts, one must file their respective grievance(s) within 90 days upon
knowledge of an alleged offence. For grievances involving administrative contracts, individual(s)
have one year to file.
The court also provides free legal counseling to prospective plaintiffs. Given that the
Administrative Court is less than 20 years old, it is not relatively known compared to other more
longstanding institutions. In fact, in interviews with Administrative Court judges and lawyers, all
believed that the majority of Thais remain unfamiliar with the court. This results in the lack of
basic knowledge about the court as well as related procedures and jurisdiction. A noted
environmental rights lawyer stated that once the people are more aware of the court and their
rights, the cases are likely to increase.19 In interviews with officials from the Office of the

19

One should not fail to appreciate the impact that the lack of knowledge of the court can have for the average citizen. Even the
Administrative court does acknowledges this reality, and the court has various legal educational programs throughout the country
to explain the court’s function and purpose as well as citizens’ rights as they pertain to the state.
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Administrative Court, they stated that during consultations with individuals who have a
grievance, the court tries to encourage all parties to resolve the conflict before it is formally
submitted to the court. As a neutral arbiter attempting this alternative dispute mediation, officials
stated that this allows for a dispute to avoid a more formal court process that can be lengthy and
unnecessary. However, they note, when mediation is not possible, the court offers parties with
consultants who help navigate the adjudication process.
In interviews with Administrative court officials, judges and plaintiffs, all agreed that the
court’s consultation service help eliminate areas of lack of knowledge or misconceptions that
plaintiffs regularly have. Consultations provide prospective plaintiffs with comfort, trust and a
reassurance of the institutions ability to provide justice. In addition to assisting plaintiffs,
Administrative Court officials stated that their consultation assists helps individuals determine
whether their grievance merits further legal action. Discussions with former plaintiffs stated that
this allowed them to better assess whether they had a legitimate chance of winning. Finally,
some judges stated that the consultation service helps eliminates cases that are potentially
frivolous and would hinder their ability to dedicate full attention to other cases.
Likewise, interviews with senior officials from the Office of the Administrative Court
stated that the court’s consultants educate prospective plaintiffs on the rewards that the court can
provide. For example, with respect to the type of judgments the court provides, consultants
educate individuals about the prospective award as well as what the court cannot award. In
addition, the court provides consultation on the more administrative minutia related to the
adjudication process, such as how to properly submit a plaint whether in person or via postage,
as well as explain the court’s entire adjudication process. Interviews with judges and plaintiffs
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revealed that access to the court is an important determinant as to whether or not the latter would
submit a plaint. One should not overlook the frequency by which the court consults individuals.
According to the annual statistics that the Office of the Administrative Court publishes, the court
has consulted over 100,000 instances since its inception. Table 7 demonstrates the types of
consultations that the court provides individuals.

Table 7
Total Number of Consultations by Year and Type
Type Filing a plaint

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

Whether
cases are in
the
jurisdiction
or not

Miscellaneous
knowledge about
the
Administrative
Court

Steps before
submitting a
plaint to the
Administrative
Court

Other

Total

form, submitting a
plaint, appealing,
or related
information

189
2516
3636
2351
1719
1840
1527
2064
2369
4128
3381
3387
3676
32783

108
2153
2361
1662
1393
1821
1488
1742
2119
2650
2294
1922
2134
23847

34
1611
1530
1086
868
1077
1447
1523
2188
2848
2390
1801
1902
20305

74
1684
1940
1497
951
1085
1078
1697
1978
2200
1769
1654
1827
19434

213
1047
2096
1374
1023
892
1064
1174
1773
1824
1651
1179
1915
17225

618
9011
11563
7970
5954
6715
6604
8200
10427
13650
11485
9943
11454
113594

Source: Administrative Case Statistics 2013. Office of Administrative Court.

Based on this information, one can observe that most consultations pertain to properly
filing a plaint. The second most requested consultation is related to questions about the court’s
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jurisdiction. Both categories in many respects are attributed to the public’s lack of knowledge.
When interviewed, judges and plaintiffs expressed their belief that most Thais are unfamiliar
with the court.20 Miscellaneous knowledge about the Administrative Court is the third category
that ranges from questions about the number of Courts of First Instance to the total number of
Supreme Administrative Court judges.
One benefit that both judges and an environmental rights lawyer acknowledged is that
free legal counsel throughout the trial process allows those that are economically disadvantaged
to be more willing to use the court given the absence of legal fees. Both acknowledged that
usually the judicial process has the tendency to be taxing both financially and temporally, as
cases are not decided quickly, however the Administrative Court is different. Plaintiffs
interviewed in this study stated that because the court did not obligate them to hire a lawyer it
made it helped in their decision to sue.
Finally, the court has security measures in place designed to protect plaintiffs in the event
that a case may invite controversy or instances where there can be intimidation, retaliation or
another concern where there is a legitimate fear for safety and well-being. Article 60 of the 1999
Administrative Court Act states that while all hearings are open to the public, the court is
obligated to place in higher priority of the public welfare. The court can issue two orders:

(1) prohibiting the public from attending the whole or part of the hearing and proceeding with
such hearing in camera; or
(2) prohibiting the publication of such facts or circumstances.

20

Filing a form properly may not necessarily be an indication of a lack of knowledge of the court per se but reflect a lack of more
technical challenge.
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One should not overlook the importance of this. Cases involving the revocation of
administrative contracts worth millions of dollars or environmental cases which can cause
damage to large economic interests can easily raise the stakes and with it the raise the probability
of violence. Reflecting on the danger of cases, the president of an environmental NGO who has
represented plaintiffs in hundreds of cases in the Administrative Court the NGO stated, “I get
death threats all the time. I’m not worried about it—everyone knows where I live. Whatever
happens, the work will continue. There are other lawyer like me who will continue to fight.”21
Discussing methods used to reduce fear, the NGO President stated, “Most plaintiffs are
intimidated by the government and may be initially hesitant to submit cases in hopes that both
sides can resolve the conflict outside of the court. However, once I explain that if there is
physical danger, the court will protect their identities, most people are more comfortable with
proceeding with the case.”22 Closely related, another provision that serves as an incentive to
encourage legal action is that the court allows for group lawsuits. According to article 45 of the
1999 Administrative Court Act, “In the case where several persons wish to file an administrative
case for the same cause of action, such persons may jointly submit a single plaint and appoint
one among themselves to represent every plaintiff in the proceedings. In such instances, an act of
the person representing the plaintiffs in the proceedings shall be deemed to bind every plaintiff.”
The president also indicated that the ability to file jointly with others helps individuals who are
intimidated and therefore more likely to not pursue legal action.

21
22

ibid
Interview on April 19. 2012.
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Finally, the court encourages prospective plaintiffs, especially those who are
economically-marginalized, to sue. It does not require plaintiffs to pay fees in order to proceed
with adjudication. Even in the event that the court awards plaintiffs financial compensation, one
is only required to pay a percentage after the decision.23 The court is sensitive towards plaintiffs’
economic status, in particular those who may not be able to afford the court fees and thus be
discouraged from legal action. The court will even grant payment exemptions depending on the
circumstance.
In sum, as reflected in the court’s institutional procedures and confirmed in interviews
with judges and advocacy lawyers, the Administrative Court strives to ensure that barriers to
access are largely limited to questions of jurisdiction. Even with respect to addressing current
challenges related to access, such as public knowledge, the court engages in public education
outreach programs to inform citizens of their rights versus the State and the role of the court in
ensuring it maintenance. One Supreme Administrative Court judge stated that the court believes
in defending the people from abuses from the government and wants the public to trust them.24
Officials from the Office the Administrative Court stated that they try to create a welcoming
environment by showing respect for individuals and their plaint(s) no matter how frivolous
because they want to encourage people to use the court.

23

According the the 1999 Administrative Court Act, court fees are collected from cases which render financial compensation for
liable acts as well as cases involving fees collected from administrative contracts.
24 Interview on June 14, 2012
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Judges: Powers and Privileges

The judicialization literature presumes that courts and, by extension, judges possess the
independence from external actors to make decisions. Instances where judges lack independence
to make decisions translates into its politicalization. Ultimately, judicialization should
demonstrate the court’s ability to affect politics. The latter question can be determined by the
court’s jurisdiction and the particular powers that judges posses. For judges, the Administrative
Court is unique in that it empowers them beyond the more obvious responsibility of decisionmaking. This section discusses the former in addition to explaining how the court’s institutional
powers position judges to be significant to the overall question of judicialization. The first part
discusses the types of rulings that Administrative Court judges can make. The next looks at
judges’ ability to investigate evidence before determining whether cases can proceed. When
enforcing decisions, the more ancillary function that judges can perform are no less important.

Decision-making: Types
First, the court empowers judges with several different types of decisions that they can
make. Article 72 of the 1999 Administrative Act provides judges with a list of five types of
decisions that they can make. First, they can revoke a by-law or order or restrain an act either
partially or in total. Second, judges can order the head of an administrative agency or official to
perform their duty within a specified timeframe in cases involving neglect or unreasonable delay.
Third, judges can rule compensation in terms of money or property for liabilities or wrongful
acts related to administrative contracts. Fourth, judges are able to order into the existence a right
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or duty upon party’s request for clarification. Finally, judges can issue a judgment requiring
individual(s) to either take an action or refrain from doing so.

Judges as investigators
In contrast to the adversarial system, which is commonplace in courts from Western
governments, that requires an impartial judge to mediate disputes between two parties, The
Administrative Court uses the inquisitorial system of adjudication in which are not impartial and
are, in fact responsible for determining the burden of proof by conducting investigations. These
investigations are to ensure that all relevant evidence is collected so that judges are able to make
the best decision possible. Article 61 of the 1999 Administrative Act states that judges have five
powers during the investigation phase. First, they can issue an order for an administrative agency
or official to provide a written statement related to their performance as it relates to the plaint in
question. Second, judges can require an agency or official to provide material evidence related to
a plaint. Third, they can require parties in a dispute to submit evidence and/or a statement(s)
related to the case. Fourth, judges can issue orders to summon concerned persons to a case to
give a statement or evidence for the court’s consideration. Finally, judges can assess
supplementary evidence for consideration of its use.
Judges’ ability to investigate is important in several respects. First, the evidence
presented can determine which party will win. Second, the result of judges’ investigation can
determine the probability of appeal. As the legal representative the State, the Office of the
Attorney General, the evidence that the court provides lawyers assists in their legal strategies as
well as affects the length of their own investigation. An interview with legal counsel from the
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Office of the Attorney General (OAG), who represents government agencies, revealed that there
were instances where the Administrative court judges have overlooked relevant evidence that
state representative believe could have led to a favorable ruling. When this happens, it increases
the likelihood that OAG will recommend to appeal.25
In addition to their investigation duties, Administrative Court judges are also
responsibility for with enforcing their decisions. Through the Office of Case Enforcement, which
is a division within the court that is responsible for ensuring full compliance with decisions,
judges are notified when a party does not adhere to the judgment.26 One important aspect of
accountability pertains to the ability to enforce decisions. This is dependent on two actors: judges
and to whomever the court has awarded. When a losing party fails to comply with a judgment
order, the winning party is then able to notify the Office of Case Enforcement. The court begins
to take action immediately by sending its officers to inquire about compliance by summoning the
party for justification and to execute the order. As of December 2013, according to the
Administrative Court’s Office of Case Enforcement, 5,222 cases exist. Over 80 percent of all
cases pertain to State agencies or bureaucrats who have still failed to comply with the court’s
order.
Table 8 demonstrates that nearly 85 percent of the office’s activity involves the
enforcement of offenses against a state official or agency. Given the overall number of cases, this
demonstrates that compliance is usually not a serious challenge for the court. This section has
demonstrated that the Administrative Court judges are vital actors who are institutionally
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Interview conducted on April 2, 2014.
It is important to understand that the Office of Enforcement only accepts cases in which a party has failed to adhere in full to
the decision. This office’s activity is only a fraction of the cases the court has adjudicated and parties have complied.
26

117
empowered to impact the adjudication process at every phase—even before the court accepts
cases. As an institution, in addition to its jurisdiction, through several measures the
Administrative Court attempts to eliminate any potential access barriers. For example, it does not
require legal representation, provides free legal consultations, and allots a generous timeframe
for the aggrieved to submit their plaint(s). All of the aforementioned measures are intended to
encourage individuals to submit their grievances. Finally, Administrative Court is responsible for
ensuring its enforcement through its Office of Case Enforcement. This allows both winning
parties and, more importantly, judges to be important to ensure that their decisions are obeyed.

Table 8
Office of Case Enforcement Statistics Based on the Accused Parties 2001-2013
Year

Cases Received

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

6
55
208
302
362
508
592
655
620
676
883
1152
1125
7144

Noncompliance
from
State/state
officials
6
55
199
249
300
419
486
533
539
555
695
996
971
6003

Total
Percentage
of overall
cases
100
100
95.67
82.45
82.87
82.48
82.09
81.37
86.94
82.10
78.71
86.46
86.31
84.03

Source: Administrative Court Case Statistics, 2013. The Office of the Administrative Court.

Noncompliance
from
Private
individuals
0
0
9
53
62
89
106
122
81
121
188
156
154
1141

Total
Percentage
of overall
cases
0
0
4.33
17.55
17.13
17.52
17.91
18.63
13.06
17.90
21.29
13.54
13.69
15.97
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Activating the Administrative Court: Process
This section provides an overview of the protocols and regulations that are necessary to
activate the court. For several reasons the procedures are important to the question of
judicialization. First, it offers a partial explanation for the why plaintiffs use the court—thus
justifying the rights-centric approach to explaining judicialization. Second, the process explains
that the important role judges play is not strictly limited to decision-making but, also, throughout
the adjudication process, including monitoring the implementation of decisions. After a brief
overview of the court’s various processes, this section brings greater attention to the importance
of plaintiffs to explaining the judicialization of politics.
The Administrative Court process formally commences once individual(s) realizes they
may be aggrieved due to a violation involving an administrative act. For such acts, individual(s)
have 90 days to submit a plaint to the court either through post or in-person to either their
regional Court of First Instance or Supreme Administrative Court, respectively. In the event that
the violation involves an administrative contract, the aggrieved has one year to file. What is
important to understand is that like most judiciaries, the court is not empowered to initiate cases
but must receive complaints. In this respect, it is easy to understand that both plaintiffs and judge
have an interdependent relationship. But while this relationship describes what occurs, it doesn’t
explain why. Therefore examining motivations behind both actors’ behavior commands the
rights-centric and court-centric approaches and their associated theoretical assumptions.
After a party submits a plaint(s), officials from the Office of the Administrative Court
determines its merit for acceptance. For example, in some instances, the form may be filed
incorrectly and thus requires the court to offer assistance to individuals in order to remedy it. In
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other cases, the plaint may not be within the court’s jurisdiction, in which case court officials
would then notify the individual(s) and recommend the proper court to file their plaint. In the
event that the court accepts the plaint, a court official sends the plaint to the President of the
Supreme Administrative Court or Court of First Instance who then assigns the particular case to
a chamber for adjudication as well as appoints a judge-commissioner of justice.
After the Chamber receives the case, there is a process called “inquiry into the facts.” The
President of the Chamber then appoints a judge-rapporteur.27 Next, the judge-rapporteur
examines the plaint to re-ensure that it adheres to the court’s jurisdiction and regulations and if
not, what recommendations are needed for adherence. If the latter cannot occur, the judgerapporteur recommends to the chamber the plaint’s full or partial dismissal. After the judgerapporteur deems the plaint acceptable, the defendant is given a copy of the plaint as well as the
associated evidence from the plaintiff. The judge then determines the necessary documentation
that the defendant should submit in order to assist in the adjudication process. The defendant
then has 30 days from the time that the court serves the plaint to respond. If the defendant does
not reply, the court will assume that they have considered the plaint as valid. If the defendant
desires to contest the plaint, they can deny or seek its dismissal and therefore submit
corresponding evidence to justify their position.
Upon receiving the defendant’s response, the plaintiff then has 30 days to respond in
order to submit a rebuttal or accept. Failure to respond leads to dismissal of the case. If the
plaintiff then responds to the defendant’s evidence, the defendant is allotted 15 days to respond
in kind. The process continues until the judge-rapporteur determines that the evidence is

27

The court also assigns an administrative case official to assists in the judge-rapporteur duties.
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sufficient to commence the proceedings. Once the evidence is satisfactory, the judge-rapporteur
then prepares a memorandum that includes the case facts, the decisions under consideration, and
their opinion. After the memo’s submission and the chamber determines that no other evidence is
needed, the President of the chamber will then declare that an inquiry into the facts is closed and
submits the file to the President of the Court of First Instance.28 The Judge-commissioner of
Justice will then prepare the Statement of Facts and, with consultation from the President of
either the Court of First Instance or Supreme Administrative Court (depending on the court),
establishes a hearing date. During the hearing, parties are required to submit evidence from the
proceedings in original form unless noted otherwise. After the hearing the Judge-Commissioner
of Justice presents their opinion orally to all parties.
Upon receiving the Judge-Commissioner of Justice’s oral statement, the court then
delivers its judgment. If any parties are not satisfied with the decision, they are able to appeal to
the Supreme Administrative Court within 30 days. What the Administrative Court proceedings
demonstrate is that both plaintiffs and judges are vital to understanding the judicialization of
politics. Indeed the process does not start without individuals’ decision to submit their grievance.
From that, the court’s institutional rules afford judges considerable powers to determine the
outcome of cases.
This section has demonstrated the Administrative Court’s adjudication process. While the
process is largely one involving the submission of written documentation, there are opportunities
for an oral hearing. Further, the section demonstrates judges’ and the court’s administrative

Clause 62 in the ‘Rule of the General Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court on Administrative Court
Procedure’ states that the court is required to give the parties at least 10 days advance notice that the facts inquiry will terminate.
28

Figure 3. Chart.
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officials’ salience. In terms of the court’s ability to be adjudicate cases, both judge and
administrative court officials are vital.
Judicial Independence: Institutional Arrangements
While the literature review chapter demonstrated that arguments attempting to position
judicial independence as a necessary prerequisite for judicialization, this section discusses the
extent to which the Administrative Court’s formal institutional arrangements elevate judges to a
position in which they are able to produce decisions free from external influence. Utilizing
indicators suggested by Rios-Figueroa (2011) to measure independence, the section finds that the
Administrative Court provides judges with the independence to make decisions thereby making
judicialization possible. Institutional considerations, although important, alone do not determine
how judges make decisions. Nonetheless they are important, and, as reflected in interviews with
judges, are significant to explaining both judges’ and plaintiffs’ behavior.
Judicial independence as a concept is surrounded by considerable debate and lack of
consensus. This study uses Feld and Voigt’s (2003) distinction between de jure and de facto
independence. This chapter focuses on the former given that it focuses on formal institutional
rules. De jure independence refers to the formal institutional protections that the court affords
judges while de facto independence is the court’s actual behavior. Examining the role of
constitutional courts in Latin America, Rios-Figueroa (2011) proposes five indices to
demonstrate the extent to which the court is free from extra-judicial influence: (1) judges’
selection and appointment process, (2) tenure length of judges versus appointer, (3) the
appointment procedure’s relationship with tenure length, (4) whether judges’ removal process
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requires 2/3 of legislature tenure, (5) whether there is a particular quota of judges and the budget
process.
According to Rios-Figueroa (ibid) and Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2009) the selection and
appointment process of judges can determine not only the extent to which judges are accountable
but more importantly the degree to which they are independent.1 With respect to the appointment
process, whatever body is responsible for appointing judges is important to determining the
extent to which judges are independent. Rios-Figueroa (ibid, 29) states that “a simple distinction
between procedures in which the appointment is done by judges themselves or by at least two
different state or non-state organs and procedures in which appointment is done by a single organ
or organization that does not belong to the judiciary. The former appointment method would
guarantee a minimum of independence of judges from the appointers, whereas the latter would
not meet this requirement.” Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2009) argue that it is preferable that the
judiciary itself dictate the process in order to preclude undue interference, although this is not
necessarily a hard and fast rule.
Both Thailand’s 1997 Constitution and the subsequent 1999 Administrative Court Act
established the protocol for the appointment of judges for both the Courts of First Instance and
the Supreme Administrative Court, respectively. The nomination process for judges is strictly an
internal one where a body entitled the Judicial Commission of the Administrative Court (JCAC)
selects judges. The JCAC is comprised of nine members from both the Court of First Instance
and Supreme Administrative Court. JCAC members serve for two years and are eligible for re-

Rios-Figueroa, Julio and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2009 “An Evaluation or Cross-National Measure of Judicial Independence.” Paper
presented at the fourth annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, November 19-21, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, CA.
1
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election but cannot serve more than two consecutive terms. The JCAC elects the Court of First
Instance judges and them submits the list to the Prime Minister who then forwards the selections
to the King for royal appointment.2
Similar to the process for appointing judges of the Court of First Instance, for the
Supreme Administrative Court, the JCAC submits the nomination list to the Prime Minister who
then forwards it to the Senate for approval. Upon approval, the Senate submits to the names to
the King for royal appointment. The Thai Senate is both elected and appointed. While it is
important to appreciate the role of the JCAC, there is slightly more of an opportunity for
interference in the nomination of Supreme Administrative Court judges given that they must be
Senate-approved before they are royally-appointed. Discussion with the Office of the
Administrative Court and Supreme Administrative Court judges revealed that there have never
been a judicial appointee that either the Senate or King rejected. According to judges, this
internal process allows the court to escape interference from third parties and limits the politics
involved in the appointment process to within the court itself.
The second indicator that Rios-Figueroa utilizes is whether the length of judges’ tenure is
longer than that of their appointers. His argument is that if the tenure of both parties is the same,
the possibility exists where the potential for pressure from the former into making favorable
decisions. The former is dependent upon another important element: whether there are multiple
organs participating in the appointment process. Multiple players involved in the appointment
process could equally make the length of tenure obsolete given that they would influence which
judges are selected.

2

See Article 19 of the 1999 Administrative Court Act.
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Thailand’s Administrative Court qualifies in both categories of tenure process and
appointment process. As mentioned, only the JCAC creates the list of judges for consideration.
According to the 1999 Administrative Court Act, members on the JCAC serve for a term of two
years with the possibility of an additional consecutive term. Administrative court judges do not
have term-limits and are able to continue to serve provided that there are no violations of ethics.
In order to apply to be a judge, individuals have to be at a minimum age of 35 and can serve until
the retirement of age of 65. At 65 years of age, if a judge desires to continue to serve, they are
subject to a physical and, upon successful completion, given a five-year term extension. As
demonstrated, the JCAC selects judges for appointment, with the only distinction between Court
of First Instance and Supreme Court being that the former are directly approved by the Prime
Minister whereas the latter must be Senate-approved and then submitted to the Prime Minister
who subsequently submits the list to the King for royal approval.
According to Rios-Figueroa (ibid, 30), the relationship between appointment procedure
and tenure length of judges is critical to the question of independence because “as the length of
tenure increases, the appointment method would tend to become irrelevant for influencing
judges’ independence from their appointers.” If appointers’ tenure is longer than those of judges’
the latter may be pressured to make decisions to appease those responsible for their appointment.
There is also the assumption that in the event that they deviate from appointers’ preferences, the
latter would retaliate by packing the court. The Administrative Court’s appointment process is
conducted through an internal committee, the JCAC. The tenure for JCAC members is only for
two years, with the potential of serving for a consecutive 2-year term. This pales in comparison
to judges’ tenure.
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Removal proceedings are important for judicial independence for a variety of reasons.
For example, if the proceedings are easy to commence, judges are likely to be careful to ensure
that their decisions do not invite controversy. Rios-Figueroa (ibid, 31) states that, “Particularly
important is the accusation part of the process because a simple accusation may tarnish a judge’s
reputation; the easier it is to accuse, the more likely it is that the judge will be unduly pressured.”
He also distinguishes between who is able to commence the removal process in particular
whether it is a single individual like the prime minister or a simple majority from either the court
or another organ. Whether the proceedings can only commence upon a supermajority assigned
from another organ is also important in additional to the protocol for submission and the speed
by which the merits of such accusations are addressed.
According to the 1999 Administrative Court Act the removal process of administrative
court judges is strictly under purview of the JCAC. There are particular reasons why this may be
appropriate. Articles 22 and 23 specify the grounds by which the JCAC can initiate the removal
process of judges. Most of the grounds for dismissal are related to conduct violations. For
example, Article 22 states that the JCAC can pass a resolution removing a judge because of
misconduct or neglect of duty, the inability to perform a duty or an inability based on an illness,
being imprisoned or being bankrupt, incompetent or a mental health or physical disorder that
prevents one from performing their tasks.3 In addition, the JCAC can remove judges due to
financial bankruptcy, a mental disorder and/or a physical or mental ailment that would make
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Judges that are financially bankrupt are more susceptible to bribes, which interviews with judges revealed, are offered.
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them unsuitable for their position.4 Regardless of the aforementioned offenses, judges are still
eligible to receive their pension.
Article 23 of 1999 Administrative Court Act gives the JCAC the power to expel judges in
the following circumstances:
(1) malfeasance within their official capacities;
(2) code of conduct violations; and,
(3) being imprisoned on an offence other than negligence or a pretty crime.
In the event that the JCAC expels judges, they are not obligated to receive a pension. Both the
JCAC’s powers to remove and expel judges illustrate the institutional protections that aim to
provide the court with the ability to be independent of external interference.
Finally, Rios-Figueroa (2011) state that a constitutionalized quota of judges or a
comparative document will complicate any party’s efforts to pack or unpack a court in order to
influence decisions. Again, the Administrative Court is exempt from quotas on judges. For the
budget process, the Secretary-General of the Administrative Court submits a request to the
Council of State for approval.
Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, the Administrative Court’s institutional procedures and
powers offer a partial explanation of both judges’ and plaintiffs’ behavior and, in essence,
judicialization, judges, while the more obvious role of decision-making is well known, the court
empowers judges in much more significant respects. Empowered by the 1999 Administrative
Court Act, judges are important actors throughout the entire adjudication process. As an
institution, the court’s rules provide several incentives for the aggrieved. With respect to the

4

In addition, the JCAC can remove judges related to violations of Articles 13, 14 and 18.
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court as an institution reduces access barriers that help encourage individuals to sue. Finally, this
chapter has demonstrated that court has important institutional measures that protect judges from
external interference in turn making judicialization a real possibility.

CHAPTER 5
FROM INDIVIDUALS TO PLAINTIFFS
I get death threats all the time. I’m not worried about it—everyone knows where I live. Whatever
happens, the work will continue. Even if I’m killed, there are others who will continue the work.
—Environmental-rights NGO President1
At its most rudimentary level, judicialization is about courts impacting politics. However,
without the submission of plaints, the courts are immobile. This simple though important truth
underscores the need to understand the factor(s) that motivate individuals to use the court—the
subject of this chapter. Plaintiffs’ perspectives offer a partial explanation of the phenomenon and
in doing so provide indications of both current and future trajectories. While the legal
mobilization literature is voluminous, this chapter focuses solely on those within the
judicialization of politics literature.2 This chapter’s purpose/thesis is threefold: First, it argues
that based on responses from several public opinion surveys, Thailand is most hospitable to
judicialization. Second, prospective plaintiffs are motivated by several factors when determining
whether or not to use the Administrative Court, namely: perceiving themselves as without any
other recourse, the desire to receive justice and the use of strategy to calculate the anticipated
risks and benefits with legal recourse.

1

Interview on April 19, 2012
See McCann in Whittington, Kelemen and Caldieira (2008) for an excellent overview of the literature. Specifically, the
literature presents plaintiffs as motivated by perceptions of alienation from elected institutions and individuals and positive
perceptions towards the judiciary.
2
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The first section of this chapter reviews theoretical approaches within judicialization of
politics scholarship as it pertains to the plaintiff activity. The second section explores the
argument from both Cortner (1968) and Tate and Vallinder (1995) that correlates public
perceptions of elected and unelected institutions with individuals’ decision to submit plaints—
turning to the court to resolve disputes normally reserved for the former and latter, thus initiating
judicialization. Acknowledging that correlation does not equate causation, the third section
summarizes key themes based on interview responses with former plaintiffs. In particular, the
section elaborates motive(s) for using the court and the court’s perceived impact on their
relationship with the bureaucracy and the latter’s behavior. The chapter then concludes by
summarizing key implication from the interviews and survey results.
Why Did They Sue the State? Contending Explanations
As previously discussed in the literature review chapter, Dressel (2012) observes that
existing judicialization scholarship fails to provide a convincing explanation for the phenomenon
in Asia. In an attempt to offer a general account for the phenomenon, he argues that
understanding the judiciary’s empowerment through a model that focuses on with the “demand”
and “supply” side of judicialization. Demand-based explanations present the empowerment and
activity of the judiciary to be a consequence of macro-structural movements that embrace rule of
law, improved quality of governance. Supply-side explanations are those that present judicial
empowerment and activity as originating largely from elites who, facing political uncertainty,
empower courts in order to maintain their access to power. While this dissertation differs from
the actors that Dressel (ibid) proposes, it acknowledges that judicialization is a result of several
interdependent relationships. Demand in this sense originates from the plaintiffs while it is
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judges who “supply” decisions. As an institution, the Administrative Court was empowered by
both the now former 1997 and 2007 constitutions and the 1999 Administrative Court Act. The
latter in particular offers formal independence from outside influences in the nomination and
appointment process of judges. Neither the Courts of First Instance nor the Supreme
Administrative Court are able to initiate adjudication.
The judicialization of politics literature offers several perspectives that explain plaintiffs’
motivated to pursue legal recourse. These range from the material (reward) to the non-material
(rights). In their article surveying victims from the 2002 Moscow Theater Hostage crisis motives
to pursue litigation against government, Javeline and Baird (2007) conclude that motivation was
based on perception of trust in government. This borrows from Richard Cortner (1968) who
found that plaintiffs’ decision to litigate is dependent upon both their perception of alienation
from elected institutions and the perception that the judiciary serves as the only recourse to
address grievances. Cortner (1968, 287) defines the “disadvantaged” as, “highly dependent upon
the judicial process as a means of pursuing their policy interests, usually because they are
temporarily, or even permanently, disadvantaged in terms of their abilities to attain successfully
their goals in the elected process, within the elected political institutions or in the bureaucracy.”1
Tate and Vallinder (1995) echo this argument within their presentation of factors correlated with
judicialization. Specifically, they submit that individuals’ perceptions towards elected institution,

1

Interestingly, the literature explaining plaintiffs’ motives argue that those who perceive themselves to be “advantaged” are just
as eager to use the judiciary as well. As several authors have made clear, (Epstein 1985, Galanter 1974; Kritzer and Silbey, 2003;
Olson, 1990), even those that perceive themselves as well-represented by elected institutions are also keen to pursue litigation. In
particular, those who possess superior resource endowments are thus better positioned to win their case. For example,
professional legal counsel can be the crucial factor that determines whether one is able to win their particular case, especially
when facing a party that lacks one or is inexperienced. Galanter‘s (1974;1975) classic article argues that the judiciary even favors
litigants that have status, power and resources (“haves”) as well as engage in the legal process on multiple occasions (“repeat
players”) over those who lack resources (“have-nots”) and only use the courts once (“one-shotters”).
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whether effective or ineffective, determine their willingness to sue. Through the examination of
existing public opinion surveys, this study tests this argument. It anticipates that survey results
will show respondents have a less favorable perception towards elected institutions but a more
favorable perception of the judiciary. In addition, this study includes the addition of the civilian
bureaucracy. This is because the Administrative Court’s jurisdiction is one that is largely
responsible for adjudicating disputes between private individuals and the bureaucracy. In
addition, this inclusion of survey results of the bureaucracy are important because it, in the event
that they would indicate a more positive perception towards the bureaucracy, it may be unlikely
that respondents would use the Administrative Court to address their grievance—irrespective of
responses towards elected institutions.
Why They Sue: Perceptions of Elected and Unelected Institutions
As previously discussed, the judicialization of politics literature provides explanations for
plaintiffs’ activity. Tate’s chapter in Tate and Vallinder’s (1995) argues that one important precondition correlated with the phenomenon is public perceptions towards elected institutions and
the judiciary. Specifically, an inverse relationship between perceptions between the former and
latter—negative perceptions towards elected institutions and politicians compared with positive
perceptions towards the judiciary would make judicialization more probably. The assumption is
that it is the public that is more likely to use the judiciary to address their grievances than other
elected institutions and individuals who are elected. This argument can even be applicable to
elected officials who are also prone to utilize the judiciary as a means to achieve partisan ends
once they perceive existing mechanisms as no longer effective.
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This section examines several public opinion surveys assessing Thais’ perception towards
elected institutions and elected officials as well as unelected institutions, including the judiciary.
These surveys query respondents their perceptions although the question categories slightly vary:
trust, confidence, institutional integrity, institutional politicization, and effectiveness in fighting
corruption, all are proxies that capture individuals’ perceptions towards elected and non-elected
institutions. While these concepts connote different meanings, they all offer insight into the
likelihood that the institution in question would be used. Ultimately, this section affirms Cortner
(1968) and Tate and Vallinder’s (1995) argument. Thais’ negative perceptions towards elected
institutions and individuals, in comparison to more positive ones towards the judiciary thus
presenting a germane environment where the judicialization of politics is likely to occur.
In 2010, the King Prajadhipok Institute (KPI) published Assessing Public Trust in
Various Institutions and Satisfaction with Public Services, a comprehensive report summarizing
past opinion surveys measuring Thais’ perceptions of trust and satisfaction towards several
elected institutions and officials, as well as individuals and institutions responsible for providing
public services. Table 9 provides the results from the eight surveys.
Results from the series of KPI public opinion surveys present several poignant realities.
First, while the September 2006 Thai military coup may have been bloodless, one casualty was
public trust in every category. These are reflected large reductions in percentage points between
the 2006 coup and 2007 onwards. An average reduction of approximately thirty percentage
points in respondents’ trust towards the prime minister and parliament between the 2006 and
2007 years was likely a consequence of the military junta’s occupation of government and were
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also responsible for the drafting of the 2007 Constitution that included the weakening of several
elected institutions from the 1997 Constitution.

Table 9
KPI: Public Perceptions of Trust in Public Institutions
Individual/institutions
Category
Prime minister
Government/Cabinet
Political parties
Members of the lower house
Members of the upper house
Provincial governors
Civil servants
The military
Courts of Justice
Constitution Court
Administrative Court

Year
2002
87
82.8
52.1
63.1
64.6
59.8
76.1
83.2
80.7
79.4

2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
92.9 87.8 77.2 45.2 37.6 60.5 61.6
74.7
83 71.5 36.5 34.4 44.7 47.4
75.5 59.6 52.7 26.1 33.2 36.4 36.9
67.5 62.4 41.8 36.5 42.5 43.9
61.2 58.1 41.9 39.8 47.2 46.4
79.5
79 66.5 55.8 64.6 64.5
75.1 71.1 71.3 52.1 58.9 69.9 64.9
83.4 84.8 80.7 61.8 70.1 76.3 67.8
86.7
78 78.2 72.4 68.2 74.2 71.3
84.9 73.5
74 64.6 60.4 68.6 65.1
83.1 72.1 73.8 66.8 62.6 71.3 67.3

Source: Assessing public trust in various institutions and satisfaction with public services. 2002-2010. King Prajadhipok Institute
(KPI).

Second, the 2006 military coup also negatively affected perceptions towards non-elected
institutions. Usually relatively higher than other institutions, even perceptions of trust towards
the military declined by nearly twenty percentage points between 2006 and 2007. Particularly
noticeable was a decline in respondents’ trust in the judiciary for all three courts: Courts of
Justice, Constitutional Court and Administrative Court. Several prior events may help account
for this reduction. For example, the Constitutional Court’s decision to annul the 2006 snap
national election that the incumbent government under Thaksin Shinwatra and his Thai Rak Thai
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party (TRT), who had won a landslide the previous year, was again on course to win was under a
cloud of controversy given that King Bhumipol had directed the judiciary to do so. In addition, in
2007, the military-appointed Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to ban the Thai Rak Thai party
and 111 party executives for five years appeared biased in the face of acquitting its main rival,
the Democrat Party.2 This lead to cries a judicial “double standard” by those who were aligned
with Thaksin.
Although largely popular and at least considered by the media as being truly independent,
the Administrative Court of Thailand did not escape criticism. As will be discussed in the later
chapters, at the apex of a crisis pitting Thaksin Shinawatra against conservative-royalists in
society and government as well as strong anti-Thaksin groups that were largely Bangkok-based,
large protests paralyzed the capital. In an attempt to quell swelling protests, Thaksin called a
snap election. The election was boycotted by the Democrat Party and other opposition parties
and produced another one-sided TRT victory. However, in some districts in the Southern region,
an inefficient turnout meant that a re-running of the election would be necessary. During this
time, in April 2006 King Bhumipol Adbulyadej’s suggested in multiple speeches before the
Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court to “solve the crisis.”
This prompted all three courts to swift and concerted action as the Supreme Administrative Court
ruled to cancel the rerunning of elections in 14 districts that had failed to achieve the (2007)
constitutionally-required 20 percent voter turnout. A few days later, the Constitutional Court

2

After the coup, the military junta renamed the Constitutional Court the Constitutional Tribunal.
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ruled the entire election void.3 The court appeared to stand against Thaksin and TRT and offered
no non-military solution to the impasse.
These events and others have all affected the public’s perceptions towards elected and
non-elected institutions. Despite the judiciary’s actions, an overwhelming majority of
respondents nevertheless expressed more trust in non-elected institutions, especially the judiciary
than elected institutions. In addition, most of the survey results present respondents possessing
negative perceptions of the bureaucracy compared with the judiciary. While at first glance this
may not seem entirely relevant to the specific question of the judicialization of politics that Tate
and Vallinder (1995) and Hirschl’s (2008) “mega-politics” envision, however it is in fact
relevant to this particular study for numerous reasons. First, the Administrative Court of
Thailand’s primary mandate is to adjudicate grievances between individual(s) (both private and
bureaucrats) and the bureaucracy.4 Second, while the low scores related to trust in elected
institutions may indicate a greater willingness for citizens to use other institutions to mediate
their grievances this may not translate in their using the Administrative Court. This would be
better captured in scores related to the bureaucracy because they are the defendants. Low scores
for the bureaucracy strengthen the likelihood that individuals would use the court to adjudicate
grievances.5

3

The Supreme Court of Justice would too get the opportunity to engage in double standard. In 2008 judges convicted then exprime minister Thaksin and sentenced him, in absentia, to 2-years jail for co-signing a loan application for his then wife.
4 The latest official Administrative Court of Thailand case statistics data illustrate that the top three categories of offences pertain
to acts between private individuals and bureaucrats.
5 While not included in this study, a survey that measures bureaucrats’ perceptions towards the bureaucracy would offer insight
as to whether they would be more likely adjudicate their own grievance(s) through the court instead or another institution like the
Merit Service Protection Commission (MSPC). The MPSC is a division within the Office of the Civil Service Commission
(OCSC) responsible for adjudicating human resource-related disputes within the bureaucracy. This office is the administrative
arm of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that is responsible for human resource management within the civil service,
including the adjudication of personnel disputes. For more on the CSC and the OCSC, see,
http://www.ocsc.go.th/ocsc/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83&Itemid=246. Last accessed May 15, 2015.
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In addition to the KPI report, Transparency International’s “Global Corruption
Barometer” (GCB) also conducted a public opinion survey in Thailand measuring perceptions
towards key elected and non-elected institutions. The results demonstrate that a majority of
respondents perceive their government as failing to effectively address corruption and abuse of
power in government. Table 10 illustrates the results from the 2010-11 survey. Also see Figure 4.

Table 10
2010-11 Global Corruption Barometer Perceptions of Corruption in Public Institutions
Institution
Political parties
Parliament and Legislature
Police
Business and Private Sector
Media
Public Officials and Civil Servants
Judiciary
NGOs
Religious Bodies
Military
Education

Score
3.6
3.4
3.6
3.2
2.8
3.7
3.0
2.5
2.4
3.5
3.3

Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2010-116
Scale 1-5: 1=Not at all corrupt; 5= Extremely Corrupt

6Question:

To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by corruption?
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Figure 4. Thai perceptions of corruption in public institutions.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2010-117

The results demonstrate that respondents perceived public officials and civil servants as
most corrupt with a score of 3.7 on a scale of 5. Again, this is relevant to the particular type of
judicialization in question and strengthens the likelihood of willingness to sue. Moreover, the
judiciary had a score of 3.0 out of 5.0—the lowest score of all government institutions. This low
score may partially reflect the fact that, on average, interactions between the courts and citizens
are both less frequent in comparison with other institutions. But it is also probable that the
judiciary’s reputation is more positive when compared to elected institutions. As the literature
review chapter discussed, until the 1997 Constitution created judicial review, courts were neither

7

Question: To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country to be affected by corruption? (1-Not at all
corrupt, 5-extremely corrupt).
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politically-significant as they were lacked powers to adjudicate disputes involving administrative
actions nor did they have judicial review powers.
In addition, the GCB assessed perceptions of government effectiveness in addressing
corruption. This question is important because, if a majority of respondents perceive government
as effective in addressing corruption then they may be more willing to resolve their grievances
through non-judicial means (hence no need to use the judiciary and thus weakening prospects for
judicialization). The GCB survey results in Table 11 and Figure 5 indicate that respondents
perceive their government’s efforts to fight corruption as largely ineffective or having no effect.
Table 11
Global Corruption Barometer: Perceptions of Government Effectiveness Addressing Corruption

Public perception of government's efforts to fight corruption
Ineffective
Neither effective nor ineffective
Effective
Total
Source: Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) 2010-11

8

N: 10008

Question: How would you assess your current government’s actions in the fight against corruption?

Percent
47
31
22
100

140

Perceptions of Government Effectiveness
Addressing Corruption
100
80
60
40
20
0
Ineffective

Neither effective nor
ineffective

Effective

Figure 5. Perceptions of effectiveness addressing corruption.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2010-11

Addressing the same question, the 2013 GCB survey results prove relatively consistent
with the previous 2010-11 survey. However, there are important differences in scores for some
institutions. First, the judiciary’s score reduced by 0.5 percentage points from 3.0 to 2.5 (out of
5.0), demonstrating that respondents viewed it as less corrupt. Respondents found political
parties to be more corrupt from the previous survey by almost a half a percentage point (0.4). In
addition, respondents’ perception of parliament remained consistent from the 2010-11 survey
with a score of 3.4 out of 5. The police along with political parties are tied as being perceived as
the most corrupt among the listed public institutions. See Table 12 and Figure 6.
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Table 12
Perceptions of Corruption in Public Institutions
Institution
Political parties
Parliament and Legislature
Police
Business and Private Sector
Media
Public Officials and Civil Servants
Judiciary
NGOs
Religious Bodies
Military
Education
Medical and Health

Score
4.0
3.4
4.0
3.2
2.8
3.7
2.5
2.8
2.4
2.6
3.1
2.8

Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2013
Scale 1-5: 1=Not at all corrupt; 5= Extremely Corrupt. N:1000 National9

Figure 6. Perceptions of corruption in public institutions.
Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2013

9

N:1000

Question: To what extent do you see the following categories affected by corruption in this country? Please answer on a scale
from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘not at all corrupt’ and 5 means ‘extremely corrupt’.
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Regarding respondents’ perceptions of whether the government is fighting corruption, the
2013 survey results are consistent with the previous 2010-11 survey. As Table 13 illustrates, 25
percent of respondents expressed confidence that the government is either ‘very effective’ or
‘effective’, while 32 percent are ‘neither effective nor ineffective’ and 42 percent believe that
efforts are either ‘ineffective’ or ‘very ineffective’. This reveals that nearly half of Thais are
under the impression that corruption in public institutions is not diminishing.

Table 13
Global Corruption Barometer: Public Perceptions of the Government’s Efforts to Fight Corruption N: 100010

Public perception of government's efforts to fight corruption

Percent

Very Effective

2

Effective

23

Neither effective nor ineffective

32

Ineffective

25

Very Ineffective

17

Total

100

Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2013

N: 100011

As these results demonstrate, respondents perceive government as ineffective in fighting
corruption. It would thus not be difficult to assume that this would result in individuals feeling
more alienated, and thus more likely to be more receptive to using the judiciary to address their
grievance(s).

10
11

Question: How effective do you think your government’s actions are in the fight against corruption?
Question: How effective do you think your government’s actions are in the fight against corruption?
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Perceptions of Institutional Integrity
In 2009 and 2010 the Asia Foundation administered a series of public opinion surveys in
Thailand assessing respondents’ perceptions of governance across numerous questions. For
example, during both years the surveys measured perceptions of the institutional integrity of
elected and non-elected institutions. With respect to perceptions towards the judiciary, the 2009
survey results measuring institutional integrity revealed that 64 percent of Thais perceive the
courts to have high/very high integrity. Following at a distant second is the Army with high/very
high integrity score of 44 percent— 20 percentage points difference. Moreover, the courts have
the lowest score for ‘low/very low integrity’ with 9 percent. The highest score for an elected
institution in the high/very high integrity rating is 17 percent for the Senate that was, based on
the 2007 Constitution, half-appointed, half-elected. See Table 14.
Table 14. Asia Foundation 2009 Perceptions of Integrity of Institutions
Institution
High/very high
Neither high
Low/very low
integrity
nor low
integrity
Courts
64
26
9
Army
44
41
12
Election
36
47
15
Commission
Senate
17
59
21
Police
17
42
39
Parliament
10
60
29

No response
2
4
3
4
2
2

Source: Asia Foundation 2009, N: 1500

Included in the survey was the question assessing the extent to which non-elected institutions
were politicalized. Politicalized means the extent to which to institutions are not independent.
This question provides insight related to alienation because the extent to which Thais perceive
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institutions as biased serves as an indication as to whether they are trustworthy and thus more
likely to be used. See Table 15.
The results from Table 15 illustrate that there is a large gap between how respondents
perceive the judiciary compared with the other listed institutions. With 62 percent, the courts
received almost twice as high a score in the category of “generally neutral and unbiased” than the
military, which was second at 37 percent. Once again, this illustrates the judiciary’s more
favorable position in Thailand relative to other institutions.12

Table 15. Asia Foundation 2009 Perceptions of Politicization of Institutions.
Institution
Courts
Military
Election
Commission
Police
Media

Generally Neutral and
Unbiased

Don’t
know

Often/Sometimes
biased
62
37

34
58

3
5

30

67

4

14
17

84
81

2
2

Source: Asia Foundation 2009
N: 1500

With respect to institutional integrity, according to Table 16, in 2010 the Asia Foundation
repeated the 2009 survey. In the 2010 survey there was a reduction of 3 percent points (from 62
percent to 59 percent) in the most high/very high institutional integrity score. Interestingly, the

12

While the survey questionnaire did not specifically distinguish between the different courts, there is little to suggest that doing
so would have significantly alter the results. The three major courts—Constitutional, Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme
Court of Justice—were active and visible immediately prior to, during, and after the 2006 coup.
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reduction of the high/very high integrity score did not translate into a higher low/very low
integrity score from 2010 as the court’s neutral rating (neither high nor low) increased from 26 to
31 percent. Of the elected institutions, 11 percent of Thais viewed Parliament/MPs as having
moderately high integrity, with 51 percent being neutral. Comparing the 2009 score with the
2010 survey, respondents’ perceptions were more negative with the low/very low integrity rating
decrease of 25 down to 37.13 See Table 16.
Table 16
Asia Foundation 2010 Perceptions of Institutional Integrity
Institution

High/very high
integrity
Courts of Justice
59
Military
34
Election Commission 29
Police
17
Parliament/MPs
11

Neither high nor
low
31
47
51
46
51

Low/very low
integrity
9
17
18
36
37

Source: Asia Foundation 2010
N: 1500

Likewise, the 2010 Asia Foundation survey also measured respondents’ perceptions of
politicization within institutions. The survey questionnaire specifically asked about the Courts of
Justice and 63 percent of respondents felt that they were “generally neutral and unbiased” while
35 percent of respondents said that the court was “often/sometimes biased.” The military
received the second highest score for “generally neutral and unbiased” at 38 percent. This lower
score could be attributed to the military coup d’état that removed an elected government and
subsequently orchestrated the drafting of the 2007 constitution. See Table 17.

13

Because the 2009 survey separated Senate and Parliament, I used the mean from the previous scores: 25.
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Perceptions of Confidence in Government
In 2007 the World Values Survey conducted a public opinion survey measuring Thais’
confidence in government. The results are consistent with the surveys previously discussed (see
Table 18 and Figure 7). Of the eight institutions that the survey addressed, the justice
system/courts received the highest score in the “great deal” category with 26.1 percent—more
than double the second highest of 12.8 percent for the Armed forces. Further, the justice
system/courts received the highest rating in the next category of ‘quite a lot’ with 45.4 percent,
with the Armed forces again ranked second at a pathetic 38.5 percent.

Table 17
Asia Foundation 2010 Perceptions of Politicization of Institutions
Institution
Courts
Military
Election
Commission
Police
Media

Generally Neutral and
Unbiased
63
38
27

Often/Sometimes
biased
35
58
70

Don’t
know
3
3
3

15
17

83
81

2
2

Source: Asia Foundation 2010
N: 1500

Nearly 72 percent of the responses for the judiciary were for those having ‘a great deal’
or ‘quite a lot’ of trust. Neither the government (38.5), parliament (32.6), political parties (23.2),
civil service (43.8), police (43.3) nor television (47.4) received over 50 percent in the combined
two categories. Further, almost 60 percent either had ‘not very much’ or ‘no confidence at all’ in

147
Table 18
2007 World Values Study: Confidence in Government14
Institution
The Government
Parliament
The Political Parties
The Civil Services
The Police
Justice
System/Courts
Armed Forces
Television

A great
deal
5.7
5.0
3.9
6.3
8.3
26.1

Quite a
lot
32.8
27.6
19.3
37.5
35.0
45.4

Not very
much
53.5
57.2
63.1
48.1
43.7
22.6

None at
all
7.9
9.8
13.2
7.9
12.7
5.5

No
answer
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.3

12.8
10.0

38.5
37.4

41.0
46.7

7.4
5.5

0.3
0.3

2007 World Values Survey
N: 1534

Confidence in Government
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

A great deal

Quite a lot

Not very much

None at all

No answer

Figure 7. 2007 World Values Foundation confidence in government.

14

Thailand Question: I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you
have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (Read out and
code one answer for each):
The government (in your nation’s capital)
WV5_Results_Thailand_2007_v_2014_04_28.pdf; World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) Aggregate
File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
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reaffirms the high confidence held by the judiciary in the eyes of the Thai public that the
previously discussed surveys expressed.
Asia Barometer
Asia Barometer conducted two public opinion surveys in 2002 and 2006 assessing
perceptions of trust in several important Thai institutions. Again, both scores are consistent with
the previous surveys by showing favorable perceptions of judiciary. For the judiciary, the 2002
combined results for respondents that have a ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of trust in the judiciary
was approximately 60 percent, while the later results from the 2006 survey asking the same
question was nearly 70 percent, ten percentage points increase. The series of KPI surveys reflect
attitudes before the September 2006 military coup showing that a slight majority (51 percent) of
Thais perceived the Prime Minister, Parliament and other elected institutions as relatively
trustworthy. This is illustrated in the electoral success of former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra and his TRT majority government—the first to be re-elected in the country’s tenuous
history with democratic politics. Public opinion surveys conducted after the September 2006
coup all demonstrate a considerable reduction in public trust towards elected and non-elected
institutions. See Tables 19 and 20.
The judicialization of politics invokes Epp’s (1998) “rights-enhancing judicialization”
model to explain important legal victories in Britain, the U.S. and Canada. Making the
counterargument, contrary to the popular assumption that success was based on the actions of
elites and judges, Epp (ibid, 2) finds, “sustained judicial attention and approval for individual
rights grew primarily out of pressure from below, not leadership from above.” In particular, an
increasingly right-cognizant public’s “strategic” utilization of existing “legal support structure”
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Table 19
2002 Asian Barometer Thais Perception of Trust in Institutions
Institution

None
at all

A great
deal of
trust
19.4
16.9

No
Answer

2.1
2.1

Not very
Quite a
much trust lot of
trust
19
38.9
26.8
48.1

Courts
National
Government
Political parties
Parliament
Civil Service
Military
Police
Local government
Newspapers
Television
Election
Commission
Nongovernmental
Organizations

5.8
5
4.1
2.5
7.2
5.3
4.3
1.4
3.5

38.7
30.7
23.9
16.5
32.2
24.9
35.8
18.2
22.7

36.9
41.8
46.9
47.7
40
44.3
40
54
43.5

10.5
12.9
16.1
28
15.8
20.1
10.5
21.7
17.7

8
9.7
9.1
5.4
4.9
5.4
9.3
4.8
12.7

4.9

22.3

31.6

8.7

32.5

20.5
6.0

Source: 2002 Asian Barometer15
N 1546

15

(http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=04&ESID=447 accessed July 22,
2014) Q007.- I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them. Is it a
great deal of trust, quite a lot of trust, not very much trust, or none at all?
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Table 20
Asian Barometer 2006 Thais Perception of Trust in Institutions 16
Institution
None at Not
Quite a A great Do not
all
very
lot of
deal of
understand
much
trust
trust
the question
trust
5.1
22.6
45
19.4
0.8
Prime
Minister or
President
2.1
16.8
54.4
15.3
1.8
Courts
6.3
25.5
48.6
11.1
0.7
National
Government
7.8
31.6
42.4
8.1
0.7
Political
parties
3.3
28.6
50.4
8.7
0.9
Parliament
2.8
20.4
56
12.5
0.4
Civil Service
1.9
17.0
55.5
18.9
0.4
Military
6.4
26.0
50.1
12.6
0.2
Police
4.2
18.5
55.5
16.3
0.3
Local
government
7.1
25.0
46.9
9.9
1.0
Election
Commission
4.4
26.3
35.7
6.1
3.6
Nongovernmental
Organizations

Can’t
Decline
Choose to
Answer
4.4

2.5

7.1
5.1

2.4
2.8

6.3

3

6.1
5.8
4.8
3.3
3.0

2
2.1
1.5
1.4
2.2

7.6

2.5

19.9

3.9

Source: Asian Barometer 2006
N: 1546

16

The 2006 Asia Barometer survey was conducted from April 3, 2006, and data collection was completed on April 18, 2006.
This likely explains the relatively high scores for majoritarian institutions but is consistent with the pre-2006 coup d’état scores.
Source: http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=08&ESID=503
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helped provide consistent litigation which ultimately spurred a rights revolution in the U.S.,
Canada, India and Britain.17
If we apply this to the Thai context, one would have to explore the existing institutional
support structure of the rights-advocacy organizations, rights-advocacy lawyers and financing.18
While there are advocacy groups that exist, most of the institutional support is provided by the
Administrative Court discussed in chapter four. In particular, the court makes public access
relatively easy and providing the legal and technical counsel to encourage potential plaintiffs to
sue. Further, finance for litigation is unnecessary given that the court provides free legal
counsel.19
As all of these studies have indicated, Thais have a negative perception of elected
institutions and non-elected governing institutions. In all of the surveys, respondents perceive the
judiciary more favorably than any elected institution. This confirms the arguments both Cortner
(1968) and Tate and Vallinder’s (1994) that judicialization is correlated with society’s negative
perceptions towards elected institutions and positive perceptions of the judiciary. Results from
the survey should not necessarily come as a surprise given Thailand’s turbulent history with
attempts to consolidate democracy. The public’s positive disposition for the judiciary is notable
given that the major courts either lead or were a part in the removal of popularly elected
governments on multiple occasions. Another important revelation is that respondents have low
perceptions towards the bureaucracy/bureaucrats. This further strengthens the argument that they
would be more likely to use the Administrative Court to adjudicate their disputes.
17

The legal infrastructure that Epps refers to are right advocacy organizations and advocacy lawyers eager to prosecute.
By finance, Epp specifically refers to government financing
19 In Chapter 4 I elaborate on the institutional provisions that the court provides.
18
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In Their Own Words: Former Administrative Court Plaintiffs
While public opinion surveys provide insight into Thai sentiments that are correlated with
judicialization, this does not equate causation. This section then provides key themes from indepth interviews with former Administrative Court plaintiffs that help explain why they chose to
use the court. In addition to the question of motives, the section also explores former plaintiffs’
perspectives related to the impact of judicialization towards questions of the court’s ability to
affect the relationship between themselves and the bureaucracy, its effectiveness in affecting
policies.
This chapter will discuss the experience of three people: “Plaintiff S,”— a prominent
environmental rights advocacy lawyer who is also president of an environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO). As a principal litigant in over 500 cases in the Administrative
Court, Plaintiff S has served as a principal litigant in over 600 lawsuits. In addition to reflecting
on their own experience as a former plaintiff, this study utilizes Plaintiff S as a proxy for those
they represented. “Plaintiff J” is a former senior-level bureaucrat within the Ministry of Interior.
While working as a Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister, the Office
transferred him to the Ministry of Interior’s Office of the Inspector General. Finally, “Plaintiff T”
is a former high-ranking bureaucrat within the National Security Council (NSC) who was
transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister. All of the former plaintiffs used both the Court of
First Instance and the Supreme Administrative Court and were awarded victories. Below focuses
on the following themes: key factor(s) for submitting grievances to the court, perceptions of the
court as a trustworthy institution, perception(s) of the court’s impact upon the relationship
between plaintiffs and bureaucracy, impact of the court upon politicians’ behavior, in particular
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their ability to perform their formal duties. Ultimately, the section will illustrate why
judicialization begins and its impact upon those affected.
As claimed at the beginning of this chapter, individuals’ decision to sue are a
consequence of their perception of institutional alienation. The surveys indirectly capture
respondents’ perceptions of alienation through the various concepts that the public opinion
surveys queried: trust, integrity, confidence, politicalization, efforts to address corruption, and
corruption. While the responses indicate that judicialization is possible, it is important to gather
the perspectives of actual former Administrative Court plaintiffs directly.
The judicialization of politics literature posits perceptions of alienation from elected
institutions as one of the factors that motivates individuals to use the judiciary. In interviews,
former plaintiffs’ answers revealed several justifications. In addition to motives, former plaintiffs
offered their opinions about the effectiveness of the Administrative Court (both Courts of First
Instance and Supreme Administrative) as institutions empowered to adjudicate grievances as
well as the court’s impact on the relationships between individuals and the bureaucracy. Further,
this chapter includes the perspective of policymakers and those entrusted with implementing
those policies.
By Design and Distress: The Administrative Court as “Court of Last Resort”
Former Administrative Court plaintiffs revealed that their decision to use the court was
also based on the feeling of necessity. For them the court is one of “last resort”; it represents the
final opportunity through which individuals can receive redress. This speaks to the value with
which individuals’ accord their grievance as evidenced by the fact that individuals are willing to
go to the furthest extent possible. Only fourteen years in existence, the Administrative Court is
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still in its infancy relative to more longstanding institutions. Former plaintiffs readily
acknowledge that many Thais remain uninformed about the court system.20 Table 21 offers
statistics from the Office of the Administrative Court showing that the majority of consultations
pertain to elementary knowledge of the institution. This is perhaps expected given its relative
youth and the lack of legal education in the country.

Table 21
Number of Consultations Requested Since the Court’s Inception up to December 2013
Type of Cases
by Year
Filing a
plaint form,
submitting a
plaint,
appealing, or
related
information
Whether
cases are in
the
jurisdiction
or not
Miscellaneous
knowledge
about the
Admin Court
Steps before
submitting a
plaint to the
Admin Court
Other

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

22013

Total

189

2516

3636

2351

1719

1840

1527

2064

2369

4128

3381

3387

3676

32783

108

2153

2361

1662

1393

1821

1488

1742

2119

2650

2294

1922

2134

23847

34

1611

1530

1086

868

1077

1447

1523

2188

2848

2390

1801

1902

20305

74

1684

1940

1497

951

1085

1078

1697

1978

2200

1769

1654

1827

19434

213

1047

2096

1374

1023

892

1064

1174

1773

1824

1651

1179

1915

17225

Total

618

9011

11563

7970

5954

6715

6604

8200

10427

13650

11485

9943

11454

113594

Source: 2013 Administrative Court Case Statistics. Office of the Administrative Court of Thailand.

The above statistics are telling in a number of respects. First they indicate that the
majority of questions that individuals have pertain to the court’s more technical functions. All of

20

Judges also recognize that most Thais still do not know about the court.
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the plaintiffs that this study interviewed stated that the Thai government should more seriously
invest in educating citizens about their legal rights beginning with the public education system.
In the absence of a systematic commitment to education, the Administrative Court has several
mechanisms to educate and inform the general public. Located within the Office of the
Administrative Court, the Department of Public Relations is responsible for promoting and
educating the public about the court’s functions, individuals’ rights and technical questions such
as how to file grievances. In addition, judges travel throughout the country to participate in
public awareness and educational events using these to promote the court.
One reason that the Administrative Court is one of last resort is a consequence of its
institutional rules. First, the court is only accessible after the exhaustion of all required protocol
mediation efforts. Paragraph two in Section 42 in the Act on the Establishment of Administrative
Court and Administrative Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999) instructs, “in the case where the law
provides for the process or procedure for the redress of the grievance or injury in any particular
matter, the filing of an administrative case with respect to such matter may be made only after
action has been taken in accordance with such process and procedure and an order has also
been given there under or no order has been given within a reasonable period of time or within
such time as prescribed by law.”21 This is intentional because it prevents frivolous lawsuits
which is important given the relatively low number of judges (approximately 212 in a country of
an estimated 66 million). For example, in discussing the decision to sue, “Plaintiffs S”, replied,
“The majority of the individuals that I represent submit plaints to the court because they have no

21

Act on the Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999) Act Section 41.
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other choice for receiving justice for their grievances. Initially, most people are scared to sue for
a number of reasons. Most Thais are afraid to challenge the bureaucracy. They worry about
retaliation. This is especially the case because they encounter the bureaucrats with whom they
have a dispute everyday. Some are afraid of the consequences in suing the bureaucracy
especially if they lose the case because they fear that the bureaucracy would sue them back.”22
Likewise, “Plaintiff J” stated, “I protested my superiors’ decision to transfer me because I
felt that it was not based on merit but was politically-motivated. I thought my case was unjust
because my superiors had not been truthful. Even before using the Administrative Court, I sent
letters to my superiors asking them to explain their decision to transfer me. Even though my
superiors wanted me to just accept the ruling, I decided to go to the Administrative Court
because I had nothing to lose and was already planning to retire soon anyway.”
Finally, “Plaintiff T” reflected, “I used the Administrative Court because I wanted them
to review the MSPC’s action. I had nothing to lose and I had no other option to receive justice. I
was confident in the court, given its reputation from other cases and was sure that they would
rule in my favor based on the merits of my case. My case received a lot of media attention
because I was one of the first high-ranking bureaucrats to sue over an unlawful transfer. I did
discuss my case with my family and they agreed to support me. I knew about the Administrative
Court from the news and other cases like EGAT, so I thought I would get a fair ruling.”
Moreover, some of the plaintiffs answered that they strategically assessed the costs and
benefits of litigation. Both “Plaintiff J” and “Plaintiff T” stated that while they had the support of
22

ibid. While the individual bureaucrat(s) is usually responsible for committing an unlawful administrative act or inaction, it is
their respective agencies that provide legal representatives at court hearings. Furthermore, those legal representatives usually
notify the accused of the charges and subsequent status of the case.
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fellow bureaucrats, they still assessed the costs and benefits of pursing legal action. For example,
both stated that they consulted with their immediate family before deciding to pursue legal action
and even admitted that had they been younger in their careers or newly-hired, they would have
most likely just “gone along” (accepted their transfer order) in order to not cause trouble.”23
“Plaintiff J” stated, “I asked my wife what she thought I should do and she agreed that I
should challenge the order. Once my family agreed, I knew I had nothing to lose.” Likewise,
“Plaintiff T” recalled, “Before I decided to challenge the decision of the MSPC, I talked with my
family and discussed the implications from the case. Everyone agreed that I should do it. Even
my colleagues are supporting me because they have faced the same injustice.” Assessing the
costs with family, illustrates the extent of deliberation that individuals exercise before deciding
to sue. For both individuals, there was an understanding of the potential risks and pressures
associated with challenging the bureaucracy through a medium that is official and public.
As both a president of an environmental rights advocacy NGO and a lawyer, “Plaintiff S”
performs an important role that extends beyond representing the aggrieved. In many respects
“Plaintiffs S” assists individuals decide whether or not to use the court. One way is encouraging
communities to pursue lawsuits as part of a group. Remarking on this role, Plaintiff S stated, “I
convince individuals to sue as part of a large group. For example, if there is a community
affected by pollution caused by industries, getting people to sue in groups gives them the
boldness and courage as opposed to a single person versus a powerful bureaucracy. This is also a
strategy to pressure judges to be more sympathetic and rule in our favor.”
During this same interview, I asked “Plaintiff T ’s” secretary who was in attendance and in his mid-twenties, whether he would
use the court now in the event that a human resource decision was unmerited. He responded that he would not because it would
likely damage his reputation and, ultimately career.
23

158

Another way of encouraging individuals to sue is by articulating to individuals the costs
and benefits of legal recourse. Plaintiff S educates individuals about the court, its powers and
jurisdiction. Discussing the strategy to encourage individuals who are initially hesitant to sue,
“Plaintiff S” explained:
Usually, I have to reassure those that are hesitant to sue that there will be no retaliation towards
them by bureaucrats as a result of choosing legal action. One way I keep them from being afraid
and to sue is to tell them that, if the court thinks that there is a real problem with safety, judges
will make the hearing private and not reveal their names. Many Thais do not sue because they
don’t know anything about the court. The court is new and most Thais lack basic knowledge
about their rights. Thais do not understand the court so I have to teach them about the
jurisdiction and rights…I tell people that there are no obstacles in using the court because it
requires no legal fees and doesn’t require legal representation. This differs from the Court of
Justice where one must pay court fees. I also tell the people that the court is really easy and
convenient to use and also provides free legal consultations that help them determine whether
their cases are worth pursuing.

In addition to using the Administrative Court because they had exhausted all other means
and felt that they had no choice, former plaintiffs expressed that they desired to receive justice.
“Plaintiff J” pointed out, “I sued because I wanted justice. The MSPC made an unlawful decision
to agree to my transfer. On the day of the vote there was supposed to be a seven-person
committee voting to approve or reject my transfer order. However on that day only six members
attended, and the vote ended up being a tie. In this case, the head of the committee, who had
already voted in favor of my transfer, voted again as the tie-breaking seventh vote—thus
rejecting my appeal. Based on the illegal nature of this process, I decided to appeal to the
Administrative Court. The MSPC had not been fair or honest about the process. I found out
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about what really happened from one of the members. The process was a complete joke so I
appealed to the Administrative Court of First Instance in Bangkok.”
In a similar fashion, “Plaintiff T” expressed, “On the day that the seven-member
commission was to vote on my case only six members were in attendance, including one who
was a dissenting voter from the previous subcommittee. The commission ended up voting to a tie
and, the dissenting voter voted twice to break the impasse, making the total 4-3 to dismiss my
case. I felt that this vote was unfair and I decided to protest the case to the Administrative Court.
I wanted to receive justice because this was not fair.” Justice for both plaintiffs meant redressing
an injustice—in this case a decision by their respective agency responsible for adjudicating
official personnel decisions. For the former plaintiffs who were high-ranking bureaucrats, this
meant orders reinstating them to their previous position.
Sore Winners?: Perceptions of the Administrative Court Experience
All of the former plaintiffs offered their perspectives about their experience using the
court and overall impression of the court. While all three won their cases, they also articulated
similar opinions. All believed judges from the Administrative Court of First Instance were more
committed to making decisions based on the principles of the facts and law, whilst the Supreme
Administrative Court behaved in a more strategic manner. All former plaintiffs believe that the
Supreme Administrative Court was more committed to appeasing both plaintiffs and defendants
even at the expense of providing justice.
In fact, “Plaintiff S” stated, “I believe that the majority of Administrative Court judges
make decisions based in accordance with the law and facts of the case, some have failed. There
have been cases where the courts were influenced by the media. In fact, that’s why I use this as a
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strategy. I use the media as a weapon to influence and pressure them (the judges) to make
decisions in favor of plaintiffs. The more media, the better [likelihood to affect outcome in favor
of plaintiffs]. Sometimes the court follows the political mood of the day.” Discussing the court’s
propensity to make decisions that are amicable to both plaintiffs and defendants, “Plaintiff S”
remarked further, “I think that the court tries to make decisions that please all parties and judges
are especially sensitive to ruling against a large community because the court cares about its
reputation amongst the people. That is why I use the media and tell the people to show up at the
court.”
“Plaintiff J” recollected:
After the Court of First Instance’s decision came down, the Ministry of Interior agreed to not
appeal the decision, but the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister decided to
appeal the ruling to the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court took
an additional two years to decide to affirm the Administrative Court of First Instance’s original
ruling. Even though I eventually won the appeal, I believe that the Supreme Administrative
Court’s decision was purely based on politics. First they should not have even accepted the
appeal. There was no need to accept the appeal because the government did not submit any new
documents to justify their claim. The court purposely delayed their decision in order to appease
all parties. I believe that the court purposely decided to rule in favor just before I was going to
retire. The court even purposely changed judges in the chamber midway during the hearings as a
delay tactic. I am disappointed that there was no penalty for what the court has done.
Reflecting on the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to rule in their favor,
“Plaintiff T” stated, “I’m very glad that my case was finally resolved but I’m disappointed that
the court took a very long time to confirm the original ruling. The government’s appeal did not
offer any new evidence and the Supreme Administrative Court should have rejected it. I believe
that the court purposely delayed their decision. They wanted to wait until I was only a few more
months until my retirement. The decision should have happened much earlier.”
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In sum, despite winning their cases, all of the former plaintiffs believed that the Supreme
Administrative Court intentionally delayed a decision that they thought was clearly in their favor.
In addition, all believed that the Supreme Administrative Court purposely accepted appeals from
the defendants in the absence of any additional or new evidence in order to appease the losing
side (government). Former plaintiffs who were high-ranking bureaucrats also believed that
judges purposely delayed the court’s proceedings and waited until they were close to retirement
before ruling to uphold the lower court’s original decision. Both stated that they felt that the
Supreme Administrative Court attempted to appease both parties. “Plaintiff J” remarked, “Saving
face is important in Asian culture and the court does not want to embarrass the government in
high-profile cases.” Interestingly, as a lawyer who continues to use the Administrative Court,
“Plaintiff S” uses the court’s propensity to make popular decisions to their advantage through
public pressure and the media presence.”
Judicialization and the Questions of Its Effects
As the literature review illustrated, depending on context, the judicialization of politics
can emit several effects. To varying degrees, all of the former plaintiffs expressed
disappointment in the Administrative Court. However such disappointments does not reflect the
complete experience. Former plaintiffs discussed areas where the court’s decision produced more
positive impact on their relationship with the bureaucracy. The court is changing traditional
power relations between bureaucrat and the individual, improving accountability in terms of
oversight of bureaucrats work. “Plaintiff J” stated, “I and the other plaintiffs that I represent feel
empowered by the court. I think most people feel that bureaucrats are now more cautious
because the court puts fear in them and they might feel threatened. The court does make
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bureaucrats more accountable. Now they must respect the people. In the past they ignored the
people but this is changing because of the court. Now, they have worry about the court. The gap
between bureaucrats and citizens are narrower and they are more respectful of ordinary citizens.
Now bureaucrats consider the rights of the people before taking action. There is more fear when
they make decisions.” When asked whether this applied to bureaucrats at every level, Plaintiff S
responded, “bureaucrats, both lower ranking and their superiors are knowledgeable about the
court, the rights of citizens and they know what they can and cannot do. Bureaucrats know the
law. There is no excuse. They know about the court.”
Conclusion
As this chapter demonstrated, numerous reasons are responsible for former plaintiffs’
decisions to pursue litigation. First, the public opinion surveys demonstrate the environment in
which Thais do not hold positive perceptions towards elected institutions, and, as is relevant to
the court’s jurisdiction, the bureaucracy. By contrast, most Thais hold the judiciary in a favorable
esteem. This contributes to existing literature that correlates the phenomenon with public
perceptions because it includes questions that are directly applicable to the court in question’s
jurisdiction. In addition, through a discussion from interviews with former plaintiffs, the chapter
identified that several reasons were directly responsible for their decision to use the court.
Perceiving themselves as not having any other option, possessing the desire to receive justice
and, finally, using of strategic calculus were all mentioned as factors into their decision. The use
of the Administrative Court and with it, judicialization will likely continue for the immediate
future.

CHAPTER 6
STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS: JUDGES AS KINGS AND SERVANTS

In the beginning we were like brothers. Even if we disagreed with each other during a case—it
didn’t matter—we would still eat lunch together after. This began to change once Ackaratorn
began to lead a crusade against Thaksin. Then, once he began to interfere, I knew it was time for
me to leave.
-A Former Vice President of the Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand1

Based on data acquired through in-depth semi-structured interviews, this chapter provides
the Administrative Court judges’ perspectives on decision-making, politics and the court’s
relationships with several key political actors. Using the court-centric approach as a point of
departure, this dissertation hypothesizes that judges make decisions based on calculus or what
the judicial politics literature refers to as the “strategic approach.” This chapter’s thesis affirms
that judges are strategic decisions-makers. In particular, they seek to protect the court’s
reputation, appease both disputant parties based on their anticipated reactions as well as those of
the public. The level stratagem is more pronounced based on the court: Supreme Administrative
Court judges expressed greater concern for the court’s reputation and the reactions of the
disputant parties and the public than Court of First Instance judges.
The first section explores the court-centric approach while also providing a brief
discussion of the history of the Thai judiciary’s role in politics. While acknowledging the

1

Interview on September18, 2014.
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historical position of the Thai judiciary and judges’ personalities, the section argues that the
Administrative Court judges depart from traditional values. The second section discusses
Administrative Court judges’ perceptions and then teases out the key factors that they consider
when making decisions. Section three argues that based on judges’ understanding of their role in
relation to adjudicating disputes between Thai society and the bureaucracy, judicialization has
led to the realization of more progressive ideals. Finally, section four uses the perspectives from
politicians to affirm the argument that through the Administrative Court, judicialization is reality
that affects the former’s ability to perform their respective duties.
Calculated Decisions: The Court-centric Approach
The court-centric approach depicts judicialization as a judge-driven phenomenon. Through
judges’ decisions, courts ultimately determine political outcomes. Included within this approach
are numerous assumptions. First, as individuals, judges are political actors who make decisions
strategically to achieve their outcomes. This description is an extension of the judicial politics
literature that presents decision-making as strategic. Commonly referred to as the “strategic
approach”, this model of decision-making postulates that decisions represent judges’ most
optimal choice given a concomitant of factors—existing and anticipated. The approach’s origins
are in neo-classical economics rational choice theory.1 In their landmark study on the U.S.
Supreme Court decision-making, Epstein and Knight (1998, 10) argue that justices are
calculative and that decisions do not reflect their “true” preferences but, instead, a suboptimal
compromise given the following factors:
1. other actors’ preferences;
1

For an excellent review of the strategic approach, see Spiller and Gely 2007.
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2. other actors’ anticipated reactions of; and,
3. institutional context.2
Epstein and Knight’s contribution to the judicial politics literature is important because it
presents judges’ decision-making as strategic endeavors thus fully embracing them as political
actors. In turn, the judicialization of politics literature adopts this specific approach as its point of
departure. Likewise this study too adopted the court-centric approach, but was hesitant to accept
Epstein and Knight’s assumptions related to judges’ preferences without reservation. As the
literature review chapter conveyed, the public law field has historically presented judges as being
primarily invested in making decisions that conform to the principles of jurisprudence while in
contrast, post-behavioral revolution political science has been comfortable conceptualizing
judges as but “another” political actor under a different garb.
With respect to Thailand in particular, existing literature on judges present them as
conservative in their interpretation of the meaning of the rule of law and, in particular, their
attitudes about the role of the judiciary in society. Specifically, in McCargo’s (2015) review of a
series of writings by Thai academics and judges themselves, he concludes that the majority of
Thai judges have historically perceived their roles to be one that is conservative with respect to
seeking to limit the “evils” of popular government institutions and politicians. This, according to
McCargo, contrasts with more progressive-oriented outcomes that lead to the advancement of
ideals such as social justice and expansion of rights for the marginalized.
Several authors attribute Thai judges’ conservative disposition to a number factors. First,
with respect to their professional qualifications, relative to the rest of the country, most judges

2

Like the authors, I do not attempt to claim that the attitudinal and institutional approaches are irrelevant or that judges make
decisions strategically at all times.
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come from elite background with respect to educational level. All Administrative Court judges,
both Courts of First Instance and Supreme Administrative Court, must have university degrees at
the graduate level. In addition, judges must pass the Thai barrister law exam. They are also
required to have previously served as a high-ranking judge in a parallel court or have been a
senior level bureaucrat. Second, historically, the Thai judiciary has never been an ambitious
institution let alone forward-thinking enough to entertain progressive questions. The expansion
of rights, such as the elimination of slavery was royally derived. King Chulalongkorn’s Chakri
Reformation (1892) directed a series of state-building and modernizing initiatives.
Reflecting on justice administration prior to the creation of the Ministry of Justice, former
President of the Supreme Court of Justice (who would also become Prime Minister) Tanin
Kraivixien (1967, 11-12) writes that the King was the Supreme Judge. In fact, prior to the
creation of the modern bureaucracy justice administration was not a distinct position but, instead,
one of the more perfunctory administrative duties. “The Head of each department was entrusted
with administrative authority as well as judicial tasks. He acted as chief judge over the courts in
the capital that came under him. In the provinces, the Governor of each town was concurrently
administrative head and chief judge.” One of King Chulalongkorn’s reforms was the
establishment of the Ministry of Justice in 1892 that he entrusted to his son, Oxford-educated
son, Prince Ratburi, as the first Minister of Justice. The Ministry of Justice’s earliest
contributions was the creation of the 1908 Law on the Organization of the Courts which
abolished the 16 departmental courts and established six distinct ones, one of which was the
Supreme Court of Justice. Although the Supreme Court of Justice was directly responsible to the
King, the remaining five courts were placed within the Ministry of Justice. This also established
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the distinct function and position of a judge. Attempts to separate judge from King
Chulalongkorn was not without controversy.
Indeed, the question of separating judges from the King had created tension between the
Minister of Justice and his father. Mead (2004, 112) writes, “The king, Prince Damrong and
some other cabinet ministers considered the judiciary to be an arm of the absolutist state, existing
in order to serve state interests.” While serving as Minister of Justice, Prince Ratburi openly
clashed with his father on several questions related to jurisprudence, including an episode in
which a fellow royal insulted him. He used this occasion to illustrate that, due to a royal court
whose allegiance was not to the law would even fail to protect him. Although Prince Ratburi
cited this offense as a reason for his frustration, according to Mead (ibid, 114), “the real cause of
conflict lay in the prince’s attempt to establish the judiciary as an autonomous body. This caused
tension between the king and Prince Ratburi to persist, and was responsible for the delay in
completing the Criminal Code, which was under the supervision of Prince Ratburi.” Judges
wrote to the King expressing support of Prince Ratburi but the King was not impressed. He
accepted his son’s resignation and even a senior judge who claimed unable to perform his duties
without Prince Ratburi’s tutelage.
As Mead (ibid, 117) notes, “This incident showed a modern minister challenging the
king’s authority in the name of professionalism. It also confirmed the king’s worse fears, that the
practice of modern bureaucracy could be detrimental to his authority. Officials now regarded
their ministers rather than the king as patron. He was seen to be removed from the bureaucratic
processes of recruitment and promotion, and so his claim to be prime patron lost credibility.”
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This episode, which was not the first, eventually led to the severing of relations between father
and son. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court justices remained under the crown’s control.
In 1932 civilian and military officers overthrew the absolute monarchy then under King
Prajadhipok. Attempts to create a stable constitutional democracy by intellectual and Thammasat
University law professor Pridi Banomyong, proved frustrating. This was further complicated by
the Japanese interregnum of Thailand during World War II had led to the rise of General Phibun
Songkram (1932-1944). Following his resignation, the return to civilian rule occurred under
Khuang Aphaiwong. After Aphaiwong resigned in August 1945, next was career diplomat and
former ambassador to the U.S., Seni Pramoj. He then resigned in 1946 and Aphaiwong was
reinstated. Another Aphaiwong resignation led to Pridi taking office (again) in March 1946.
However, a series of events would limit Pridi’s tenure. The publication of his formulation of a
Marxist-inspired economic plan was not welcomed by the monarchy and military. After the
suspicious death surrounding King Ananda on June 9, 1946, political opponents began to paint
Pridi as culpable thus causing him to resign. Rear Admiral Luang Thamrong then became Prime
Minister. In 1947, the army staged a coup re-installing Phibun.
Following this period of a revolving door of political leadership, General Sarit Thanat
(1958-63) finally established the military’s supremacy through a coup d’etat. Seeking to create
mass appeal for his regime, General Sarit resurrected a then politically and financially anemic
monarchy.3 General Sarit also imposed martial law and replaced the civilian judiciary with that
of the military. Under General Sarit, Thailand cultivated close relations with the West, the U.S.

3

Prior to Sarit’s decision, as an institution, the monarchy was largely circumscribed. Inspired by the Japanese nationalism,
Phibun sought to legitimate his rule as an instrument of modernization through promoting Thai nationalism. The monarchy was
perceived an antiquated and antithetical to development ideals.
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in particular, in order to obtain economic development. Since the overthrow of the absolute
monarchy, Fred Riggs (1966) and other observers of Thai politics characterize the period as a
“bureaucratic polity.” This meant that the politics resided within the narrow confines of the
civilian and military bureaucracies, due to the absence of countervailing forces able to organize
and articulate demands. Far from a state of tranquility, intra-bureaucratic competition was
actually quite fierce within the bureaucratic polity. As one of the factions existing on the
“outside”, the judiciary had no constituency, and while initially close to an increasingly popular
but still military-dependent monarchy, it lacked influence.
Throughout successive dictatorships Thailand’s judiciary exercised no meaningful
influence towards political outcomes other than exonerating previous dictators from potential
prosecution. Opportunities for greater influence began in earnest with the promulgation of the
1997 Constitution. The constitution afforded the judiciary the institutional provisions to
influence political outcomes by serving as an instrument for improving governance and
administration. Discussing the increasing activity of the Thai judiciary in politics, Dressel (2006)
concludes that judges are conservative royalists and, as a result, served more of an instrument of
the King Bhumipol’s control. This is evidenced by the king’s speech to justices from the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Supreme Court of Justice in the
wake of the 2006 election impasse which led to rulings against Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party. Dressel further notes that it is only judges who swear an
oath to uphold the law directly in the King’s presence. This underscores the monarch’s influence
on the Courts and, as a result, his conclusion that politicalization of the Thai judiciary has
transpired. The latter presumes that judges are able to make decisions independent of external
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actors— the monarchy in particular. Ultimately, this dissertation finds that his conclusion is
partially correct. When the monarchy’s interests are involved, the court will comply and hence,
politicalization will be the result. But, as chapter seven will discuss, this is not the status quo.
In addition, McCargo’s (2015) review essay of writings of Thai academics’ and judges’
perceptions of justice and their role in governance concludes that for some, the concept of justice
can connote either one of two different meanings: conservative or progressive. Liberal
interpretations believe that the role of judges should reflect a type of judicialization that could
translate into more progressive outcomes, such as the expansion and protection of the rights of
the disenfranchised. Those subscribing to a more conservative bent understand judicialization as
a mechanism to sanction popular government. The judiciary in this respect reduces democratic
space. So which viewpoint is more accurate? Arguing that most Thai judges have antiquated
ideas about their role and what the rule of law means, McCargo concludes that judicialization is
likely to lead to more conservative outcomes.4
In an earlier article, McCargo (2014) surveys recent decisions by the Constitutional
Court, and to a lesser extent, the Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Justice,
and concludes that the ongoing wave of the judicalization of Thai politics has led to a series of
demos-limiting outcomes. Such outcomes, he claims, is a reflection of established political
elites’ understanding of the rule of law as well as their conceptualization of populism as a threat
to their ability to maintain access to power through electoral politics. However, McCargo’s
observations, while accurate, reflect more of a one-sided catalogue of cases than a

4

To his credit, he does acknowledge judges’ conservative orientation may not align with image of the courts that the 1997
Constitution established.
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comprehensive account of the judiciary’s behavior. A more balanced examination would reveal
that recent instances of judicialization have in fact also led to the advancement of progressive
ideals. The Administrative Court—both the Courts of First Instance and the Supreme
Administrative Court—have crafted rulings that have defended the rights of communities against
powerful state interests.5 Such decisions are one of the reasons for the court’s high esteem.
Further, McCargo’s (2014) examples reflect more of the elite’s politicalization of the judiciary—
not judicialization.
While this chapter concurs with McCargo’s observation of judges’ conservative leanings,
this does not preclude them from also making progressive decisions. In fact, even a quick
purview of key Administrative Court’s decisions reveal how they have advanced the rights of
marginalized groups, ranging from asserting the rights of the LBGT communities to protecting
communities from the potential negative effects that can result from government efforts to
privatize state industries.6
Section One: Who Are the Administrative Court Judges?
A glance at the Administrative Court judges reveals that they are well-educated. Based on
the Administrative Court’s statistics, nearly 76 percent have postgraduate degrees. Many have
studied law internationally either in Europe or North America. (See Table 22.)

5
6

As Chapter 4 indicated, this also refers to industries, which legally become state industries.

In September 2011, the Central Court in Bangkok ruled that the military could not label transvestites as “mentally ill.” The
military subsequently agreed to accept this ruling. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/court-to-thai-militarytranssexuals-not-ill-2354067.html (Accessed August 10, 2015)
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Table 22
Level of Education for All Administrative Court Judges
Less than
Bachelor

Bachelor

MA

PhD

Total

0

50

143

19

212

Percent w/
postgraduate
education
76

Administrative Court of Thailand 2013 Annual Report. Office of the Administrative Court of Thailand.

The level of education reflects the qualification standards that individuals must meet in
order to be eligible for the position. To recall from chapter four, in order to qualify to be a Court
of First Instance judge, one must be at least 35 years old, have at least a bachelors in a related
field and a hold a mid-level position rank in the bureaucracy. Likewise, Supreme Administrative
Court judges must meet the educational requirements of a relevant degree and ample years of
professional experience at the more senior executive level. The JCAC can and usually does
nominate Supreme Administrative Court judges from the Courts of First Instance. While the
court is only fifteen years old, many judges are former senior bureaucrats from ministries. In an
interview with an official from the Office of the Administrative Court, they remarked, “This
gives judges an advantage because, as former bureaucrats, judges are able to know if a
bureaucrat did not know or just refused to follow an order. It also improves the time needed to
make decisions.”7 One Court of First Instance judge stated, “Prior to becoming a judge, I was a
former high-ranking official in the Ministry of Education and that helps me understand policies

7

Interview on July, 10, 2012.
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and make better-informed decisions quickly.”8 This illustrates the advantages that one’s
knowledge about law and policies within a particular ministry or agency gives judges.
While in terms of education and age, Administrative Court judges mirror traditional
judges, the court departs from the Thai judiciaries in their progressive disposition. This is
evinced by both their perception of their roles as well as their attitudes towards aggrieved parties,
the bureaucracy and Thai society. Hence, as far as the Administrative Court of Thailand is
concerned, judicialization has led to progressive outcomes. However, important distinctions do
exist between the Supreme Administrative Court and Courts of First Instance in terms of the
degree to which certain factors are relevant in decision-making. This chapter argues that these
differences are owed to institutional dynamics. Court of First Instance judges expressed a greater
willingness to make decisions that reflect their true preferences. This contrasts with Supreme
Administrative Court judges who expressed greater concern for the anticipated reactions to their
decision’s impact on the immediate parties involved as well as Thai society. In addition,
Supreme Administrative Court judges demonstrated that their decisions are based on their
anticipation of the Thai public’s reaction(s) and how that particularly affects their reputation.
This section proposes that this distinction is a consequence of important distinctions within each
court’s institutional composition. Specifically, Court of First Instance judges articulated that the
probability of appeal was greater in cases involving large economic and political interests. This
prospect allows judges to make decisions without concern about anticipated reactions that may
be negative. By contrast, Supreme Administrative Court judges’ expressed a greater awareness

8

This same Court of First Instance judges stated that one source of friction between the courts and bureaucrats is because most
Administrative Court judges were former bureaucrats and never were asked to judge. “They [bureaucrats that are defendants]
sometimes are disrespectful because they don’t believe we are competent.” Interview on May 11, 2012.
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of their decisions’ impact on the larger public and greater sensitivity towards the anticipated
reactions of plaintiffs and judges. As a result, they revealed a greater willingness to “craft”
rulings that would appease all parties as best as possible.
Table 23 offers an illustration of the composition of the Courts of the First Instance and
the percentage of judges that are represented in this study. Of the courts that this study includes,
the total percentage of judges interviewed represent nearly 20 percent. This is significant given
the longstanding challenges associated with access to such a group comprised of reclusive
individuals and due to the sensitivity of the topic.
Table 23
Courts of First Instance Judges Interviewed Total Number and Percentage
Region of Specific
Court of First
Instance
Central
North
Northeast
South
Total

Total Judges in
Specific Court

Interviewed

Percentage

64
12
14
10
100

10
3
2
3
18

15.6
25
14.2
30
18

Source: Administrative Court of Thailand 2013 Annual Report.

In addition to the percentage of judges represented from the particular Court of First
Instance, the overall percentage of cases adjudicated in each court is well-represented in this
study. While the distribution of cases from the Courts of First Instance are heavily skewed, as
nearly half of all cases are adjudicated in the Court of First Instance located in the Central region
which is located in Bangkok/Nonthaburi. Table 24 illustrates the distribution of cases based on
region.
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Table 24
Total Distribution of Court of First Instance Cases Based on Region and the Number of
Provinces within its Jurisdiction from 2001-2013

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

Central
(20)
2, 542
2, 018
1, 848
1, 611
2, 148
2, 438
2, 702
2, 156
2, 881
2, 094
2, 468
4, 205
3, 412
32, 523

Northeast
(20)
1, 072
981
843
842
840
1, 050
1, 129
1, 057
1, 126
1, 199
1, 549
1, 015
3, 718
16, 421

Region
South
(14)
686
579
755
517
595
605
505
435
441
469
485
2, 054
803
8, 929

North
(16)
748
562
596
469
588
919
726
654
502
574
585
761
1, 197
8, 881

East
(7)
330
190
224
250
264
319
280
189
291
342
315
285
614
3, 893

Total
5, 378
4, 330
4, 266
3, 689
4, 435
5, 331
5, 342
4, 491
5, 241
4, 678
5, 402
8, 320
9, 744
70, 647

Source: 2013 Annual Statistics for Administrative Court Cases. Office of the Administrative Court of Thailand.

Finally, Table 25 illustrates the total number of Supreme Administrative Court judges
and those interviewed and the total percentage that they represent. Nearly a tenth of the Supreme
Administrative Court judges were interviewed.
During the interviews, all of the questions centered upon the following questions: 1. key
factor(s) they consider when making decisions; 2. role and impact of the court upon plaintiffs
and defendants in the immediate dispute; and, 3. impact of the court’s decisions upon the
relationships between Thais and the bureaucracy as well as intra-bureaucratic relations.
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Table 25
Percentage of Current Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand Interviewed
Court
Supreme
Administrative
Court of Thailand

Total Judges in
Court
22

Interviewed

Percentage

2*9

9

Source: Administrative Court of Thailand 2013 Annual Report. Office of the Administrative Court.

Section Two: Factors Impacting Decision-making
As the last section made clear, the judicial politics literature characterize judges as
rational actors who make decisions based on an underlying desire to achieve the best possible
outcome(s) given external factors/constraints. These factors can vary from the anticipation of
other actors’ reactions that can include the immediate parties as well as those indirectly involved.
In addition, another factor could be the anticipated impact of judges’ decisions upon the court’s
reputation. More narrow factors include the anticipated impact upon judges’ individual career
trajectories. Although, the potential list of factors could be limitless, identification of such factors
are better ascertained through having an understanding of judges’ goals.
Interviews with judges throughout four Courts of First Instance as well as the Supreme
Administrative Court revealed several themes related to those factors they consider during
decision-making. They are the following: the need to craft decisions that offer a semblance of
justice, ensuring that immediate parties were aware that decisions were based on the facts and
law, and, based on the anticipation of the public’s reaction towards their decision, and ensuring
decisions did not negatively affect the court’s reputation.

9

In addition, I interviewed 2 retired Supreme Administrative Court. One was a former President and the other a Vice-President.
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While judges from both courts expressed the same factors in decision-making, Supreme
Administrative Court judges intimated a more pronounced consideration for ensuring that their
decision did not adversely affect the court’s reputation. This section argues that the key reason
for such differences are owed to institutional factors— in particular the prospect of appeal.
Losing parties’ ability to appeal Court of First Instance’s decisions to the Supreme
Administrative Court reduces the consequences that judges from the former associate towards
anticipated reactions and thus the need to be as prospective. As a result, Court of First Instance
judges are less concerned about questions of the overall impact and anticipated reactions. As a
court whose decisions are final, Supreme Administrative Court judges are not afforded such a
luxury and therefore the consequences associated with decisions are magnified.
Justice
Although varying in degree of emphasis, every Administrative Court judge stressed that
they consider providing justice during decision-making. Justice means a ruling that provides an
appropriate resolution to grievance(s) in question. Judges depicted justice as more of a means
than end: a resolution that parties agree to accept. Decisions have elements of justice. The extent
to which judges emphasize the importance of justice in relation to other factors, varies. For
example, one senior judge from a Court of First Instance located the Northeast stated, “Our duty
is to give justice to the people. I only care about the evidence and justice when I make a decision.
If the people don’t like my decision, I don’t care, I cannot worry about that.”
This more “cavalier” perspective is rare because most judges understand decisions to be
beyond the simple provision of justice. More often judges acknowledge a constellation of other
factors. For example when asked about the important factors involved in decision-making,
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another judge from the same court replied, “When I make decisions, I care only about providing
justice. But justice is not only one question. It involves the public interest as well. It is never
simple. We have to be fair and make sure the right decision is made. Sometimes I know when
cases will be appealed. All judges know this but we have to make a decision that has justice.”
Another judge from a Court of First Instance located in Bangkok stated, “The key factors for me
are the law and the facts. When you have both in your decision that equals justice. Sometimes we
already know when cases will be appealed, so there’s no pressure. Justice is not about one
question and as judges we have to take a complete perspective.” This illustrates judges’
recognition of other factors but the key factor that they emphasized was whether the decision
provided some form of justice.
Judges believe that their decisions should contain “justice.” For judges, justice serves as a
means to reach an end: a decision that both the immediate parties and the larger public deemed
acceptable. Court of First Instance judges were more vocal about the importance of justice
irrespective of the anticipated reactions from the immediate parties or the larger public than that
of their Supreme Administrative Court counterparts. This was largely because most Court of
First Instance judges anticipate when a losing party will not agree with their decisions and appeal
to the Supreme Administrative Court, irrespective of judges’ sincerest efforts. In this way,
appeals afford Court of First Instance judges protection from facing negative backlash. This
affords them the independence from actors’ anticipated reactions. While this does not recuse
judges from ensuring that their decisions contain “justice” it does explain why most did not
express concern towards anticipating the public’s reaction.
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Institutional differences distinguish the perspectives of judges as the plaintiffs and
defendants have the option of appealing any decision irrespective of its “quality.”10 Another
judge from the same court replied, “When I make decisions, I care only about providing justice.
But justice is not only one question. It involves the public interest as well. It is never simple. We
have to be fair and make sure the right decision is made. Sometimes I know when cases will be
appealed. All judges know this but we have to make a decision that has justice.” A judge from a
Court of First Instance in the Northeast stated, “When I make decisions, I care only about
providing justice. But justice is not only one question. It involves the public interest as well. It is
never simple. We have to be fair and make sure the right decision is made. Sometimes I know
when cases will be appealed. All judges know this but we have to make a decision that has
justice. I don’t have any pressure, I think the we have enough independence to make decisions.”
This statement captures this section’s argument that losing parties’ ability to appeal
reduces the pressure that Court of First Instance judges face. While judges acknowledge that it
does not excuse them from making decisions under certain pressures, they believe that this
provides them with the independence to not consider the potential negative consequences upon
them.
Even Supreme Administrative Court judges acknowledge the importance of appeals
however, they understand the finality of their decisions and the anticipated impact associated
with their decisions and the reactions from affected parties are still important. JudgeSAC1
replied, “When it comes to making a decision, we know that people who lose will likely appeal to

10

Quality refers to the extent that decisions include the facts and correct application of the law.
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us [Supreme Administrative Court]. I know that when I make decision, I have to look at the facts
and the law. But I also have to look at how a decision would benefit society. This is difficult.
Society needs justice. We also have to think about the future. We look at the consequences and
discuss our decisions. So I make decisions based on the principle of justice but justice has to be
supported by law. There needs to be a balance between public and individual interests.” In stark
contrast, Supreme Administrative judges readily acknowledge the importance of providing
justice but are more cognizant of additional factors that they must take into account. In this
respect judges conceded that their decisions are not simple questions reduced to ones of
providing justice, they include larger concerns related to the anticipated impact upon the wider
public and the court’s overall reputation.
Facts and Law
Court of First Instance and Supreme Administrative Court judges frequently expressed
the importance of both supporting their written decisions with the relevant facts as well as
utilizing the appropriate application of the law. Like justice however, this is as much a means—
to craft a decision that was more palatable to all parties—than necessarily a sincere commitment
to legal principles. In this sense, Administrative Court judges understand beforehand that if their
decisions fail to include facts and law, the anticipated reactions of the immediate parties and the
larger public will be unfavorable. Judges from the Court of First Instance were more adamant
about the importance of the decisions reflecting the facts and law than those from the Supreme
Administrative Court.
For example, when asked about the factors that they consider when making decisions, a
judge from a Court of First Instance in the South answered, “In principal, judges should care
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only about the facts and the meaning of the law. The court cannot be seen as biased. When one
writes their decision, they will clearly know if the decision is correct. You will know when you
write the decision if it is right or wrong. If the decision is not right, then one must re-examine all
the facts.” Another judge from the same court stated, “I think that the meaning of the law is
important. The facts of the case are very important. There are always disagreements with the
chambers. How one makes decisions depends on them. Sometimes there is media pressure, but
we’re supposed to make decisions based on the facts and law.
Discussing the significance of facts and law in their decisions, a judge from a Court of
First Instance in Bangkok replied, “The facts in the case must be the most important. We have to
get to the bottom of cases and make decisions. If there is a problem, we have to search for
evidence. If we do our jobs and use the law, everything will be fine. The people will understand,
even if they lose. I know that some judges in the court make decisions based on personal
opinions, but this is dangerous. I’ve been involved in big cases, and if the verdict is logical and
based on law, most people won’t appeal.”
In addition, a judge from a Court of First Instance located in Northern Thailand,
commented, “My focus is on the facts in the case and the law…I have to be professional, even if
the decision is not popular and goes against the people. Even if I like the plaintiffs, I still have to
make the right decision based on the facts and the law.” An interview with a Supreme
Administrative Court judge too emphasized the importance of decisions including a
consideration of the facts in the case and the laws. One Supreme Administrative Court judge
remarked, “Things get difficult because we are the Supreme Administrative Court—questions
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about justice now are less clear. There are many factors involved. I make sure I take my time and
try to make the best decision given the facts and law.”
These responses capture the significance of facts and law that Administrative Court
judges attribute to their decision-making. At a rudimentary level, all of the judges acknowledged
that each decision should reflect a consideration of the facts and law. However, the degree to
which they emphasize its importance and thus determine the decision varies. These examples
reveal that Court of First Instance judges are convinced that if their decisions reflect the law,
they do not anticipate negative response from the immediate parties (plaintiffs and defendants)
and the public.
Nonetheless, judges understand that decisions that demonstrate an inclusion of the facts
and law is crucial to gain both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ and the larger public’s acceptance.
Further, these perspectives also distinguish differences between Court of First Instance and
Supreme Administrative Court judges’ reliance upon the facts and law. For the former, a greater
significance to ensuring the facts and law were expressed while for the latter, decisions were the
results of a concomitant of factors and not easily reduced to questions of fact and law. The next
section elaborates the importance that judges attribute to the court’s reputation that affects their
decision-making.
Reputation
To varying extents, all Administrative Court judges consider the facts, the appropriate
law and justice when making decision. However, in addition to these factors all judges consider
their decision’s anticipated effects upon the institution’s reputation. There is a variance with
respect to the extent to which the court’s reputation is important. In particular, the Court of First
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Instance judges expressed less concern about their decision’s anticipated impact on the court’s
reputation than that of their Supreme Administrative Court counterparts. The reason for this
difference is institutional: parties’ ability to appeal Court of First Instance reduces their need to
be as prospective.
Judges possess a rather sober understanding about the larger political realities in which
they are situated. They comprehend the potential negative effect that a poor decision would have
upon their reputation. For instance, judges do not desire to be associated with more reputable
institutions that are associated with injustice and corruption. Administrative Court judges state
the need to avoid the controversial Constitutional Court. All of the judges stated that they did not
want the public to esteem them like the former. Some believed that their decisions would allow
them to distinguish themselves from other courts that were associated with injustice.
A judge from a Court of First Instance in Bangkok, stated, “Our reputation is important.
Look at the status of other courts in the country. We want to make decisions that use the law and
facts. Look at the Constitutional Court. It was already political—see how the judges are
appointed. The court tries to use law to solve political crises and their verdicts are not based on
law and facts. Likewise, another judge from the same court in Bangkok, replied, “Our reputation
must be protected. We cannot allow politics to enter the court anymore….You see, one bad
decision can damage our reputation. If this happens, the people will not trust us anymore.”
The importance that judges attribute to their decisions on the court’s reputation is more
pronounced at Supreme Administrative Court level. One Supreme Administrative Court judge
stated, “We have to make decisions quickly because the people are waiting for us. We are the
“Court of the People.” If we make a bad decision, we will disappoint the people. We cannot be
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like the other courts. Sometimes it is difficult to balance the rights of the people and the law. If
we make a bad decision, people will lose confidence in us. We have to maintain our reputation.
This is important….We take our reputation as a court that helps the people very seriously. We
show the people respect and we never scold them or treat them bad. We encourage the citizens to
come to us when they are not satisfied with the bureaucracy.” Another judge on the Supreme
Administrative Court answered, “Things get difficult because we are the Supreme Administrative
Court. Questions about justice now are less clear. There are many factors involved. I make sure
I take my time try to make the best decision given the facts and law. I also have to consider the
public interest.” The “public interest” in this statement is less about the decision’s impact upon
larger Thai society than the court’s reputation.
Overall, Supreme Administrative Court judges were more vocal about concerns about the
anticipated reactions of their decisions on the court’s reputation and how they take this into
account when making decisions. In this respect, judges’ consideration about the “public interest”
reflects more of a desire to appease. This demonstrates their awareness of the court’s position in
society and their decisions’ potential impact on the public esteem of the court.
Section Three: Judges’ Perceptions
Understanding judicialization’s impact is important and while Administrative Court
judges express belief that they are gradually transforming power relations between citizens and
the bureaucracy and the perspective of those who interact with court: plaintiffs and defendants.
The court has proven to be more than a mediator of these two parties. In fact, it has actively
sought to transform power relations between the two. Ultimately, judges perceive themselves as
agents of change, thus judicialization has led to more progressive outcomes. For example, a
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former President of the Supreme Administrative Court opined, “Judicialization is not necessarily
a “bad thing” in Thailand although many people think so. I read the book ‘ The Global
Expansion of Judicial Power’ and I think that the Administrative Court can adapt the principles
of judicialization. Judges need to be liberal in their interpretation of the laws. The
Administrative Court has both liberal and conservative judges—neither can allow the court to be
used for political purposes. Judicialization can help if we use the law correctly. It can be a useful
instrument.”
The former president’s comments reveal the optimism towards judicialization. In addition
being the leader of the court, the court’s leadership understands the phenomenon of
judicialization from a positive perspective. Further the former president does not equate
judicialization with “the political” and understand judges to be liberal in their interpretation.
Discussing the judicialization’s impact on the bureaucracy and society, a judge currently serving
at a Court of First Instance located in the South commented, “Since the Administrative Court
was established, we have improved the bureaucracy, and we have made Thais know their rights
and the law and responsibilities of bureaucrats. Now the rights of the people are known. We
have brought the power of rights for the people. Before, there were no neutral institutions in
Thailand. Now the people know that they will receive justice at the Administrative Court.”
In addition, judges from both the Court of First Instance and Supreme Administrative
Court conceptualized their roles in more progressive terms as most believe that they are
responsible for reversing the bureaucracy’s legacies of underperformance within which they
include the mistreatment of Thai citizens. In addition, judges perceive themselves responsible for
protecting citizens as well as preventing environmental degradation. For judges, the court’s
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ability to affect policies also affords them with power to affect politicians who create them.
Finally, judges’ decisions and, ultimately, judicialization is also to result in the establishment of
new rights for not only Thai society but also bureaucrats.
First, judges believe that the Administrative Court is an instrument to create progressive
outcomes. For instance, judges believe that the Administrative Court can sanction the
bureaucracy and ensure that it is held accountable for their behavior. As one judge from the
Court of First Instance located in Bangkok stated, “Before, bureaucrats could do whatever they
wanted. There was no transparency or accountability. People were scared. Most don’t know
anything about the law or what bureaucrats do. They just obey. Since birth, we’re taught to
respect and obey the bureaucracy—to trust them because they know what is best for us. But this
is changing. Now people who have a problem can use the Administrative Court.
Another senior judge serving from the Court of First Instance located in Bangkok, stated,
“Bureaucrats have to now be careful in their duties because of the Administrative Court. If they
violate the law, they will face the court. There is more justice in this court than in any other
courts. That is why the citizens come. We give citizens confidence that they will be protected by
the law. Likewise, a judge from a Court of First Instance in the North, remarked, “The Court has
a big role to play in providing justice. In the past, bureaucrats ignored citizens’ rights, but not
now. When the court rules against the bureaucracy, it forces the bureaucrats to rethink their
attitudes and behavior towards the people. It makes them change their relationship with the
people and respect their rights.”
A Supreme Administrative Court judge remarked, “Bureaucrats are more careful now. If
they do not provide service to citizens, there needs to be an explanation, unlike in the past.
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Before bureaucrats didn’t care about the people, they could do what they wanted because there
were no consequences. Now it is different. Now if they do wrong, they must be prepared to go to
court.” One judge from the Court of First Instance located in the North, remarked, “Bureaucrats
know that they have to be careful. They are afraid of the court, because they know that if they do
not perform according to the law, they will face us. This is not like before where they could do
whatever they wanted. Now they will come to the Administrative Court.”
This passage reveals that Administrative Court judges perceive themselves as defenders
of the Thai public. Judges believe that since the court’s creation it has been responsible for
transforming traditional power dynamics between the state and citizens. Moreover, judges are
convinced that their decisions have led to the advancement of citizens’ rights and abilities to hold
the bureaucracy accountable. The court offers the aggrieved retribution. Such a transformation
has extended beyond these two actors and includes politicians whose policies the bureaucracy is
responsible for implementing. Discussing the court’s ability to affect politicians, a retired VicePresident of the Supreme Administrative Court recalled, “The current President mentioned how
the Administrative Court has a policy of protecting the environment. That’s absolutely
ridiculous. No court is supposed to have an environmental policy. It’s not supposed to be a
policymaker and it is supposed to not intervene in politics. Both Democrats and Phua Thai have
tried to prevent the Administrative Court from making policy. Nowadays the exception has
become the principle. It’s sad.”
While this former judge expresses disappointment in what they believe is an overly
ambitious agenda of the court, what is clear is that the decisions can impact politicians. In
addition to decisions leading to challenges in traditional state-society relations, judicialization
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has also advanced and protected the rights of the aggrieved. Discussing the Administrative
Court’s role protecting citizens as well as aggrieved bureaucrats from violations, a judge from a
Court of First Instance in Bangkok observed, “The Administrative Court is changing
accountability between citizens and the bureaucracy. Now the rights of the people have to be
respected by the government. People don’t need a lawyer. The plaintiffs have more power…Even
for bureaucrats, if their appointment or transfer decision was not clear, they can use the
Administrative Courts. The Administrative Courts allows people to retaliate in order to protect
their rights—and it is working.”
One Supreme Administrative Court judge stated, “We have to make decisions quickly
because the people are waiting for us. We are the “Court of the People.” If we make a bad
decision, we will disappoint the people….In the early years, people did not trust the
administrative court and believed that the court was biased toward bureaucracy. Now citizens
know more, especially the people at the grassroots; they use the court more often because they
know the court is on their side.”
Revealed within the Supreme Administrative Court justice’s statement is a perception of
the Administrative Court as possessing a more favorable disposition towards plaintiffs. This
presents the court less as a neutral arbiter of justice. In fact in an interview with another Supreme
Administrative Court judge, he commented, “When making decisions, we try to have the “mind
of the people” and use justice.” Much like the former President of the Supreme Administrative
Court, judges themselves have recognized this more “people-friendly” bias and have
acknowledged this position can cause potential danger to the court’s reputation.
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For example, after admitting to using the “mind of the people” in decision-making the
same Supreme Administrative Court judge then stated, “I will admit that while we as judges
always focus on the rights of the people, what about the bureaucracy’s responsibilities to the
people? This is a weak point for the court. The bureaucracy must take their responsibilities to
the people seriously. And we as the court have to let the bureaucracy know that we are here to
help them—not just rule against them. We should appear neutral to bureaucrats also.”
A judge from the Court of First Instance located in Bangkok/Nonthaburi, stated, “We try
to be neutral and make both the people and bureaucrats trust us. We want everyone to come to
us to receive justice. The court is for the people and the bureaucrat. Most judges focus on the
people and their rights, but we are here for bureaucrats too. We even have seminars to educate
bureaucrats about the court. The seminars educate them about the court and how the court can
help. They like that.” While judges recognize the importance of appearing neutral is important
this is more to stave off accusations of being unfair.11 When judges make decisions they do so
based on the anticipated reactions of the immediate parties involved and larger Thai society.
There are other concerns than just providing justice. Judges are more concerned with ensuring
that their decisions will at least appear to include principles of justice that make it more palatable
for the former and latter with the intention of gaining their acceptance.
While judges perceive themselves in a positive light in terms of the impact they have
made, many also acknowledge the dangers associated with their activity. One judge in a Court of
First Instance in the South stated, [A]s judges, we do have to be careful to not go beyond our
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In fact, Thai politicians who have experience facing the Administrative Court have recognized the anti-government bias. This
is discussed in greater lengths in section four.
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jurisdiction. We cannot go beyond the scope of our duties and we cannot be too aggressive
against the government. We must let ministries use the rule of law and not do their work for
them.” While the previous indicates that judges are conscientious of not appearing to go beyond
their scope, this perspective is not uniform.
A former Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court believes that the court has
in fact stepped out of its original jurisdiction. Commenting on this he recalled, “When the court
was first established, we were careful to keep balance between the people and bureaucrats. Our
focus was on staying true to the Administrative Court Act. Gradually we went beyond our duties.
We went from just looking at legal questions to not even caring about the law. Nowadays the
decisions are not really detailed. This is dangerous because if we replace the law, there will be
no standard. Today, the court needs to get back to staying in its jurisdiction.”
Discussing the belief that the court has transcended its original roles and functions, the
judge further elaborated:

When I was a judge, our role was limited, and the court tried to not have influence over the
bureaucracy. We were once respected by bureaucrats. Even when we ruled against the
bureaucracy, we would at least address the relevant questions in each case from both plaintiffs
and defendants. This has changed. Nowadays the court doesn’t even consider the defendants
claims. There’s no real application of the law. The court needs to be careful because the public
and the politician will not accept these things much longer. The court is not as balanced as it
used to be. Judges used to respect the government but not any more. Their decisions are not
logical, and it shows disrespect for the rule of law. Look at the court’s rulings in environmental
cases. The current President mentioned how the Administrative Court has a policy of protecting
the environment. That’s absolutely ridiculous. No court is supposed to have an environmental
policy. It’s not supposed to be a policymaker and it is supposed to not intervene in politics.

This is not only the opinion of a retired Supreme Court judge but also a current seniorSupreme Administrative Court judge who argues that straightforward questions for judges to
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decide have been complicated. “Some of my colleagues, I’m too ashamed to say the things that
they do when they are making decisions. You can have your own opinion, but you should act like
a professional judge. Simple things like, if cases are in the jurisdiction, plaintiffs have standing.”
The concern about judges’ ability to make decisions about questions that were previously
thought to involve technicalities is no longer the case. For this judge, the Supreme
Administrative Court began to accept cases that it should have not. Discussing the Supreme
Administrative Court’s former President Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat, the aforementioned judge
further stated, “The former President influenced certain cases. He was accepting cases that were
not in the court’s jurisdiction.” Most judges confided that the court began to accept case beyond
its jurisdiction in late 2005.
All of the judges interviewed in this dissertation believe that through their decisions—
judicialization—the court is transforming how the bureaucracy performs its duties. In addition,
their decisions affect the bureaucracy’s daily transactions with the general public. At the
policymaking level, Administrative Court judges also believe judicialization has helped provide
clear orders for the bureaucracy. For example, through their orders a judge from a Court of First
Instance in the South remarked, “We also help the bureaucracy by establishing principles for
orders. This narrows cases and it also narrows avenues of potential corruption. Now if the
administrative order is clear and already interpreted, all people have to respect this principle.
We keep emphasizing to the bureaucrats: Follow the order over your boss. Historically
bureaucrats were always powerful. They don’t like that we were established. We are especially
hated amongst senior bureaucrats. But I don’t care, I have to do my duty.”
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Elaborating upon the manner in which the Administrative Court has positively impacted
the bureaucracy and Thais, a judge serving at the Court of First Instance located in the South,
said, “Since the Administrative Court was established, we have improved the bureaucracy, and
we have made Thais know their rights and the law and responsibilities of bureaucrats. Now the
rights of the people are known. We have brought the power of rights for the people. Before, there
were no neutral institutions in Thailand. Now the people know that they will receive justice at the
Administrative Court.” Indeed, all of the judges interviewed believed that through their
decisions, the Administrative Court was responsible for an improvement in government
performance as well as a Thai society that was not only more conscious of their rights but also
better protected from official abuse.
Administrative court judges believe that they are instruments of progressive change
affecting not only the bureaucracy but also as a result, politicians who craft policy. Whether
responsible for decisions to protect local environments at the expense of economic growth,
preventing illegal elections or the partial privatization of state enterprises, judges have expressed
a bias towards plaintiffs’ concerns and an eagerness to protect their associated rights. As political
beings, judges’ motivations may at times been less than genuine and more focused on their
reputation, decisions still speak to a court that is more likely to confront the government, no
matter how popular. This does not translate to cases involving the direct interests of the King
Bhumipol Abdulyadej. When the latter is involved, politicalization results. This section has
demonstrated that judicialization and politicalizaiton are dynamic and can occur within the same
institution depending on the actors involved.
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Section Four: Impact on Politicians
The Administrative Court’s decisions and hence, judicialization’s impact extends beyond
the immediate parties in each dispute. Depending on the grievance in questions, decisions can
affect even politicians. Based on interviews with several veteran Thai politicians, judicialization
in the context of the Administrative Court has directly affected them in several areas. First,
judicialization affects politicians’ ability to effectively control the bureaucracy. Second, and
related, judicialization can determine the longevity of policies to which politicians attribute
importance. Finally, judicialization affects politicians’ decision to create policies.
When asked about the impact of judicialization upon their duties within the context of the
Administrative Court, a governor of a large city replied:
The judicialization of politics is certainly real and affects my job as an administrator in a
number of respects. First, because bureaucrats can protest their transfer orders, sometimes the
court interferes in my role as political master. While some bureaucrats also use the court, and
there are cases that are genuine, others are more political and use the court to cause trouble for
me and my administration. People who don’t like me or my party affiliation like to sue and cause
me headaches. I’ve been named in about 300 cases. Most plaintiffs are those with a habit of
complaining. These are usually mid-level bureaucrats. Another challenge is because the
Administrative Court’s jurisdiction is not clear, I have to worry about whether or not I’m
violating the law or not. As a result, I and other politicians now have to “lawyer-up” because
people are using the courts to attack each other. My legal staff has increased since I’ve been in
office, but I’m not too concerned. We just have to make sure every decision is explained clearly
and is supported by law. I’m not afraid of lawsuits.

The statements above reveal several realities. First, the governor concedes that the
Administrative Court’s decisions forced them to become more cognizant of the potential legal
ramifications of future actions.12 In addition, several Thai politicians believe that the
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A former judge stated that judicialization led to the creation of one of the very outcomes that the Administrative Court was
supposed to remedy: it has actually caused the bureaucrats to performs their tasks with greater caution thus creating the very
delays that the court is supposed to eliminate.
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Administrative Court has failed to properly distinguish between an unpopular though
procedurally-legal policies versus those that have not conformed to legal standards. Discussing
judicialization, a former minister of Foreign Affairs who is a senior member of the Democrat
Party remarked, “I think the Administrative Court can be a good thing for Thai society, if it stays
in its jurisdiction. It should not be telling the Ministry of Foreign Affairs what policies should or
should not be made. A bad policy may not mean that it is illegal. The court must be careful.”

Another politician interviewed was a senior Phua Thai Party politician who formerly served as a
minister of Foreign Affairs. According to him, the Administrative Court has illegally determined
foreign policies. Discussing a particular instance where the Supreme Administrative Court was
involved in the annulment of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s joint communiqué to support the
Cambodian government’s application for World Heritage Status consideration for the Preah
Vihear temple, this former minister recalled:
The Preah Vihear case was a cabinet decision which was clearly out of the Administrative
Court’s jurisdiction. The Court must do their business in accordance to the rule of law. The
Court of First Instance rejected the case and the plaintiffs appealed. The concern about the
overlapping land issue was negotiated through the Joint-Boundary Commission (JBC). The issue
was taken care of through diplomatic means. The Ministry was protecting Thai land. Based on
legal principles, the case should have not even happened. The NCCC was involved because the
former President of the Supreme Administrative Court illegally changed the Supreme
Administrative Court’s original decision.
While the previous former foreign minister expresses a negative view of judicalization,
by contrast, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Democrat Party had a more positive
perception of judicialization but still acknowledge its dangers:
The Administrative Court is a positive development for Thai democracy. It can do good things
and can be more positive for Thai democracy. I think that Thais do not know their rights, and
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this needs to change. When Thais begin to know their rights, this will make government have to
answer more to the people. When I was Foreign Minister, the Court did not necessarily stay
within its jurisdiction. This needs to be clarified so that there is no more confusion. Judges think
that they are politicians but they should stay out of politics…Nowadays in Thailand, the Courts
are involved in politics. It’s dangerous and unfortunate. That is not their role, I mean it has a
duty to uphold the law but not get involved in politics. You have to understand, everything is
political now. I think the Administrative Court judges want to be politicians and the bureaucrats.
This hurts checks and balances. I’ve had so many cases against me—cases since I was Minister
of Foreign Affairs. You cannot have the Administrative Court determining foreign policies, that
is MFA’s role.13

Finally, discussing the role of the Administrative Court and its impact, a senior executive of the
Phua Thai Party who has served as a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Energy, Justice and
Education stated:
I and my party have been victims of the judicialization of politics and all of the courts have
purposely targeted me and my party. The Administrative Court needs competent judges. They
don’t know administrative law and there are not enough qualified judges. Some of the judges are
former bureaucrats and they don’t even know administrative law. Judges must be independent,
most are used to being old bureaucrats and are, by nature, not independent and slow. Judges
have to change their attitudes. Even several academics have criticized the Supreme
Administrative Court’s rulings. Most of the judges lack a substantive understanding of
administrative law. It’s proven difficult for Thai judges and lawyers to understand law and the
fundamental concepts. They lack knowledge of fundamental principals of law and aren’t wellqualified. Political cases arise when the court gets involved in the political process. Sometimes
the court intentionally does this, almost like a conspiracy.14

For this former minister and others from the Phua Thai Party, judicialization has largely
translated into anti-Thaksin decisions through the courts. Even judges within the Administrative
Court acknowledge politicians’ sentiment about the court’s anti-Thaksin bias. One former Vice
President of the Supreme Administrative Court stated,

13

“MFA” is an acronym for Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

14

Interview on June 5, 2012
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Akaratorn wanted judges to follow him and fight Thaksin. After the Yellow Shirts protests,
Akaratorn wanted to control the whole court and make us follow him. The solution to Thaksin
was going to be through the military coup and siding with the Yellow Shirts. When you look at
how the court rules between Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts you can clearly see a double standard.
The court is still in favor of the Yellow Shirts.
Not only did the former Minister express that the court’s behavior was inappropriate, but
moreover it was politically-motivated to undermine the ruling government. This sentiment
affirms previous Administrative Court judges’ fears that the court’s reputation could suffer if the
court is not viewed as neutral. True to the judicialization of politics literature, even outcomes that
are progressive in intent can produce both positives and negative affects on governance. While it
can lead to greater improvements in the areas of accountability and transparency, it can also yield
the usurpation of elected officials’ powers. While some politicians acknowledge the court’s
contributions to governance, elected officials believe that the Administrative Court has, on
occasion, purposely went beyond upon their jurisdiction by encroaching in areas of foreign and
domestic economic policymaking. While encompassed within their decision are references to the
facts and laws according to some judges the underlying motives were to frustrate governments,
in particular, those affiliated with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Conclusion
From the in-depth interviews with judges, this chapter has demonstrated how the courtcentric approach captures Administrative Court judges’ decisionmaking and, ultimately,
judicialization. Administrative Court judges, many of who possess progressive leanings, make
decisions strategically by ensuring their decisions appear to include a sincere consideration of the
facts, law, and justice. Judges also consider the anticipated reactions of the immediate parties as
well as the larger public which impacts their reputation. This chapter has also demonstrated that
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judges from the Court of First Instance and Supreme Administrative Court differ in the degree to
which they emphasize the importance of anticipated reactions. The prospect of appeal makes
judges from the Courts of First Instance less prospective while Supreme Administrative Court
judges were predominantly concerned with the anticipated impact of their decisions upon the
institution’s reputation. This chapter argued that the prospect of appeal was a key factor in Court
of First Instance judges’ decisions since they did not have to consider the long-term implication
of their decisions because of the belief that cases of significance were almost always appealed
regardless of the quality.
Finally, in examining the impact of judicalization upon politicians, the chapter
demonstrated that judicialization is a reality that affects the former’s ability to govern. Perhaps
not surprisingly, politicians from the previous two civilian governments are skeptical of
judicialization. While they acknowledge that the court’s has provided opportunities for greater
accountability and the advancement of progressive rights, they also believe that the court has
exceeded its jurisdiction. Moreover, judicialization has affected their ability as politicians to both
make and ensure the successful implementation of policies.

CHAPTER 7
CURIOUS COURT CASES AND POLITICAL PERMEATIONS
The 1997 Constitution established the Administrative Court of Thailand as the primary
institution to adjudicate disputes between individuals and the bureaucracy as well as within and
among bureaucracies. The effects of many of the court’s decisions have transcended the
immediate parties through which the cases originate. In order to comprehend the context in
which these decisions were made, this chapter examines five Administrative Court cases. These
cases afford the opportunity to go beyond official court statistics and case summaries. While the
latter two are important, they neither offer a complete nor particularly neutral perspective given
the source.1
The chapter’s argument is that in November 2005, the Administrative Court’s leadership
began to make decisions believed to protect the institutions’ independence and, as a result,
reputation against what they believed to be a Prime Minister aggressively seeking to control the
court. Under the direction of the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, the court’s
decision began to be anti-Thaksin and created divisions within the court mirrored by larger

1

First, while statistics offer insight towards the type(s) of grievance(s), specific services that were requested, etc., they do not
provide an indication as to why individuals (both private citizens and bureaucrats) ultimately chose to use the court. This question
is important because it not only informs theory, in particular those adopted in this dissertation, but also allows us to better
understand the future behavior of the court. Second, these cases allows one to capture the full contextual factors within which
judges adjudicate and thus may have had on judges’ decisions. Third, the cases allow one to understand plaintiffs’ perception of
the court both pre- and post-adjudication. So in a sense, the case studies offer the opportunity go beyond what the available
quantitative data reveals.
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society: pro-Thaksin, anti-Thaksin and a more neutral minority. Ironically, such internal
divisions caused an increase in judicialization that continued to produce progressive outcomes. It
also paved the way for the court’s first experience with politicalization that was directly caused
by the monarchy.
The first section previews the overall structure of the case study approach and its key
contributions. Emphasized in this study are the actions of former plaintiffs and judges. Beginning
with the second section, the case involving the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
government’s attempts at privatize the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) will
be examined. Such decision were less about a concern for the facts and law as they were about
the court’s survival as an independent institution and hence their reputation. Section three
demonstrates a case of politicalization of the Supreme Administrative Court and, ultimately the
fluidity with which the court’s position can shift depending on the external actors involved.
Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the chapter’s key implications and how they
contribute to the overall judicialization of politics literature and Thai politics.
Case Studies: Insight and Importance
George and Bennett (2005, 5) define case studies as a “detailed examination of an aspect
of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to
other events.”1 As a methodological approach, case studies are a tool that yields several
advantages. First, by providing contextual richness, case studies can provide a more complete
and accurate account of the phenomena in question. This degree of comprehensiveness does not

1

Gerring (2008, 645) presents nine typologies: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most similar and
most different. Different authors offer alternative typologies. For example, Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein (1975) offer five, while
George and Bennett (2005, 74-76) offer six: Atheoretical/configurative, disciplined configurative, heuristic, theory testing,
plausibility probes, and “building blocks” studies.
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have to sacrifice parsimony. Indeed one key criticism is the level of detail or, more properly, the
extent to which it is necessary for explanation. Both George and Bennett (2005) and Bates
(1998) demonstrate that case studies can be presented in a “structured-focused” manner that is
both economical in narrative yet precise in explanation. In addition, George and Bennett (ibid)
point out that the various case study methods yield better measurements of concepts and are able
to generate new hypotheses and variables that rival that of quantitative methods. Finally, case
study methods improve our ability to explain causation, which usually entails many variables.
Based on the judicialization literature, this chapter expects that judges and plaintiffs are the key
actors to understanding the phenomenon.
In two further case studies, the Thai Supreme Administrative Court’s senior leadership
directly manufactured outcomes that still illustrate judicialization. Hilbink’s (2007) analysis of
the Chilean Constitutional Court’s activity is also relevant. However, whereas in Hilbink’s case,
Chilean justices were instrumental in creating a professional culture of “averseness” towards
judicial activity, in the case of the Thai Supreme Administrative Court, the reverse was true as
the president of the Supreme Administrative Court became overtly anti-Thaksin. When King
Bhumipol directed the court to “resolve” the 2006 election crisis, many judges interpreted it as a
decision against the incumbent Thaksin and the TRT government. The episode of the court’s
politicalization underscores both the phenomenon’s fluidity and the need to understand
contextual factors that make both a possibility.2

Tsebelis (2002,19) defines veto players as, “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the
status quo.” In this context, King Bhumipol would be considered an “institutional veto player” given that both the 1997 and 2007
Constitutions position him to be revered (both sec 8) and absolved from any accusation as the Head of the Armed Forces (sec 10)
and whose approval is necessary for government to function. Highly revered, King Bhumipol is above any authority and is
considered to be the “father of the nation.”
2
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The Beginning of the End: The Electricity-Generating
Authority of Thailand (Case Number 5/2549, 2006)
Established by Thai parliament after the passage of the Electricity Generating Authority
of Thailand Act B.E. (1968), the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) is a stateowned enterprise (SOE) responsible for generating, procuring, transmitting or distributing
electricity to consumers.3 On September 1, 1998, the Council of Ministers approved a plan to
eventually privatize EGAT. That plan was supposed to be in effect following the passing of two
Royal Decrees within the State Enterprise Corporatization Act (hereafter referred to as State
Enterprise Corporatization Act): article 26 and 28, respectively. Article 26 of the State Enterprise
Corporatization Act established a privatized entity’s special exemptions and privileges. Article
28 changed the original Act’s repeal date that turned it into law. However, due to several events,
most notably the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, both the Chavalit and successive Democrat-led
Chuan Leekpai governments were too beleaguered to move forward with privatization.
Moreover, perhaps commonsensically given that the crisis had led to the collapse of the
Thai baht and a devastating contraction of the economy, any attempt to move forward with
privatization would have largely been perceived as insensitive. In addition, since the 1992 coup,
a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) had been meeting with minimal progress made.
Public blame for the economic crisis was almost solely placed on the shoulders of Thai
politicians and the bureaucracy. Within the more liberal factions of the CDA, accusations of
corruption and fiscal mismanagement helped gather support for provisions allowing greater
public participation in governance and administration in the final draft. Liberals hoped that

3

For more on EGAT, see: http://www.egat.co.th/en/ Accessed on August 30, 2015.
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participatory governance would provide the antidote to the country’s historical ills. Despite the
strong resistance from conservative faction consisting of politicians and bureaucrats, parliament
finally approved the 1997 Constitution and submitted it to the King for royal endorsement.4
Referred to “People’s” Constitution, given the considerable number of public participation
forums during the drafting process, the inclusion of a fully-elected parliament (House of
Representatives and Senate) and mandatory citizen participation in policy decisions, it was, and
remains, the country’s most participatory. Democracy enthusiasts welcomed the 1997
Constitution with excitement and unrealistic expectations as it offered the principles of public
participation, accountability and transparency.
The January 2001 national elections would provide recovering Thailand fresh start under
new leadership. After narrowly escaping disqualification stemming from an asset concealment
case, a new government under business tycoon turned politician, the nation chose Lt. Col.
Thaksin Shinawatra, as prime minister. Having formed the Thai Rak Thai party in 1998, Thaksin
seemed to have all the answers for the country in desperate need of hope. Likening his
governance style to more of a CEO than politician, Thaksin endorsed privatization of the
country’s SOEs.5 Selectively promoting the partial privatization of public services within these
SOEs, the Thaksin government attempted to proceed with EGAT’s privatization.6 While
experiencing early success with the privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT)

4

Klein and McCargo provide accounts of how conservative politicians and the bureaucracy like the Ministry of the Interior and
Court of Justice blocked the reform process and even tried to sabotage the entire effort.
5 Comparing governing to running a business, Thaksin’s words proved prophetic, as he governed with little regard of democratic
values and principles. This was evidenced by his suppression of the media. The Senate was key to maintaining the checks and
balances envisioned in the 1997 Constitution, most notably the Constitutional Court of Thailand, the National Counter Corruption
Commission (NCCC) and the Electoral Commission of Thailand because they were responsible for appointing members. It is
also important to note that the terms of Thailand’s bailout package included the International Monetary Fund’s structural
adjustment program that included the recommendation to privatize public sector industries.
6 An immediate victory for Thaksin government was the privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand.
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in November 2002, by this time, however, labor unions and civil society organizations met the
government’s proposals with stiff resistance. One reason was that by, 2005 Thaksin became
increasingly controversial. In part this stemmed from his increasingly authoritarian style of
governance. Discontent began to grow from nearly every segment of society, none more
crucially than that of King Bhumipol.7 Disastrous policy initiatives like the “War on Drugs” had
led to thousands of extrajudicial killings of drug dealers, the majority of which were low level,
suppression of the media and inept management of the conflict in the South that then led to an
exacerbation of violence. All of these events began to affect Thaksin’s popularity. Enemies
formed, and voices of discontent began to grow louder.
Despite the growing opposition towards the government, in early February 2005, Thaksin
and the TRT became the first political party to be re-elected with an impressive absolute majority
(see Table 26 for election results). With this new mandate, he sought to proceed with the
privatization of EGAT. Under the State Enterprise Corporatization Act plans for privatization did
not require the prime minister to obtain parliamentary approval.8 On June 24, 2005 Prime
Minister Thaksin issued two royal decrees—one repealing the EGAT Act and the other
establishing EGAT as a public company. Now called the EGAT Public Limited Company (PLC),
in addition to providing electricity, would be authorized to provide telecommunications services.
In addition, the government approved a privatization committee responsible for oversight of the
process. According to the State Enterprise Corporatization Act, members of the privatization

7

On several occasions, the head of the Privy Council, and former Prime Minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda intimated his
displeasure with Thaksin. Prem’s statements are significant because they are usually believed to be expressing the sentiments of
King Bhumipol.
8 Under the government’s proposal, the Ministry of Finance would still maintain majority ownership of EGAT with about 30%
open to private investors.

204
committee were not to have any conflict(s) of interest. With privatization closer to realization,
preparations began to enter EGAT PLC on the Thai Stock Exchange. The committee announced
that an initial public offering (IPO) to investors would occur.

Table 26
The Thailand 2005 National Election Result

Total
TRT
Democrat
Chat Thai
Mahachon

Bangkok
37
32
4
1

Center
97
80
7
10

North
76
71
5

South
54
1
52
1

NE
136
126
2
6
2

Subtotal
400
310
70
18
2

Party List
100
67
26
7

Total
500
377
96
25
2

Source: Election Commission of Thailand, 2005 National Election Final Results

In late 2005, the Supreme Administrative Court accepted a plaint from a group consisting
of EGAT union representatives and non-governmental organization like the Campaign for
Popular Democracy, the Consumer Protection Foundation, and the Federation of Consumer
Organizations. The plaint requested an immediate injunction of the scheduled IPO, revocation of
the entire process, including a return to its original state-owned enterprise status. In addition, the
plaint also claimed that public should have been involved in the process, and that privatization
would hurt consumers by no longer allowing the government to control costs. In November
2005, the court found merit in plaintiffs’ argument and blocked the IPO.
Discussing the significance of the ruling, Leyland (2006, 142) notes, “The decision had
far-reaching ramifications. In economic terms, the interruption of the schedule for flotation in a
market-sensitive area dependent on investor confidence called into question the financial
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viability of the entire scheme. At a political level, the anti-privatization campaign had cofunctioned as a personal campaign against the Prime Minister. Indeed, the court’s decision was a
serious blow to a central plank of government policy.” In addition, according to Leyland the
decision brought into greater focus the Supreme Administrative Court’s jurisdiction and its
ability to balance and protect public interests.
The Thai media lauded the court’s decision as a rare sign of courage in the midst of other
government institutions that were by then presumed compromised. A December 2005 article in
the english language daily, The Nation, entitled, ‘Beyond Govt Control’ commented, “Regarded
as one of the few agencies in the three branches of government to survive political interference,
the Administrative Court deserves to be honoured.”9 Discussing the court’s decision in another
article entitled, ‘People’s Court’, appearing in the other main English daily, The Bangkok Post,
the author proclaimed, “The Administrative Court is now widely seen as the most reliable
institution in addressing the plight of people affected by government decisions and policies.”10
The Administrative Court was popular and considered as the remaining institution to have true
independence.11
During this time the press was angered by Thaksin’s use of government institutions to
retaliate against journalists who were critical of his policies although the Administrative Court’s
decision afforded them a rare victory.12 Although Leyland correctly observed that plaintiffs were

9

Beyond Govt Control, The Nation, December 30, 2005
People’s Court, Bangkok Post January 15, 2006 Sunday.
11 Opas Boolom, "The Country's Last Truly Independent Organization?" Nation, 6 November 2005.
12 In 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled unlawful Anti Money Laundering Prevention and Suppression Office
(AMLO) investigation of journalists from the Nation who were critical of Prime Minister Thaksin and his government. See also,
Kesinee Taengkiew, "'Nation' Wins Key Battle over AMLO", Nation, 21 June 2002; and "The 'Thaksingate' Verdict Is a
Victory", Nation, 26 June 2002.
10
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motivated by a larger political campaign against Thaksin, he does not consider the motives of
Administrative Court judges. Through interviews with Administrative Court judges with direct
knowledge of the inner workings of the chamber, comes the revelation that the court’s decision
against Thaksin was motivated less by a concern for the facts, law and justice and more about the
survival of the court. Specifically, the court’s leadership President of the Supreme
Administrative Court, Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat, was personally invested in preventing Thaksin
from achieving political success that he believed was a threat to the Administrative Court’s
ability to remain independent and thus maintain its reputation.
Discussing the former Supreme Administrative Court President’s actions, one former
Supreme Administrative Court judge stated, “The EGAT case was the beginning of his
[Ackaratorn] personal crusade against Thaksin. He believed would save the nation. I think he
believed he was acting on behalf of the King as well. After the EGAT decision, we began to have
divisions between pro- and anti-Thaksin camps. Ackaratorn made it clear he was anti-Thaksin.”13
It is important to understand that the former Supreme Administrative Court judge stated that Dr.
Ackaratorn acted independent of external influence. Many of the judges believe that the EGAT
case was the court’s formal entrance into politics. A sitting Supreme Administrative Court judge
stated, “The EGAT decision was embarrassing. It should have not even been accepted but
Ackaratorn wanted it. The court was clearly beyond the scope of its power.”14 This former
Supreme Administrative Court judges and other judges believe that Dr. Ackaratorn personally
orchestrated the EGAT defeat as well as other key Thaksin policies.

13
14

Interview on June 26, 2013
Interview on October 29. 2014.
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Elaborating more bluntly, “Ackaratorn [former President of the Supreme Administrative
Court, Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat] began to “go out of his way” to ensure that the court stopped
him [Thaksin]. For instance, the court should not even have accepted the plaint given that
plaintiffs did not file within the allotted time. The decision to accept the Consumer Protection
Foundation as one of the plaintiffs was not right because they did not have legal standing.
Organizations are supposed to have their purpose and mission statement clearly written and they
[the Foundation] did not have these things. They were just created to challenge Thaksin. It was
clear that Ackaratorn wanted to “get” Thaksin. Once this began to happen, I knew it was time for
me to leave.”15
While not commenting on the EGAT specifically, several judges serving in both the
Court of First Instance and the Supreme Administrative Court acknowledged that during Dr.
Ackaratorn’s tenure the court was more “political” and too visible in the media16. Ultimately, the
Supreme Administrative Court’s injunction of the IPO served as the court’s “baptism” into Thai
politics. Interestingly, none of the judges mentioned the Supreme Administrative Court’s 2002
decision that ruled Thaksin’s use of the AMLO to investigate critical journalists as unlawful as
being a “political” judgment. Their consideration of “political” translates into the manner in
which judges adjudicate cases and not politicalization as understood by external actors’ influence
determining outcomes. One is perceived by judges as “political” to the extent that they go
beyond their scope for reasons other than providing “justice” or applying the facts and law.

15
16

Interview on September 18, 2014.
Interview with judges on November 11, 2011.
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Adding More Fuel to the Flame
On January 23, 2006 Thaksin’s family sold their Shin Corporation holdings (49.61
percent) to a Singaporean-based firm Temasek Corporation for $1.7 billion dollars. This sale was
tax-free, given Temasek’s status as a foreign firm. Last ditch legal maneuverings by the
government made this possible as Pasuk and Baker (2009, 262) write, “Only days before the
transaction, the Telecommunications Law was modified to extend foreign ownership from 25 to
49 percent. The Revenue Department reversed an old tax ruling, and reimbursed a tax-payer, to
remove a precedent which would have made some of the capital gains tax-liable.” Public outrage
was unprecedented. In early 2006, this sparked renewed protests led by former business
associate-spurned-rival Mr. Sondhi Limtonkul—then owner of the (rival) Matichon Group
Media Company. While Sondhi had managed to serve as Thaksin’s main irritant months prior,
the latest act of chicanery provided a then fledgling movement with a much-needed injection of
overwhelming support from various sectors of society.
On February 9, 2006, Sondhi and others created the People’s Alliance for Democracy
(PAD). An umbrella organization committed to the removal of Thaksin and his government, this
group was comprised of several NGO leaders and social activists, like veteran political agitator
Maj. General Chamlong Srimuang, as well as opponents of privatization, Mr. Somsak Kosaisuk
and Mrs. Rosana Thongchai.17 Ironically, when he was a candidate for prime minister, many of
the NGOs and individuals pledged their support for Thaksin because of his campaign declaration
to collaborate with them. Once in office, however, many of these promises were broken, as

Chamlong was one of the leading opposition figures to General Suchinda’s attempt to remain in power in 1992. For a great
book on the man and his life, see McCargo 1997.
17
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Prime Minsiter Thaksin began to deem civil society as more of an obstacle. Tensions between
the PAD and Thaksin and his supporters continued to escalate. Beginning in February, large
rallies, particularly in Bangkok ensued with some reaching over 100,000 in attendance. Already
paralyzing downtown Bangkok, protesters began to actively call for King Bhumipol to intervene
and remove Thaksin. The king relented and suggested that it was inappropriate to call for such an
arrangement. Despite calls from key military leaders and even members of the king’s own Privy
Council suggesting he step down, Thaksin was defiant and even attempted to undermine the
growing momentum by holding a snap election in April 2006.
The Context and the Court
In the context of an increasingly unpopular prime minister, it was the Shinawatra’s
family’s sale of their Shin Corporation shares tax-free that further emboldened Supreme
Administrative Court President Dr. Ackaratorn to take action against the Thaksin government.
After the February sale of his shares tax-free, other senior judges on the Court also began to
follow Ackaratorn’s firm anti-Thaksin lead. There was little likelihood of the Taksin government
winning its appeal of the EGAT injunction. Further, given the deleterious effects that the
November ruling had on investor confidence, even had the court reversed its decision and thus
permitted the IPO to proceed, the market would not have been as forgiving. In March 2006, the
Supreme Administrative Court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor to void the entire process with
retroactive application. This meant that EGAT would continue to function within its original
capacity. Officially, the Supreme Administrative Court offered the following reasons as the basis
for its decision:
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First, with respect to the question of jurisdiction, because determining the legality of
Royal Decrees is a specific responsibility of the Supreme Administrative Court, the court ruled
that the case was within its jurisdiction.18 Further, there was a question of whether all of the
eleven plaintiffs had legal-standing—in particular the Consumer Protection Foundation.
According to the decision, all plaintiffs were EGAT consumers and thus were or could be
aggrieved by potential negative outcomes of impending privatization efforts.19 For example,
there were concerns that the impending privatization may have caused prices to rise, and that this
would have been unfair to existing consumers who could not afford to pay.
Second, reviewing the credentials of the privatization committee members, the court
found that one of the members had concurrently held the position of senior executive in the Shin
Corporation. At that time, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, through his family, still owned a
nearly fifty percent stake. Further, the inclusion of this committee member constituted a clear
conflict of interest. According to the court, the committee’s entire proceedings were
compromised and thus void. In fact, the court stated that the ruling would apply retroactively and
reestablish EGAT as a state-owned enterprise.
Finally, the chairman of the public hearing committee was an assistant to the Minister of
Natural Resources and Environment. The court found that, based on Article 5(3) of the Rules of
the State Enterprise Corporatization Policy Committee on Public Hearing, B.E. 2543 (2000),
privatization committee members are prohibited from holding political office. Finally, the court

18

Article 11 Number 2 of the Administrative Court Act states that the Supreme Administrative Court is responsible for
adjudicating, “the case involving a dispute in relation to the legality of a Royal Decree...”
19 One former Supreme Administrative Court judge interviewed indicated that another concern that the defendant raised was that
the timeframe for submitting a plaint had expired and should have factored in the court’s decision to reject the case outright.
Interview on October 29, 2014.
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found that the committee failed to publicize the hearing in at least one (1) newspaper for three
(3) days. Instead, the committee publicized the hearing in three (3) newspapers for only one (1)
day. Finally, that court ruled further that both Royal Decrees were illegal because the
government was legally-required to conduct public hearings before its passage.
Although Leyland (2006, 2012) is convinced that the decision was indicative of the
court’s greater commitment to upholding the principles of jurisprudence, Administrative Court
judges with direct knowledge reveal that while popular, it was a continuation of the politics
behind the injunction months earlier for the public. The case was a litmus test for the court of not
whether it would provide the “right” decision but, instead, whether its position would be solidly
against Thaksin. Reflecting on the victory, Rosana Tositrakul, a board member of the Consumers
Confederation of Thailand proclaimed, "Our victory with EGAT today should tell the
government that people are not as stupid as Thaksin might have thought. We know what he and
his cronies are up to. They want government power to sell off national assets to fatten their
pockets. We will not allow that to happen. Today proves to us that justice and the people's
interest will prevail."20 Although the Supreme Administrative Court’s March ruling provided
(another) ruling that appeared as predicated on legal grounds, the court’s senior leadership
influenced the decision. Interviews with two Supreme Administrative Court judges, one a former
senior judge and another currently serving, revealed that larger, more political factors affected
the chamber’s decision. Discussing further, the former senior judge stated:
Ackaratorn made this [case] about him [Thaksin]. He thought it was his duty to save the country
from Thaksin, and other judges [within the court] started to follow. You have to understand that
leadership is very important within the Thai bureaucracy and especially the [Administrative]
court. Most of them [judges] will follow the president—no matter what he does. He [Ackaratorn]
20

Quoted in Royal Decrees Revoked, March 29, 2006. The Nation.
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even had dinner with anti-Thaksin groups. This became public and was an embarrassment to the
court.21
The dinner refers to a March 28, 2006 meeting hosted by palace insider Piya Malakul Na
Ayutthaya. Other attendees included the following: Army General Surayud Chulanont, former
deputy director of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Mr. Panlop Pinmanee,
President of the Supreme Court of Justice Mr. Chanchai Likhitchitta, Mr Charan Pakdithanakul,
Secretary-General of the Supreme Court, and Mr Pramote Nakhonthap, an academic with proPAD leanings.22 After his removal from office later that year, the scorned Thaksin would float
the conspiracy argument that the objective of the dinner was to plot a coup against his
government. In the article, when asked about the merits of Thaksin’s accusation, Malakul
replied, “I only wanted to hear what the country’s top judges who happened to be my friends had
to say about the situation.”23 Even if one were generous in their conclusion that there was no
discussion of a coup, it is highly unlikely that neither politics were discussed nor each official’s
and their respective institution’s actions against Thaksin.
When discussing the decision-making behind the EGAT ruling, in separate interviews
with a former senior Administrative Court judge and a current Supreme Administrative Court
judge reveal that they believed that two key motivations lay behind the President’s actions.24 One
was the tense political climate, especially the growing protests of the PAD, but also, according to
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Interview on September 18, 2014.
For more on this meeting, see: http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1238263549&grpid=00&catid=01(Title in
Thai: “Piya Malakul insists to ward off the claim that the meeting with Surayud and 3 Big Judges Plan a Coup was only Dinner
(Author’s Translation)) Surayud Chulanont would eventually be chosen by the Council for National Security as prime minister in
October that same year.
23 As quoted in The Nation, March 29, 2009: Piya Malakul, the dinner host,responded that there was no talk of coup.
24 Interview with senior Courts of First Instance judge on September 18, 2014. Interview with senior Supreme Administrative
Court judge on October 29, 2014.
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one judge, “the president’s obsession that he was acting on behalf of the nation in order to “save
it” from destruction by Thaksin.”25 A retired Supreme Administrative Court judge stated that
former President Ackaratorn Chularat believed that he was acting on behalf of what he perceived
the King wanted him to do (italics for emphasis).
Determining whether or not President Ackaratorn’s motivations derived organically or
were the result of “higher-up” influences can lead to endless speculations. However, it is quite
likely that the increasing polarization of society and the manner in which Thaksin was able to
compromise the independence of the new institutions that 1997 Constitution created which
motivated him to act aggressively against the prime minister and his government. And he, like all
of the judges interviewed, expressed the fear of the court being associated with the Constitutional
Court—an institution that most judges presumed to be under the premier’s control. While for the
Administrative Court, Thaksin was not able to control the appointment of Administrative Court
through the formal process as the Thai Rak Thai dominated Senate could neither directly
appoint or remove judges nor could it affect its budget. Nevertheless, Ackaratorn perceived
Thaksin as a threat to the court’s independence and ultimately reputation. In fact, EGAT was the
first key case in which the Administrative Court ruled against the Thaksin government. In
addition to the 2002 AMLO decision, the Supreme Administrative Court had also ruled that
nominees to the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) as well as the nominee list for the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) were illegal based on several procedural
violations.26
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Interview on September 18, 2014
In 2003 and 2005, the court ruled against the new round of the NTC and NBC selection process. For more, see ‘Thai Court
Orders a New Candidate Selection Process for NTC’, World Dialogue for Regulation for Network Economics, January 10, 2003;
26

214
Discussing further, he recalled, “Once the King got involved, most [judges] thought that
he was sanctioning Ackaratorn and the rest fell apart.”27 For this judge, royal involvement
referred to King Bhumipol’s April 26, 2006 address to newly appointed Administrative Court
judges at Klai Kangwol Palace in Prachuap Khiri Khan. This occurred during the immediate
aftermath of the 2006 snap election and served as an obvious rebuke of Thaksin, Thai Rak Thai
and the election result that would have continue their rule.28
The two active Supreme Administrative Court judges who were interviewed
acknowledged that immediately following the court’s injunction, divisions within the court
began to arise. One judge stated, “After the EGAT case, three main groups emerged: those that
were anti-Thaksin, pro-Thaksin, and those that were neutral. Even in the cafeteria, judges began
to mingle only with Court members who agreed with their position. Overall, I think the court
became “yellow.” Judges who were deemed as “red” were kept from some of the more obviously
political cases.”29
A retired Supreme Administrative Court judge reflected, “In the beginning we were like
brothers and stood together. Even when we disagreed with each other in a chamber arriving at a
decision, we would still eat lunch together. No problems. We thought that we were doing
something great for the nation. This began to change with the EGAT decision, when he
[Ackaratorn] began to go out of his way to get Thaksin.”30 Both judges stated that politics from

‘NBC Candidate Choice Nullified’, The Nation, March 5, 2003.’Broadcasting Panel: Additional Doubt Over NBC Future’ The
Nation, September 29, 2005; ‘Rejection of NBC Appeal Upheld’, The Nation, June 7, 2006.
27 Ibid
28 In another speech before an audience of Supreme Court of Justice members, the King assigned the responsibility “solving the
political impasse” to the judiciary, even urging the head of three courts to join together and craft a solution.
29 Interview on September 18, 2014. The UDD was a group of pro-Thaksin group who wore red shirts to demonstrate their
solidarity.
30 Interview with a retired Supreme Administrative Court judge September 18, 2014. Interview with a judge from the .Court of
First Instance on August 21, 2014..
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without began to affect the court internally and that divisions within persist today even though
there is new leadership, specifically a new President of the Supreme Administrative Court.31
According to a senior Courts of First Instance judge, the Court began to have internal
dysfunctions with many judges wanting to follow the Court President’s position.
To recap, although it was popular and provided labor unions and consumers with a major
victory, the Supreme Administrative Court’s EGAT decision was neither a result of concern for
the law, facts and justice nor their commitment to more progressive ideals. The EGAT injunction
was politically-inspired by then President of the Supreme Administrative Court who was
concerned about Prime Minister Thaksin’s potential actions upon them. While it is difficult to
determine whether the Administrative Court should have accepted the plaint given the lapse in
time the case was controversial enough to create divisions that still persist. The EGAT case also
brings into focus the importance of the larger political environment as President Ackaratorn was
affected by his belief that the Administrative Court would come under the control of Thaksin.
The heightened political situation further motivated the former president to steer the Supreme
Administrative Court towards an anti-Thaksin bent. The price for Dr. Ackaratorn’s actions was
an eruption of internal divisions.32
In order to understand the consecutive elections of 2005 and 2006, some background
information is needed. The 1997 Constitution stipulates that in each of the country’s 400
districts, a minimum 20 percent turnout of the registered voters is necessary to be considered

Although President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat retired and was replaced by Mr. Hassavut
Vititviriyakul in September, 2010, he maintains an office as an “unofficial consultant.” Following controversy involving the
abuse of power, the JCAC suspended President Hassavut Vititviriyakul. After an attempt to appeal the suspension, he accepted
the ruling.
32 Hilbink (2007) demonstrates how senior Chilean Constitutional Court judges influence the court’s activity. This certainly
resonates in the Supreme Administrative Court’s maneuverings in this case.
31
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valid.33 When districts fail to achieve this threshold, the Electoral Commission of Thailand, the
entity responsible for the oversight of all elections, would be responsible for conducting a re-run.
In the immediate aftermath of the Shinawatra family’s tax-free sale of their Shin Corp shares to
Temasak for almost 1.2 billion dollars in profit, a revived PAD called for renewed protests
demanding Thaksin’s resignation. In an attempt to quell the rising dissent, embattled Prime
Minister Thaksin, despite his resounding victory in February 2005, called for a snap election that
would serve as a referendum on his power and the legality of the sale. However, fully cognizant
that this would likely lead to the same outcome as the prior year, many opposition parties chose
to boycott the election, most notably the TRT’s chief rival, the Democrat Party.34 Despite
accusations of paying money for opposition parties to run, in 14 districts, mainly in the South
where the Democrat Party has historically maintained a stronghold, voter turnout failed to reach
the constitutionally-required 20 percent threshold.
In lieu of the incomplete election, individuals submitted several plaints to the
Constitutional Court, Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Justice seeking to
nullify the election based on various claims ranging from voter fraud to several technicalities.
The plaint submitted to the Supreme Administrative Court requested an injunction on the
potential re-run in those respective districts that failed to meet the 20 percent. If the Supreme
Administrative Court sided with the plaintiffs, it would ultimately prevent a projected TRT
government from forming and prolong the impasse likely leading to an “extra-constitutional”
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1997 Constitution of Thailand
I use the term “rival” loosely, as, at least with respect to the ability to win democratic elections, the Democrat Party never
posed a serious challenge to TRT.
34

217
response. On April 26, 2006, King Bhumipol addressed the Supreme Administrative Court
judges about the election:

Now, I will talk about the election. The court itself has the right to discuss the election,
especially the candidates who received less than 20 per cent of the vote. Besides, some of them
were the sole candidates in their constituencies, which is critical. The sole candidatures cannot
lead to full membership in the House, because a sole candidate must have support from at least
20 per cent. Is this issue relevant to you? In fact, it should be. The issue of the sole candidacy
elections is important because they will never fulfill the quorum. If the House is not filled by
elected candidates, democracy cannot function. If this is the case, the oaths you have just sworn
would be invalid. You have sworn to work for democracy. If you cannot do it, then you may
have to resign. You must find ways to solve the problem.…….Should the election be nullified?
You have the right to say what's appropriate or not. If it's not appropriate, it is not to say the
government is not good. But as far as I'm concerned, a one party election is not normal. The one
candidate situation is undemocratic.
When an election is not democratic, you should look carefully into the administrative issues. I
ask you to do the best you can. If you cannot do it, then it should be you who resign, not the
government, for failing to do your duty. Carefully review the vows you have made. ……You
must make the country function correctly. Otherwise, you must have a discussion with the
Supreme Court judges who will come in later. Conduct your discussions with people based on
knowledge, honesty and faith in your duty to resolve this situation. The country should function
according to the law……I will be grateful if you look into the issue.35
The King’s address was a clear death knell for Thaksin and the TRT. Remarking that an
election dominated by one party was undemocratic signaled that King Bhumipol did not accord
legitimacy to the impending 2006 election and, possibly, the year prior. A few days after the
speech, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled to suspend the re-run of the elections in 14
districts. The implications of this decision were important. First, this would mean that Thaksin
and Thai Rak Thai would not be able to claim (another) election victory thus officially
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‘HM the King’s speech to the Administrative Court’s judges’, quoted from The Nation, April 27, 2007.
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legitimizing their rule. Second and perhaps more immediate for Thaksin, it would have brought a
conclusion to this controversial sale.
Third, the injunction would guarantee that the impasse would continue and that a nondemocratic solution would by now be necessary. Fourth, the decision allowed the Court to affirm
its loyalty to the King while simultaneously producing another popular anti-Thaksin decision.
One should not underestimate the importance of the Court remaining aligned with the crown. For
most Administrative Court judges that I interviewed, in the 2005 EGAT case, there were
questions within the court about the whether judges should follow an overly zealous Supreme
Administrative Court President Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat. It was not clear whether his behavior
was on his own volition, however, after the King’s speech, there was little room for confusion as
to the decision the court was to render.
With respect to the whether Dr. Ackaratorn was under the influence of another actor prior
to the King’s address, this study argues that it is doubtful that the monarchy directly influenced
Ackaratorn in the EGAT decision thus making it one of judicialization. If the King was able to
influence Ackaratorn through his “network monarchy”, it would appear that the April 26 address
or, at the very least, its directness would have not been necessary.36 King Bhumipol’s message
was uncommonly direct and left little to be interpreted with respect to his sentiment towards
Thaksin and the TRT. This is not a staple of the network monarchy where under the cover of
other parties King Bhumipol’s is able to articulate his demands and use his power.

McCargo (2005) conceptualizes the “network monarchy” as fluid a system that centers on and is driven by King’s Bhumipol’s
use of secondary parties to exert his influence. For more on the network monarchy, see McCargo (2005).
36
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Following the Supreme Administrative Court’s injunction on the re-run of the 14
contested districts, on May 8th the Constitutional Court voted 8-6 to nullify the election, citing
several irregularities. The Constitutional Court claimed that the ECT failed to provide an
appropriate number of days for parties to organize, and that new standards had compromised
voters’ ability to cast their ballot secretly. Later the Presidents of the Supreme Court of Justice,
Constitutional Court and Supreme Administrative Court implored the ECT commissioners to
resign, due to their decision to proceed with the election in the face of the boycotts from the main
opposition parties. After the commissioners refused to resign, on July 25, the Supreme Court of
Justice found them guilty of malpractice and sentenced them to four years in prison without bail.
On September 16, another two years were added. Pasuk and Baker (2009, 273) offer the
unofficial results from the incomplete 2006 elections based on 397 of the 400 total
constituencies: 5. See Table 27.

Table 27
The 2006 National Election

Constituency
Party List

TRT
52
56

Other
2
8

Abstain
33
29

Damaged
13
6

Source: Cited in Pasuk and Baker (2009, 273)

The results from the 2006 election demonstrated a slightly less popular TRT perhaps
expected given the controversy behind the sale of the Thaksin’s family Shin Corp shares.
Nevertheless, results clearly indicate that the TRT would have won.
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As expected, the Supreme Administrative Court decision was influenced by the King’s
speech. Right before an unprecedented meeting with the President of the Constitutional and
Supreme Court of Justice, President Dr. Ackaratorn, commenting on the King’s address to the
Supreme Court of Justice and Supreme Administrative Court was quoted in the English daily,
The Nation, “Everyone has clearly heard the royal statement and should have understood it.”37A
few days following the meeting, the courts would make decisions in coordinated fashion. One
reason for this level of coordination was that the King instructed the Presidents of the three main
courts to “resolve” the crisis in concert. When asking a senior Supreme Administrative Court to
provide their account of the former President’s actions in the EGAT case, the 2006 election, and
Preah Vihear, they replied that Ackaratorn believed his actions were justified because for him it
was an issue of national security. His answer meant that the facts and laws were not important in
the court’s decision-making; on this occasion, judges obeyed the King.
As this case has demonstrated, politicalization depends on the actors involved. Although
the Administrative Courts possess formal institutional safeguards to guarantee independence
from outside influence, King Bhumipol is not like any other actor. Revered by nearly all, the
king’s ability to influence decisions is unique though appropriate given his status in Thailand as
the “Father of the Nation,”— a belief that finds its origins in the Sukhothai dynasty under the
reign of Ramkhamhaeng. The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to rule an injunction is a
case of politicalization. King Bhumipol’s ability to influence any institution demonstrates how
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The Nation, ‘Crucial summit by court chiefs’, April 27, 2006. In the same article, Chularat stated, "Please do not try to
interpret the royal statement and jump to an early conclusion about the election cancellation because every dispute would have to
be resolved in accordance with the law," It is unlikely that he was sincere in this statement because not cancelling an election that
the King considered undemocratic and given his previous actions during the EGAT case.
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judicialization can turn into to politicalization. The king’s power is unique as no other external
factor had been able to determine the court’s decisionmaking.
Going Green: The People v. The Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate
(Court order 592/2009)
On June 9, 2009, Mr. Srisuwan Janya, President of the Stop Global Warming
Association, represented 36 individuals in a lawsuit against the National Environment Board and
eight persons. The plaint claimed an area referred to as “Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate” was
causing environmental harm which also endangered the health of the local public. The plaint
requested an injunction of 76 industrial projects until the industries complied with the 2007
Constitution by following environmental and health regulations.38 Residents believed that many
of the industries had in fact been the source environmental pollution that had caused several
health problems for local communities. Further, plaintiffs were convinced that many industries
were illegally operating due to the failure of having had conducted a mandatory environmental
impact assessment (EIA) and a health impact assessment (HIA) study required by that the
National Environmental Act and the State Enterprise Act (1999).39 On September 29, 2009 the
Central Administrative Court of First Instance handed down an injunction on the illegal
operations, which included both domestic and foreign firms who were involved in petrochemicals manufacture and distribution.

38

A district in Rayong province, the eastern seaboard project consists of several adjacent provinces is located on the eastern side
of the Gulf of Thailand. It is part of the Thailand’s Eastern Seaboard industrial zone, which consists of several additional
provinces and plants. For more on the case, see In Industrial Thailand, Health and Business Concerns Collide by Thomas Fuller.
NY Times. December 18, 2009.
39 Article 67 of the 1997 Constitution also declares that such studies be performed and that local communities participate in any
such decisions. The issue was the previous NEA was not updated to the 2007 Constitution. Section 59 of the Enhancement and
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, B.E. 2535 (1992) states: “In case it appears that any locality is affected by
pollution problems and there is a tendency that such problems may be aggravated to cause health hazards to the public or adverse
impact on the environmental quality, the National Environment Board shall have power to publish notification in the Government
Gazette designating such locality as a pollution control area in order to control, reduce and eliminate pollution.”
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This case was significant because it symbolized local communities asserting their rights
through legal means against powerful economic interests. In addition, the coalition government,
at the time led Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiwa and the Democrat Party, was pro-business and
attempting to maintain positive economic growth given the political instability in a context of an
ongoing global financial crisis. The case also attracted considerable media coverage both
domestic and international. The media depicted the case as one of powerful businesses exploiting
local communities. The Administrative Court of First Instance in Bangkok agreed with the
plaintiffs and ruled that in the absence of an EAI and HAI, operations were illegal and ruled for
an injunction of activities until ones were completed.
Immediately following the decision, the Abhisit government appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court seeking to revoke the injunction based on the grounds that it prevented the
government’s ability to effectively and efficiently administrate as well as damage the country’s
economic recovery efforts which were, at the time, particularly important given the Global
Economic Crisis caused by the U.S. subprime loans market collapse.40 However on December 2,
2009, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the prior ruling. As chapter six illustrated,
judges from both the Court of First Instance and Supreme Administrative Court admitted
because they themselves lacked the technical expertise, they had to contract third parties to
understand the impact assessments.41
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There are various estimates of the economic losses incurred by the initial injunction. Based on one estimate, the losses included
billions of dollars.
41 When asked whether there could have been a conflict of interest from those third parties, they acknowledged that it was
possible, and that the court indeed needs to develop its own experts going forward.
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In an interview with lead plaintiff Mr. Srisuwan Janya, he claimed that the decision to sue
was one of necessity. “We realized that no one in government or any party cared. I had to
convince the people that this had to be resolved through the courts. Most of the local people are
not happy to use the courts. Some are scared because the cases are public, but I had to assure
them that there would be no retaliation. Although the people know more about the
Administrative Court today, I still have to educate them about what it does and their rights.”42
Interviews with judges revealed that the decision was easy to derive because it was
premised on Article 67 paragraph 2 of the 2007 Constitution, which states, “Any project or
activity which may seriously affect the community with respect to the quality of the
environment, natural resources and health shall not be permitted, unless, prior to the operation
thereof, its impacts on the quality of the environment and on public health have been studied and
assessed and a public hearing process has been conducted for consulting the public as well as
interested persons and there have been obtained opinions of an independent organization,
consisting of representatives from private organizations in the field of the environment and
health and from higher education institutions providing studies in the field of the environment,
natural resources or health.”
Years prior when the National Environment Board (NEB) approved the projects at Map
Ta Phut Industrial estate and surrounding areas, regulations for a HIA and public hearing did not
exist. However while the 1997 Constitution required an EIA and an effort to include the public
participation, the 2007 Constitution also required an additional HIA, the NEB regulations
remained unchanged to reflect to additional standard. The 1997 and 2007 Thai constitutions
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Interview on April 19, 2012.
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respectively granted new powers to citizens already able to petition the Administrative Court. An
earlier ruling by a Court of First Instance in Rayong acknowledged that environmental and
associated health defects experienced by locals was caused by pollution at Map Ta Phut. This
made the Central Administrative Court in Bangkok’s ruling easy to make.
The Supreme Administrative Court rejected the government’s argument that the
injunction was responsible for directly causing the economic losses by writing, “Good practices
in continuous environmental management to enhance the quality of life for all citizens is
regarded as an equitable right to be applied not only to the citizens who are presently living in
this area but also to citizens who are going to settle down in this area in the future.”
Immediately following the decision, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
drafted new regulations after consultation with a government-appointed “independent” fourparty panel that former caretaker Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun chaired. Although the
panel had approved a list of 18 criteria of industrial projects that would need to comply with
section 67 of the 2007 Constitution and then submitted the list to the NEB, it only endorsed 11,
causing public outrage.43 Based on these new standards, only 2 out of the original 76 projects
would be deemed environmentally harmful thus requiring compliance with section 67 in the
2007 Constitution. This regulation went into effect on September 1, 2010. On September 2, the
Central Court in Bangkok overturned the injunction. The Central Court’s decision caused
outrage with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs re-submitted an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court to
(again) require the original 76 projects to comply with the original 2009 ruling, based on the
previous NEB standards. The case remains active.
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This case demonstrates that the Administrative Court has the ability to impact important
government policies. While plaintiffs were motivated to receive justice, judges question
themselves about their ability to understand the technical complexity of environmental and
health impact assessments. This brings into focus the court’s ability to make informed decisions
within their own capacity. The injunction lasted nearly a year. The economic losses from this
decision reached billions of dollars as well as an increase in investor confidence concerns. The
Abhisit government’s response to the court’s ruling illustrates how the government seeks to
evade accountability. After the retroactive change of regulatory standards, the court agreed to reopen the plant. Still, this ex post-facto manoeuver has not prevented plaintiffs from continuing
their legal fight.
More than just a Temple: Prasat Preah Vihear
and Internal Politicialization
On June 18, 2008 Thailand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Noppadon Pattama, signed a
joint-communiqué with the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreeing to support the
Cambodian government’s application to UNESCO for consideration of Prasat Preah Vihear
temple for World Heritage status.44 Prior to this decision, controversy about the temple and the
surrounding land area had remained standing and, as a result, a potential source of friction
between the two countries. In the early 20th century the French, under control of Cambodia,
redrew maps to include the temple and surrounding area under their control. For the Thai side
little protest was made until 1959 when both countries went to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to mediate the dispute. In 1962, the court ruled that the temple was Cambodia’s, although it
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Prasat Prear Vihear is the English transliteration of the Khmer word for the temple; Kao Pra Viharn is the Thai equivalent.
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failed to produce clear ownership of the surrounding area in question.45 The court’s decision was
a bitter defeat for Thai nationalists. Pawakapan (2013, 40) notes that, in the aftermath of the
decision, “Demonstrations against the ICJ verdict were held throughout the country. Students
from five leading state universities led protests in Bangkok. Even though public demonstration
was illegal in Thailand at the time, the government openly approved of these instances.” The ICJ
decision proved unable to clarify the question of who controlled the surrounding area of the
temple would be important because it would be revisited nearly forty years later.
For several reasons, the question concerning ownership of the temple’s surrounding area
was important. First, with respect to geography, anyone wanting access to the temple would
enter through the more easily accessible Thai border. Second, this case would prove an enduring
point of contention in Cambodian-Thai relations despite the efforts of the two governments to
resolve the matter amicably. The Thai government under Chatchai Choonavan (1988-1991) used
economic cooperation to resolve the border conflict. Third, the joint-sponsorship for World
Heritage status would have been the first ASEAN security dispute to be resolved through mutual
cooperation. However, this dream died. After the September 2006 coup to remove Thaksin
Shinawatra, the Thai military crafted a new constitution and held national elections in which new
party, People’s Power Party (PPP) won. The new party was essentially pro-Thaksin and could be
expected to act on his behalf. See Table 28

For ICJ’s decision, see: “Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand, Merits, Judgment of 15 June
1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.6. See, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/45/4871.pdf
45
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Table 28
The 2007 National Election Result
Party

Seats

PPP

233

Democrat

164

Chat Thai

34

Phua Phaendin 24
Matchima

11

Ruam Jai

9

Pracharaj

5

Total

480

Source: Matichon, December 29, 2007.

During the PPP government, PAD protests continued. The election had essentially been a
referendum on Thaksin and the military government. After winning the new election, the PPP
quickly moved to reverse the actions and policies of the previous (military) government. First as
Minster of Foreign Affairs, Thaksin’s lawyer, Noppodon Pattama reinstituted Thaksin’s passport
that the previous Abhisit government had revoked. Relations prior to and after his removal,
Thaksin and longtime Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, had developed a positive rapport.
Hun Sen angered many Thais, including the Abhisit government by befriending and even
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employing fugitive Thaksin as an economic advisor.46 The PAD, fuelled by anti-Hun Sen and
racist rhetoric against Cambodia, continued to insult and even claim that the joint application to
UNESCO was motivated less by diplomacy than a projected land development deal to build
casinos.47
During Thaksin’s tenure as prime minister, Thai and Cambodian ties had moved closer.
This was the result of both he and Prime Minister Hun Sen close friendship that reflected mutual
economic interests as the former invested in casinos in Cambodia. After the 2006 coup d’etat, the
military oversaw the development of the 2007 Constitution, The regime also ensured the TRT’s
dissolution and suspension of 111 of its senior executive members. The election results placed
long-time political veteran and Thaksin ally, Samak Sundarej in power as premier. Previously
out of the country, on February 28, 2008, Thaksin returned to face corruption charges. The PPP
held talks to reform the 2007 constitution, which they believed was particularly hostile to them.
This caused the PAD to reignite its protests against the government.
On June 24, 2008, the PAD submitted a plaint to the Court of First Instance in Bangkok
asking the court to rule an injunction on the joint-communiqué. Four days later the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs. The Samak government responded by questioning aloud whether the court
had gone beyond its jurisdiction.48 Discussing related critiques by academics, Pawakapan (2013,
68) quotes Thammasat University law professor Worajet Pakeerat’s assessment of the decision,
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On October 21, 2008, the Supreme Court Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Holders of Political Positions convicted
Thaksin of corruption of using his position to help his wife buy land and sentenced him to 2 years in absentia.
47 The PAD and the Democrat Party who used each other to protest Thaksin would later pay for this. During the 2009 ASEAN
summit in Cha-am, Hun Sen stated that Cambodia would not extradite Thaksin if he remained there. As expected, this angered
the Thai hosts.
48 Commenting on the role of the court, President Ackaratorn stated, “It's like we're making plenty of merit for people every day,”
Quoted in, ‘The court with legal teeth’ July 14, 2008. Bangkok Post.
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“The Administrative Court had no jurisdiction over the case because the joint-communiqué was
the work of the government and not an administrative order.”49
In response to a petition by the opposition Democrat Party, on July 8th the Constitutional
Court ruled that the joint communiqué was unconstitutional because it was in fact an
international treaty, and according to Article 190 of the 2007 Constitution, needed to be
submitted to parliament for approval. Criticizing this decision, Professor Worajet commented
that the court’s ruling that the joint-communiqué might have resulted in loss of Thai sovereignty
was speculative and did not reflect article 190 of the constitution which requires parliamentary
approval when a treaty results in loss of territory.50 In the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s
ruling, Minister of Foreign Affairs Noppadon Pattama resigned to accept full responsibility.
On September 9, 2008 the Constitutional Court ruled to remove Samak from office for
corruption due to a conflict of interest from his hosting of a weekly cooking show. The PPP was
on notice. Pasuk and Baker (2009, 327) wrote, “In the nine months following the installation of
the Samak government, court judgments played a role in politics in a way never before witnessed
in Thailand.” After Samak was removed for violating the constitution, next in line was interim
prime minister Mr. Somchai Wongsawat—Thaksin’s brother-in-law. On December 1, 2008 the
Constitutional Court ruled that the PPP, Chart Thai and Matchima were all guilty of election
violations. In addition to banning the parties, the Constitutional Court also suspended 111 of the
PPP’s senior executives from political activity for five years. With the PPP removed, on
December 17, 2008, the Democrats then formed a new government. Led by Prime Minister
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Woraject ultimately argued that the Constitutional Court should be responsible.
Interestingly, the joint-communiqué only addressed the temple and not the disputed surrounding area. Thus, it was not in the
jurisdiction of either court.
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Abhisit Vejajiwa, the Democrat-coalition gained support from those scorned by Thaksin; most
notably Buriram province veteran Newin Chidchob and his Bhumjaithai Party faction.
On December 29, 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled to permanently revoke
the joint-communiqué based on the grounds that it failed to receive parliamentary approval. In
interviews with officials directly involved in the case, they offer a different perspective on the
factors that went into the decision. Both current and former judges are adamant that the Supreme
Administrative Court’s ruling to overturn the joint-communiqué was influenced by its senior
leadership whose actions were politically-motivated. According to a current Supreme
Administrative Court judge with direct knowledge of the chamber’s proceedings, the Supreme
Administrative Court’s original decision was going to be in favor of the now-deposed Samak
government. However, once President Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat became aware of the impending
decision, he forced the chamber to resign and established a new one comprised of judges that
were anti-Thaksin. As a result, the new chamber upheld the original injunction.51 In an interview
discussing the case, a former Supreme Administrative Court judge remarked, “Look at the Kao
Pra Viharn case. As soon as Ackaratorn learned that the original court had ruled 3-2 in favor of
the MFA, he made the chamber resign before announcing the decision. He established a new
chamber, and they ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Although this was widely known and even
reported in the media, nothing ever happened. When people brought the case to the (National)
Counter Corruption Commission nothing was done.”52 President Ackaratorn’s actions were
reported to the then Counter Corruption Commission (then renamed from the original National
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Anti-Corruption Commission). The media reported the change of chambers and the
commission’s investigation.53 Under the Abhisit government however, the NCCC’s investigation
of Ackaratorn’s actions was never concluded.
Consequences from the Supreme Administrative Court’s revocation of the jointcommuniqué resonated beyond the immediate parties. When the PPP held power, the PAD had
made the temple dispute one of their strongest criticisms of Thaksin and the subsequent Samak
government whom they accused of being a proxy. Seeking to align themselves with the popular
anti-Thaksin movement, several members in the Democrat Party began to align with the PAD. In
addition, now in power, senior executives in the Democrat Party made several vitriolic
comments about Thaksin and his relationship with Prime Minister Hun Sen. As a result, relations
between Cambodia and Thailand rapidly deteriorated. As a fugitive living in exile, Thaksin still
met with party members in Cambodia much to the irritation of the Abhisit government. Frequent
requests by the Abhisit government for Thaksin’s extradition were soundly rejected by
Cambodian officials. Insults and vitriolic rhetoric between cabinet officials in both countries
ensued and culminated when, in October 2008, Kasit Piromya who would be the Minister of
Foreign Affairs two months later, called Hun Sen a “gangster.”54 In addition, the areas
surrounding the temple became militarized with frequent attacks on local residents followed by
deadly border exchanges between militaries ensued this included several losses of life and
economic losses.
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Ultimately, this dispute would spill over into the international arena, as Cambodia
submitted the dispute to the ICJ seeking clarification of their original 1962 ruling. The Court
would later rule that the temple and the surrounding land belonged to Cambodia.55 What began
as a dispute between two opposing parties in Thailand ended up leading to a foreign policy
disaster between two neighboring countries. Indeed, the Supreme Administrative Court’s
decisions exacerbated tensions between two countries which eventually ended up being resolved
by the ICJ. This demonstrates that while judicialization can originated domestically it can elevate
to the international level.
Bad Bosses and Significant Losses: Thawil Bpleensri vs.
Yingluck Shinawatra (Court of First Instance decision: 847/2556)
(Supreme Administrative Court decision: 33/2557)
In June 2011, the Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s cabinet transferred then National
Security Council Secretary Mr. Thawil Bpleensri to the Office of the Prime Minister as Deputy
Assistant Prime Minister. A career bureaucrat and appointee from the previous Abhisit
government, Mr. Bpleensri was a career bureaucrat who expected to remain in his position
despite the change in government. However, the new government under Thaksin’s younger
sister, Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, decided to appoint former National Police Chief
Wichean Potephosree to replace Mr. Bpleensri. This decision allowed for Mr. Priewphan
Damapong, a Shinawatra family member, to replace Wichean as National Security Council
Secretary.
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The cabinet approved the order to transfer Mr. Bpleensri’s to the Office of the Prime
Minister. While technically not a demotion with respect to rank, Thawil’s new position would
not have the same responsibilities as he had in his previous position. Given that Mr. Bpleensri
was an appointee from the previous Democrat government, his new role as Deputy Prime
Minister in the Office of Prime Minister would depend on the Prime Minister’s delegation of
tasks. In an interview with Mr. Bpleensri, he stated, “I considered the transfer to be a demotion.
It was not fair, and it was not based on sufficient justification.”56 Mr. Bpleensri stated that he
believed that the cabinet’s decision was not based on merit and that he initially appealed the
decision to the Merit Service Protection Board. However, according to Mr. Bpleensri, the
Board’s decision was a further source of injustice.
Based on a controversial (and illegal) “double vote” by the President of the Merit Service
Protection Board committee that Mr. Bpleensri stated that he was more determined to appeal
cases to the Administrative Court of First Instance. Mr. Bpleensri stated that he ultimately chose
to use the Administrative Court because he had no other option, and that he believed that they
would agree with his reasoning. “Prior to using the Court, I talked with my family and they gave
me their support. I also had the support of my colleagues who too had faced similar injustices
during their career.”57 Discussing his earlier experience with the Merit Service Protection Board,
he confided, “I was really disappointed with them. They purposely tried to get me to accept the
cabinet decision and just go away. I knew my cause was just, so I didn’t.”
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In April 2012, Mr. Bpleensri’s submitted his plaint to the Court of First Instance in
Bangkok and attracted significant media coverage that was overly sympathetic.58 Projected as a
victim of injustice and corruption, Mr. Bpleensri’s case was known throughout the bureaucracy.
On May 31, 2012, the court ruled in his favor and ordered his reinstatement as Secretary to the
National Security Council. In an interview in the aftermath of his initial victory, Mr. Bpleensri
stated, “ If Yingluck does not appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court and allows the Court
of First Instance ruling to stand, I would move on and drop everything.” When asked what would
happen if the government appeals, he, answered, “I will be forced to go to the NACC. It is clear
that my transfer was based on corruption.”
The Yingluck government appealed the Court of First Instance’s ruling. On March 7,
2014, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the original ruling and ordered that Mr.
Bpleensri be reinstated to his original position in 45 days. During that time however, questions
about the motives behind the transfer had been raised as had strategies about legal action.
Opponents of Yingluck believed that corruption motivated the transfer. The National Counter
Corruption Commission agreed and submitted the case to the Constitutional Court. A few days
following the Supreme Administrative Court’s ruling, 27 senators submitted the case to the
Constitutional Court requesting that Prime Minister be removed from office for the unlawful
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transfer order.59 On May 7th, 2014, the Constitutional Court removed her and several cabinet
ministers who signed the order.60
In another interview after the decision, Mr. Bpleensri stated that while he was relieved
that the Supreme Administrative Court ruled in his favor, he was disappointed that the length of
time it took for the decision to be made. According to him, “ I believe that the Supreme
Administrative Court was political because it took so long to make an obvious decision. The
government’s appeal did not even offer any new evidence to show that an appeal was warranted.
The court purposely waited until it was near time for me to retire to rule in my favor. I am
retiring in a few months.”61
According to a senior Administrative Court of First Instance judge, before the Supreme
Administrative Court announced its decision, all of the senior judges from the Court of First
Instance and the Supreme Administrative Court met to discuss its potential implications. All of
the judges agreed that the ruling had to be careful to avoid perceptions of any bias given the
political environment.62 This particular judge expressed disappointment that the court failed,
“The senators used our decision to go to the Constitutional Court. The media wrongly viewed
our decision as demonstrating that the Yingluck was corrupt. The senators then went to the
Constitutional Court seeking her to be guilty. We [the Supreme Administrative Court] avoided
the question of whether his [Thawil’s] transfer was politically-motivated. It [the Supreme
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Administrative Court’s ruling] simply stated that the government didn’t provide a convincing
justification for his transfer based on the Civil Service Commission Act. We were upset with the
Constitutional Court because they made it seem like our decisions were related. The
Administrative Court never said that Yingluck was corrupt.”63
In sum, what seemed to be a routine transfer evolved into another judicial-led removal of
a Thai prime minister without the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision the Constitutional
Court ‘s eventual decision to remove her from office. To think that another government was
removed based on an administrative order points to the court’s relevance to questions of politics
and the endurance of judicialization. The Thawil Bpleensri case illustrates that in Thailand even
a simple unlawful transfer order can evolve into something much more. It also shows that the
Administrative Court is certainly aware of the politically-charged context in which it operates.
Judges from the Supreme Administrative and Courts of First Instance met to ensure that the
former’s decision would not incur negative reactions from the public and, their overall
reputation. For Mr. Bpleensri, the desire to challenge an injustice led to much more than even he
could have originally fathomed. This episode also demonstrates that bureaucrats are now more
aware of their rights than they were in the past and may be more willing to use court if necessary.
Based on most recent statistics available, the Administrative Court is becoming a court where
personnel disputes in the bureaucracy are resolved. The court has even created a specialized
division that is specifically responsible for adjudicating personnel disputes within the
bureaucracy.
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Conclusion
The cases in this chapter illustrate that the judicialization of Thai politics has effects that
permeate society, politics, and economics. Decisions by both judges and individuals were
motivated by a host of factors. First the failure of checks and balances, especially within the
Senate-appointed institutions, made the Administrative Court attractive as an “instrument of
resistance” for government opponents. In the case involving Thawil Pliensri, because an existing
institution like the MPSC had failed to produce what he believed to be a fair decision, in his
opinion, this made the decision to elevate their grievance to the level of the Administrative Court
a necessity. Thawil Pleeinsri made it clear that had the MPSC provided a fair ruling, he likely
would have not have continued to fight.64
The larger political environment began to affect the court’s leadership, who then started
to influence other members of the Court. According to some judges, Supreme Administrative
Court, President Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat’s decisionmaking was anti-Thaksin crusade. Prior to
the EGAT decision, the court managed to avoid the being politicized that the Constitutional
Court and other independent institutions created by 1997 Constitution failed to. Until then, the
Administrative Court was relatively little known and deemed irrelevant to political questions.
Even after the EGAT decision, the Thai media (which was largely critical of Thaksin and his
government, due to his repression of journalists) went so far as to characterize the Administrative

Interview on May 21, 2012. Interestingly, in an interview with another senior bureaucrat who also won their case faced the
same circumstance as the MPSC subcommittee’s double-voting to defeat. This bureaucrat too stated that this injustice was
motivation to elevate the case to the level of the Administrative Court. Interview on May 22, 2012.
64

238
Court as one of the last beacons of integrity that the 1997 Constitution had intended to be truly
independent.
The Thaksin government’s defeat in the EGAT case illustrates the Administrative Court’s
involvement in judicialization. Despite what the mainstream print media would characterize as
courage in the face of an increasingly authoritarian prime minister, the court was motivated by a
concern for maintaining its independence and weakening a government that its leadership felt
hostile to it. While the decision was celebrated by onlookers and opponents of Thaksin, this
represented a turning point in the court’s short history.
Third, the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision nullifying the rerun of elections in
the 2006 national election illustrated a transition from judicialization to politicalization. While
judicalization had until then occurred, politicalization of the court came with the involvement of
King Bhumpiol. When the monarch’s interests are directly or indirectly vested, the court, like all
Thai institutions, will acquiesce.65
The behavior of former President of the Supreme Administrative Court Dr. Ackaratorn
Chularat was critical and brings into greater focus the need to consider the importance of internal
politicalization in discussions about judicialization. The question of independence is paramount.
In closely critiquing the literature on judicialization one is compelled to conclude that prior
studies had largely limited themselves to raising questions involving factors external to the
workings of the court when it was in session. The cases in this chapter demonstrate that the
judicialization of politics literature should take into greater account the importance of internal
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politics at work within the Court’s chambers, and, in particular, how its complex chemistry of
interactions affects the direction the Court took in decision-making during recent turbulent times.
For example, all judges interviewed acknowledged that leadership is important. As the
most visible and outspoken representative of the court, the President of the Supreme
Administrative Court is important. In addition to administrative/technical responsibilities, he
ensures that the Supreme Administrative Court and all of the Courts of First Instance perform
their duties with probity and efficiency.66 One of the key responsibilities of the President is to
serve almost as a public spokesman. In many ways the Court’s reputation is dependent on the
stance taken by the President’s behavior. One judge from the Court of Instance stated, “Court
leadership is important. If the President is seen as political, then the court will also be viewed as
political.”67 Discussing the significance of the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, a
former senior Supreme Administrative Court judge stated, “If lower level judges want to get
promoted, they feel compelled to show loyalty to him [the President], even if he is wrong. The
President sets the entire direction of the court. If he is always in the media for bad things, then
the people will see the court as bad.”68
This affirms what previous judges expressed about the importance of the President’s
vision for the court. For example, one judge at the Court of First Instance stated, “While the first
President [Dr. Ackaratorn] focused more on promoting the court in the public eye and was more
“political”, I think the current President (Hassavut) was less active in the media. He [Hassavut]
has focused on the court’s ability to adjudicate cases more quickly. Now judges want to complete
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cases as quickly as possible. He wants us to be quick but accurate.”69 When asked whether he
and other judges are concerned that an emphasis on speed may reduce the quality of decisions,
given the lack of judges, a senior Court of First Instance judge acknowledged, “This could occur,
but this was the new focus of the Court due to some criticism that cases took too long. One area
that would be affected is the amount of time judges spend investigating cases.”70 A judge from a
Court of First Instance judge located in the South stated, “The new President wants us to make
decisions quicker, but unless there is an increase in the number of judges, there is no way to
prevent the quality of decisions from being negatively affected.” Understanding the court’s
reputation for making slow decisions, a current Supreme Administrative Court judge said, “The
people are waiting for our decisions. We have to do so quickly. The people are waiting and
counting on us.”71 Most of the judges who commented on the leadership, acknowledged
differences between the first and second Supreme Administrative Court Presidents, all expressed
relief that the court was not as active in the media as before.
Former Supreme Administrative Court President, Dr. Ackaratorn Chularat’s tenure was
one filled with controversy. To expect otherwise would have perhaps been unrealistic given the
larger political environment at that time. In a country where mass protests against an unpopular
and increasingly authoritarian yet democratically-elected prime minister became increasingly
common, to expect the Administrative Court to have remained on the “sidelines” when none of
the other of the 1997 Constitution’s independent institutions were afforded that luxury would
have made Dr. Ackaratorn a legend. Perhaps it would be unfair to place complete blame on him
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for the Court’s fate, especially since Thaksin had managed to control the Constitutional Court
composition even after a favorable ruling in 2001. Even if Ackaratorn would not have been
personally invested in challenging Thaksin, it is hard to believe that he would have managed to
“steer the court clear” of politics after King Bhumipol’s address.
Likewise, while many Thai politics scholars believe that the King politicized the court to
do his bidding, Administrative Court judges confirmed that internally, it was already pro- and
anti- Thaksin. The King’s remarks solidified the direction that the court would take in future
decisions related to Thaksin and those who were perceived affiliated. The series of cases
discussed in the preceding pages demonstrated that, internally, more conservative motivations
can be the underlying motive for making ultimately progressive decisions.
This chapter has also demonstrated the evolution of the court. Previously more united,
tensions between opponents of Dr. Ackaratorn and Hassavut have now started to manifest
divisions inside the Court openly. Shortly after the May 2014 coup d’etat, then President
Hassavut Vititviriyakul attempted to submit a draft to the military-appointed parliament that
would have removed power from the JCAC to administer disciplinarian acts against internal
ethics violations.72 However, once judges became aware of the proposed legislation, they were
incensed. On September 17, 2014, more than one hundred judges and administrative staff walked
out of the court as a sign of protest against President Hassavut in protesting his attempt to submit
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to the National Legislative Assembly an amendment modifying the JCAC’s prerogative in
managing human resources including the appraisal and discipline of judges without consulting
and gaining approval from the General Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Administrative
Court.73
Discussing the event, a senior Court of First Instance judge stated that the majority of
judges were against Hassavut and wanted him to resign and to take full responsibility, or to at
least force the Director-General of the Office of the Administrative Court, Mr. Direkrit
Jenkrongtham, to resign.74 He also stated that Hassavut was close to Ackaratorn, whom many
blame for damaging the court’s reputation. When this did not happen, the Court eventually
created an ad-hoc disciplinary committee and suspended Hassavut. Much like the rest of the
country, the Administrative Court’s internal political divisions continue to persist. This indicates
that judicialization will remain for the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Although writing about a United States of America that was still in its infancy, De
Tocqueville (1835) noticed that rarely were there any political questions that did not eventually
become judicial ones. As this dissertation has demonstrated, De Tocqueville’s observation
resonates with what has been occurring over the last fifteen years in Thailand. Since the 1997
Constitution of Thailand assigned judiciaries with the responsibility to oversee elected and nonelected institutions, courts have in turn determined important political, social and economic
questions. In some cases, the judiciary has made decisions independent of external influence
while in other instances, the court has been under the sway of the monarchy albeit this is rare.
This study of judicialization of politics in the Administrative Court has demonstrated that
both plaintiffs and judges are paramount, given that the phenomenon is dependent on both. As
the results from several public opinion surveys make clear, Thais are likely to be more open to
using the Administrative Court when they have disputes with bureaucrats and/or government
policies. First, Thais still hold the judiciary in much higher esteem than elected institutions,
political representatives, and appointed officials acting in one official capacity or another in
governing the nation. This is noteworthy given the instability that has characterized the country’s
politics over the last decade, in which the judiciary has become an active player. Second, that the
judiciary remains more positively perceived than elected institutions may speak to
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judicialization’s endurance. Despite instances of the monarchy’s politicalization of the
Administrative Court, the court remains active—an indication of citizens’ trust.Third, the
Administrative Court has proven that judicialization can occur even during military dictatorships.
The current injunction of a television station, Peace TV, from an opponent of the Chan-ochoa
military junta television program is a bold act in a period where basic human rights remain under
assault. This reflects the reality that judicialization is fluid and that, despite other cases in which
the court rejected attempts to challenge the regime, judges rule strategically in the cases they
agree to accept or reject. The activities and decisions of the courts are responsible for
adjudicating grievances within and against the bureaucracy. The courts encapsulate the ideals of
the rule of law and individual human rights. That regime opponents are willing to use the
Administrative Court to challenge the regime speaks to the validity of judicialization as an
important research topic.
Interviews with former plaintiffs reveal that they are willing to sue out of the desire to
receive justice and that the benefits of using the court outweigh the costs. The explanation for the
latter primarily resides within the court’s institutional provisions. First, the court does not require
individuals to hire a lawyer and provides free legal counsel. Second, the court offers a generous
timeframe for the aggrieved to sue. Finally, all of the plaintiffs interviewed stated that the court
was one of “last resort”, as it was used after exhaustion of other measures to adjudicate
grievances. The court’s formal rules offer the best explanation because the court is only
accessible after all other means have been employed.
Moreover, for an environmental rights advocacy lawyer who has represented hundreds of
individuals in as many cases, the court presents an opportunity to hold the government
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accountable. Through plaintiff victories, which were unimaginable in years prior to its
establishment, the bureaucracy has to be more conscious of citizens needs. This also applies to
politicians whose policies have become important benchmarks of their success. While in the
lawyer’s opinion, most Thais are still relatively uninformed about the court, their knowledge is
increasing. For opponents of ruling governments, whether at the national or subnational level, the
Administrative Courts offers opportunities for those who lose an election still to win victories. A
Court of First Instance judge located in the northern region, stated, “Nowadays, in local
government cases, even presidents of PAO will encourage local people to sue. This is a strategy
used to place blame on the ministries in Bangkok and to protest their control over policy. Local
governments pass the blame onto the ministries in Bangkok.”1
For the senior bureaucrats interviewed in this study, their decision to use the
Administrative Court represented the final opportunity to receive justice. Ironically, despite
senior bureaucrats’ victories, all believe that the court intentionally crafted their victories into
pyrrhic ones. Specifically, the court’s decisions were strategically submitted close to the date of
their retirement in order to satisfy both parties. Giving plaintiffs a victory in the form of reinstatement would demonstrate that the court was able to provide justice and, providing their
decision was close to their retirement, reduced the costs associated with the loss. Likewise, the
environmental rights lawyer is also convinced that decisions reflect popular sentiment although
on more rarified occasions. Further, recognizing that the courts are susceptible to outside
influence, the lawyer admitted to employing several strategies to pressure judges, such as using
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the media to attract widespread sympathy for the particular cause and mobilizing local
communities to protest at the court.
This study has also demonstrated that gaining access to judges themselves can help better
understand the court’s behavior. Interviews with judges reveal several truths. First, despite
initially professing an absolute commitment to providing justice only, most would later make
apparent that they consider paramount the court’s overall reputation, the anticipated reactions of
the disputant parties, and the institutional context in which they operate when making decisions.
However, there have been serious departures from the ideal when the courts cave in to outside
political forces. It is in such instances when judicialization accedes to the forces of
politicalization. This points to the need to understand how judges reveal their biases and the
factors that could compromise their independence. In the case of the Administrative Court, the
monarchy has proven to be the only factor able to directly dictate judges’ decision-making.
Chapter 7 demonstrated that while judicialization requires judges to be able to make
decisions independent of external influence, this does not mean that they are not political actors.
Interviews with Administrative Court judges prove that they are all too cognizant of the political
climate and the need to navigate deftly. While all of the judges that I interviewed did not admit
to any direct wrongdoing, they did not believe that all of their colleagues maintained the same
level of professional integrity. Interviews with judges have raised several questions about their
decision-making. Their concern about the court’s reputation is a concern for survival in
autocratic times. This study has also shown the court’s evolution. From a relatively quiet
beginning, the court became more politically relevant. This was no doubt a consequence of the
larger political environment, but also senior leadership’s behavior. Interviews with several
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Administrative Court judges revealed that prior to King Bhumipol’s April 2006 speech to the
court, the Supreme Administrative Court’s leadership had already begun an anti-Thaksin
campaign months earlier. It was former Supreme Administrative Court President, Dr. Ackaraton
Chularat, who spearheaded efforts not only to accept the EGAT case but also to ensure that the
court delivered an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs.
According to several Supreme Administrative Court judges, both active and retired, it
was Dr. Ackaraton’s conviction that he was protecting the nation from Thaksin that led him to go
to great lengths to ensure that an important policy decision would be a defeat for the Prime
Minister and his TRT government. Perceived by Courts of First Instance and Supreme
Administrative Courts judges as being “overzealous” in his decision to accept the case given it
was already beyond the 90 day limit, the legal-standing of some plaintiffs were questionable.
Most stated that this was the first case where they believed the court became “political.” This is
an important reality. First, although it was not the first time the court was involved in a decision
that directly challenged the popular but increasingly divisive prime minister’s interests, it was the
first time that judges stated that the court became “political.” According to several judges, this
case began to create tensions within a court that was until then relatively united. Judges
expressed the opinion that the Administrative Court has not recovered from that position, as
divisions among pro-Thaksin, anti-Thaksin and neutral groups still persist.
After Dr. Ackaratorn stepped down as president of the Supreme Administrative Court in
October 2010, several administrative court judges that I interviewed stated that many judges
viewed his successor, then president Hassavut Vititviriyakul, to be an acolyte, even though the

248
latter had a different personality and judicial emphasis.2 Hassavut’s unpopularity came to a head
when the media reported that he had written two recommendation letters to the Royal Thai
Police in hopes of influencing the promotion of an officer who was the friend of a family
member. When asked in interviews, judges stated the entire court was embarrassed and became
angry once they discovered that President Hassavut had attempted to usurp the JCAC’s General
Assembly disciplinary powers to decide whether he and the Secretary-General of the Office of
the Administrative Court Direkrit Jenkrongtham should be suspended and/or expelled. This
attempt made his suspension and eventual expulsion all the more likely. Eventually, the JCAC
voted 8:3 to suspend Hassavut indefinitely in March 2015; in late September 2015 he was
formally expelled.3
Second, the 2005 EGAT case provides new insight into the various charges filed because
observers like Leyland (2011, 2009, 2006) and Mutebi (2006) believe that the court’s November
2005 injunction was motivated by a commitment to professionalism. In addition, the decision
was popular and signaled an important victory for unions and consumers. The court’s motives
were inspired by extra-legal motives to limit the activities of the prime minister and political
parties. This demonstrated less of the judges’ commitment to upholding the principles of
jurisprudence than an instance of strategic political motives on their part. But this does not mean
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that the court is not independent. At a time when other independent institutions, like the Electoral
Commission of Thailand, the Constitutional Court and the National Anti-Corruption
Commission were compromised by the Senate’s ability to appoint pro-Thaksin members, the
Administrative Court demonstrated its independence as evidenced by its ability to challenge
Thaksin that led to his government policy defeats.
This dissertation has also shown that the separation of politics from governmental
administration is no longer easy. Much like the contrasting color of opposing members’ shirts, in
Thailand, legal challenges ranging from transfer orders, the privatization of state-owned
enterprises, or mandatory health and environmental regulations for major industrial projects are
perfunctorily reduced to technical questions. As their responses have made clear, for many
plaintiffs, their cases represent opportunities to resolve grievances and to challenge superiors in
charge of protecting the public and the government itself. Indeed, the Administrative Court
represents an opportunity for individuals to challenge those parties once deemed free from
accountability: policymakers and bureaucrats.
This dissertation has demonstrated that judicialization and politicalization of the judiciary
are not mutually exclusive. The former demands autonomy, as evinced by institutional
safeguards for judges in reaching decisions without fear of retaliation. As the chapter on case
studies has demonstrated, judges have the necessary safeguards to make decisions and have ruled
against ruling governments both democratic and authoritarian. With respect to the current
regime, on July 17, 2015 the Central Administrative Court ruled against the National
Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission’s (NBTC) decision to revoke the license of
Peace TV. The Administrative Court issued an injunction against NBTC (the junta) and in favor
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of Peace TV, a popular Red-Shirt television station that the UDD leadership controlled. The
NBTC claimed that Peace TV had breached the terms of its licensing contract as well as the
current junta’s broadcasting rules.4 The importance of this decision is that not only clearly went
against the military’s wishes, but the court stated that it would also rule on the NBTC’s authority
to censor programs.
This Peace TV episode is not an isolated incident. On October 31, 2014, the Supreme
Administrative Court dismissed a lawsuit against former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra
concerning a water management project that her administration approved in 2012.5 Representing
45 villagers, the Stop Global Warming Association specifically named the former prime minister
as well as the Strategic Committee for Water Resources Management, the National Water and
Flood Management Policy Committee and the Water and Flood Committee as defendants guilty
of malfeasance because of the lack of public hearings. In June 2013 the Central Administrative
Court had previously ruled in plaintiffs’ favor by requiring the then Shinawatra government to
conduct additional public hearings. Since the Constitutional Court voted her out of office, the
former prime minister is still facing several lawsuits for financial losses attributed to several
policies under her administration. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case by
arguing that the plan had never been implemented and therefore there could not be any claim of
compensation. Given that the current military government has successful facilitated lawsuits
against the former prime minister, that the Supreme Administrative Court has made a decision
for an opponent of the Chan-Ocha government speaks to the court’s independence.

4
5

Red Shirt TV Allowed to Broadcast Again, Bangkok Post. July 17, 2015.

‘Court dismiss water case against Yingluck’, The Bangkok Post, October 31, 2014 and ‘Court throws out Yingluck water case’,
The Bangkok Post, November, 1, 2014.
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Finally, the Court of First Instance in Songkhla ruled in November 2011 that the Royal
Thai Army and the Ministry of Defense compensate Two Yala Rajabhat University students, Mr.
Amizi Manak and Mr. Isamaae Tae 250, 000 baht and 255, 000 baht for torture suffered at hands
of the Yala 11th Task Force. In 2008 officers arrested and tortured both men for nine days.
Arguing that the amount that the court awarded was insufficient, both appealed to the Supreme
Administrative Court. The court began to hear the appeal on January 13, 2015.6 Given the
context in which the court faces, accepting an appeal in which the victims are requesting more
compensation from the military for a case of torture is truly novel.7 These examples are
important as given the context of a military dictatorship that has curtailed basic human rights,
such as freedom of speech, expression and assembly that the court made, the court’s actions
demonstrates judicialization’s fluidity.
This dissertation has made several contributions to the existing judicialization of politics
literature. First, it has demonstrated that judicialization and politicalization are not mutually
exclusive. Rather the two competing forces are dependent on context; and thus, this study
highlights the fluid character of both. This mirrors Moustafa’s (2007; 2008) characterization of
Egypt, where judicial independence was afforded exclusively in cases involving property rights
for the expressed purpose of creating market confidence for investors. While there was issue
spillover in Egypt that led to the authoritarian regime being challenged by the very courts it had
established, it does demonstrate that judicialization and politicalization are issue-specific and can

6
7

‘Torture case reaches Supreme Administrative Court’ The Bangkok Post, January 13, 2015.

In addition, on August 23, 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Prime Minister Office compensate the family
of Mr. Ashari Sam-ae 534,301 baht including 7.5 percent interest within 60 days. Mr. Sam-ae died while in custody of the
Internal Security Operations Command in Yala. For more, see, ‘PMO dealt landmark compensation defeat’, The Bangkok Post,
August 23, 2015.
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take place within the same court. Likewise, at different points, the Administrative Court of
Thailand has been more aggressive in making decisions that affect important policy and political
questions, either on its own volition (judicialization) or at the behest of other actors
(politicalization).
With respect to the politicalization of the Administrative Court, the underlying factor was
the proclamation of the His Majesty King Bhumipol who intended to move the nation beyond the
political impasse. No individual or institution in Thailand has ever been free from the influence
and desires of the monarchy when its interests are peaked on a certain issue. Even judges
acknowledge that cases involving the Crown Property Bureau are usually avoided by the court. 8
When the monarchy’s interests are not involved, judicialization is the norm. Despite instances of
internal politicalization, as evidenced by Dr. Ackaratorn’s decision to influence the court’s
decision in the EGAT and Prasat Khao Pra Viharn decisions, the Court remained independent of
external influence.9 Their desire to be respected and trusted by all motivated the court to seek a
compromise and to engage in tactics, such as delaying decisions and changing chambers.
Cultural values of compromising, avoidance and waiting for time to resolve issues are embodied
in Thai social behavior and bear on judicial matters.
Second, and related, this study has better distinguished the difference between courts that
are biased versus those that lack independence. While the judicial politics literature has
convincingly proven that, like every political institution, judges have their particular biases, this

8

When I asked a lawyer about cases that the court avoids, he mentioned this. A judge from the Court of First Instance, also
confirmed this.
9 This dissertation also contributes to the judicialization literature by highlighting the importance of internal politicalization. By
illustrating the politics involved in decisionmaking and within the court, it also contributes to the understanding that the judiciary
is far from a unitary actor.
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does not mean their decisions are not “theirs.” Determining judges’ values can better allow
scholars to analyze and predict the court’s behavior depending on a particular context. Not all
Administrative Court judges are conservative. In fact, most express a responsibility to protect
citizens’ rights in the face of an abusive bureaucracy.
Third, this dissertation has demonstrated that judicalization can produce progressive
outcomes. McCargo’s (2015) call to observers of Thai politics is timely in understanding the role
of the judiciary and, in particular, the extent to which they produce progressive or conservative
outcomes. While he demonstrated that the several courts have, when under the influence of the
monarchy, made decisions that have supported demos-limiting and frankly anti-Thaksin rulings,
he does acknowledge that conclusions have to be contingent on a the particular case in question.
The example from this study, affirms the importance of his advice. But as the EGAT case
demonstrated, it is crucial to know what transpired during decision-making. Another contribution
to the judicialization literature that this study makes is that it demonstrates that progressive
decisions can result from conservative motives. As the cases discussed made clear, because
judges are strategic actors, that opaque operational dimension complicates one’s ability to
deduce their values from their final case decisions.
While all of the Administrative Court judges believe that the court assists citizens in
holding the bureaucracy accountable, this does not preclude them from making decisions that
appease opposing parties whenever possible. Many stated that ever since the court’s inception,
Thais are no longer intimidated by the bureaucracy/bureaucrats and that the court serves as a
source of justice for the public. One judge stated that the court tries to be a “court of the people”
where people can trust the court and feel welcome.
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It is likely that judicialization will persist despite recent democratic and authoritarian
reversals. While the current military dictatorship takeover has resulted in another setback to Thai
democracy, eventually the soldiers will return to the barracks. The eventual re-introduction of
democratic governance will likely produce an even more restrictive role for elected institutions.
This is the result of a future constitution that will further weaken the aforementioned
institutions—similar to what transpired with the 2007 military government and subsequent
constitution. Still, it is unlikely that the next constitution will weaken the Administrative Court.
After all, it was the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision that ruled that the Yingluck
Shinawatra cabinet had illegally transferred former National Security Council Secretary-General
Tawin Bpleeinsri to a position of her choice. The Constitutional Court then used that decision as
the pretext to dismiss her and the cabinet members from office. Again, the Administrative Court
has proven to be an institution that allows for regime opponents to achieve victories.
The Judicialization of Thai Politics: Future Research and Recommendations
Future research on the judicialization of Thai politics from the perspective of the
Administrative Court should focus on the impact of the court upon intra-bureaucratic
relationships, especially with respect to grievances related to human resources and controversial
administrative orders. Interviews with officers from the Administrative Court responsible for
offering several training modules to bureaucrats about the court’s operations and limitations
indicate that the majority interests are aimed at challenging superiors in the bureaucracy. Finally,
as one of the first studies that focused on the Administrative Court as a political institution, this
dissertation has pioneered an attempt to raise as many additional research questions as it has
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answered.10 This is to be expected. This study has sought to highlight ways in which the courts,
especially the Administrative Courts, matter in Thailand.
The Administrative Court is still relatively young. Future research could direct its
attention on the extent to which the court strengthens or undermines whatever regime is in
power. Furthermore, the extent to which the counter-majoritarian difficulty can provide a
solution to a political impasse that has prevented Thai democracy and authoritarian regimes from
being consolidated may determine the extent of continued judicialization. The court’s ability to
provide access and victories to losers of electoral politics may reduce the implications of defeat
that may be cause for it to remain and potentially stabilize the current tension. As we have seen
from Thailand and much of Southeast Asia, elections alone are neither guarantor of quality
democracy nor regime legitimacy. Future studies should research the extent to which
judicialization can improve the quality of governance of administration as well as the
transparency and accountability of government. Furthermore, depending on the decision, studies
would do well to examine the extent to which judicialization undermine those respective
regimes. It is hoped that this study has set the stage for expanded research on the Thai judiciary
and its relationship with and impact on the state and society.

10

For example, the judicialization of politics literature presumes that independence from external actors is necessary but it does
not address the question of internal independence that proved important in the Administrative Court’s decisions. Future studies
on judicialization and, especially those that adopt the court-centric approach, should consider the degree to which judges can be
subject to internal interference or internal politicalization.
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